Platforms of memory:social media and digital memory work by Smit, Pieter Hendrik
  
 University of Groningen
Platforms of memory
Smit, Pieter Hendrik
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Smit, P. H. (2018). Platforms of memory: Social media and digital memory work. [Groningen]: University of
Groningen.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




Cover design: Sylvia van Schie (http://www.sylviavanschie.nl/)
Lay-out and print by: ProefschriftMaken // www.proefschriftmaken.nl
ISBN (print): 978-94-034-0403-5
ISBN (electronic): 978-94-034-0402-8
Copyright © 2018, Pieter Hendrik Smit
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or intro-
duced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, 










Platforms of memory  
 










to obtain the degree of PhD at the 
University of Groningen 
on the authority of the 
Rector Magnificus Prof. E. Sterken 
and in accordance with 
the decision by the College of Deans. 
 
This thesis will be defended in public on  
 









Pieter Hendrik Smit  
born on 5 November 1986 














Prof. H.B.M. Wijfjes  
Prof. A. Hoskins  





















Voor mijn ouders, zussen en broer





Chapter 1 From memory to memory work 19
Chapter 2 Memory work in a new media ecology 45
Chapter 3 Between practice and materiality: Seeing memory work through 
the lens of practices and affordances 
67
Chapter 4 Methodology: Researching digital memory work 81
Chapter 5 Witnessing in the new memory ecology: Memory work and the 
Syrian conflict on YouTube
97
Chapter 6 Activating the past in the Ferguson protests: Memory work, digital 
activism and the politics of platforms
117
Chapter 7 The limits of an ‘open’ past: Memory work on Wikipedia and the 




List of referenced YouTube clips 199
List of referenced Wikipedia pages 201
Appendix 1 – coding categories for talk page threads 203








This dissertation could not have been completed without the support from family mem-
bers, friends, and colleagues. With the risk of inevitably forgetting someone, I would like to 
express my gratitude to some of them. 
In the first place, I would like to thank my wife Iris for her continuous faith in me. Her 
patience, care, and proactive attitude have kept me in one piece and, without a doubt, 
helped me complete this dissertation in time. I truly could not have done it with her. Also, 
the thought of the arrival of our son Tibbe has kept me going the last nine months. Thanks, 
little man.
Various colleagues have been crucial in the development of this dissertation. In particu-
lar, I would like to thank my supervisors Marcel Broersma and Ansgard Heinrich. Over the 
last five years we have had great meetings, ranging from brainstorm sessions over coffee to 
email exchanges in the middle of the night, right before deadlines. 
Marcel, thanks for you strategic and creative thinking at various stages in this project. 
Also thanks for providing me with the opportunity to teach and to do research within a 
phenomenal department. I owe much to you.
Ansgard, ever since you were my MA supervisor, we have had many conversations, 
whether they were about global politics or domestic issues. Your determination and cour-
age, especially in the last two years, have inspired me. Thank you for that. Also thanks to 
Nola, whose smile is the best antidote to pensive moodiness there is. 
Over the last five years, the department of Media and Journalism Studies at the RuG 
has become like a family to me. People have come and gone, but the culture within the 
department has remained the same. The department’s openness, helpfulness, ambition, 
and high professional standard have contributed greatly to the completion of this disserta-
tion. I’d like to thank a couple of people in this department in particular. 
Frank, former roomie, HR-advisor, fellow Groninger, colleague, paranymph, friend, 
thanks for all the great talks in the office, at the gym, and over many beers. Never change, 
always stay F(f)rank (and feed me burgers when I need them most). Michael, thanks for 
introducing me to the DMI in Amsterdam, IPAs and Michael Stevenson studies. Stay snarky 
(and come back to Grunn). Robert, former roomie, master of naps and Marx, thanks for 
your jokes and letting me write a chapter with you when I needed to reset my mind. Anna, 
former roomie, sister from another mother, my favorite hippie. Please keep allowing me to 
draw on your white board and I’ll listen to media effects mumbo jumbo. Thanks for being 
Anna. Marc, thanks for letting me win at squash and share what’s on our corazón. Dana, 
thanks for introducing me to Latour back at one of the first RMeS events in Groningen six 
years ago. Everything is material. 
Special thanks goes out to Scott Eldridge II for his sharp editorial eye when he proofread 
the introduction and conclusion of this dissertation. Keep Scottifying. 
9Acknowledgments
Super special thanks to Tamara. She has not only read and commented on various 
parts of this dissertation, but also listened patiently to my complaining and motivated me 
throughout the process of writing. Big hugs, Tamara.
In no particular order, thanks Sanna, Erika, Chris, Todd, Berber, Huub, Susan, Eli, Yannis, 
Yigal, and Sabrina for being and having been the awesome colleagues you are! Colleagues/
friends from other departments that deserve to be mentioned are James and Kiki, fellow 
PhD-lecturers. Thanks for the coffee breaks, lunches, dinners and drinks we’ve shared.
This dissertation would not have been brought to fruition without the institutional sup-
port of the Faculty of Arts at the RuG, the Groningen Research Institute for the Study of 
Culture (ICOG), and the Graduate School for Humanities (GSH). I am grateful that I was 
able to fulfill the role of Lecturer-PhD  (docent-promovendus) in the last five years. I am 
convinced that teaching while also writing this book kept me sane. Moreover, this combi-
nation gave me a vast amount of experience I will rely on during the rest of my career. By 
extension, I want to thank the students in the minor, BA, and MA programs in Media Studies 
and Journalism. 
I would also like to thank the Research School for Media Studies (RMeS) for the inspiring 
Summer and Winter Schools they offered and for the opportunity to present my ongoing 
research. Moreover, I made some good friends during RMeS events, in particular Tom, Tim 
Niels, Alex, and Abby. Thanks for showing interest in my work and for the discussions and 
debates we’ve had.
Of course friends outside the university setting deserve a special word of thanks. They 
are the ones who put both of my feet on the ground and offered the necessary distractions 
from work. Menko, my oldest friend, thanks for the walks and talks. Jules, Thomas, and 
Sven, thanks for the wines and whiskeys. Koen, GJ, and Tom, thanks for the trips to Berlin 
and other places (and of course for the GeKoToRi app). Asing, for the trips to IMAX. Roeland, 
thanks for your common sense and good taste in films and books. Tim and Annemarie, 
Alex and Rosan, Teelkien, Alexander, Steven, and the rest of the “O&N” group, thanks for 
being there, also during the rest of the year, of course.  
Sylvia, thanks for designing the best cover I could wish for and for being such a good 
friend to Iris and me.
Last but not least, I would like to thank the people to whom this dissertation is dedicated: 
my parents Anne and Christien and my siblings Frederiek, Sybrig, and Coen. They provided 





Each new medium imprints its own special flavor to the memories of that epoch. 
(Bowker, 2008, p. 26.)
People increasingly turn to social media platforms to share their knowledge, opinions, 
experiences, emotions and feelings of and about the past. They come together on Face-
book to mourn or to commemorate a deceased friend or community member. Twitter can 
become a place to celebrate a national anniversary or to reminisce. People use YouTube 
both to save videos on atrocities and of their child’s first steps. They save and share their 
photos of events on Instagram, whether they are of birthdays or national memorial days. 
And on Wikipedia, editors collaboratively reconstruct historical events. These diverse en-
gagements with the past on, by, and through platforms are what I call digital memory work.
Memory work is as old as humankind, and it has always involved specific technologies 
and techniques—whether they are cave paintings, rituals, writing, or television. Memory 
work can be more personal, like diary writing, or more collective, as in the case of national 
anniversaries and commemorations. It encompasses the transfer and reconstruction of 
knowledge and experience of the past into the present and future. This occurs through 
and by specific practices, technologies, and cultural forms and, often, for specific goals. 
This makes memory work inherently political. Which and whose version of the past is 
carried into the future is the result of a continuous power struggle. Hence, I argue, the 
past is continually being constructed in the present by various social actors with their own 
goals and agendas. Nowadays, this process increasingly involves social media platforms. 
These platforms affect memory work—like the media technologies before them—in idio-
syncratic ways. The primary effort of this dissertation is to trace how different social actors 
use platforms for digital memory work and, concurrently, how platforms enable, shape, 
and constrain it.
The focus on memory work instead of ‘simply’ memory is a conscious decision. The word 
‘memory’ can mean many different things to many different people, up to the point that 
the term risks becoming meaningless. As cultural theorist Marita Sturken (1997, p. 1) writes: 
“Memory forms the fabric of human life, affecting everything from the ability to perform 
simple tasks to the recognition of the self. Memory establishes life’s continuity; it gives 
meaning to the present, as each moment is constituted by the past.” Like the terms nature 
and culture, memory is incredibly hard to grasp and may be attached to anything and ev-
erything. Memory as it is used in this study is not an object of positivistic scientific inquiry 
and it is not my aim to ‘discover’ facts and truths, naturally or socially, about it. Rather, 
one of the goals is to demonstrate that memory is always in a state of becoming and is 
never ‘fixed’. It is re-affirmed, challenged, or negotiated—both as a concept, capacity and 
a process. Memory is, therefore, a process of “social construction” (Berger & Luckmann, 
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1966). Memory work, then, describes the ways in which and the means by which the past is 
constructed (Van Dijck, 2007, pp. 5-7). It describes how the past is worked in the present.
This study, phrased alternatively, is about the ways in which the “politics of platforms” 
(Gillespie, 2010) are interwoven with the politics of memory work. “At the most general 
level,” writes Srnicek (2017, p. 43) “platforms are digital infrastructures that enable two 
or more groups to interact.” Like all media, platforms are constituted by users, communi-
ties, practices, technological features and architecture, design, form and content. Also 
like media, they are not neutral intermediaries or tools. Rather, they all ‘want’ something 
from their users and, for example, what Facebook wants from its users differs from what 
YouTube, Wikipedia, Instagram, Twitter, or Tumblr want from theirs. They each have their 
own ideologies that inform how they operate and how they are operated. 
Social media platforms thrive on user-generated content. They provide templates for 
people to share their contributions, whether as posts, wikis, videos, or blogs. Social media 
platforms are, in most cases, free and easy-to-use and allow people to produce content 
with each other and for each other (Goff, 2013, p. 17). This underlying logic makes Facebook 
a social media platform, but also makes Wikipedia one. Without peer-production, these 
platforms would not exist. As such, I argue, platforms have come to take important roles in 
saving, storing, archiving, interpreting, and re-presenting our personal and collective pasts. 
They hold peculiar types of knowledge and experiences and shape these in specific ways. 
Regarding personal memory, for example, past user activity results in targeted advertising, 
or the automated selection and re-presentation of ‘memories’ through applications such 
as Facebook’s ‘On This Day’ or ‘Friendship Anniversary’. On a socio-political level, which 
is the prime focus of this dissertation, these platforms influence whose voices are heard, 
whose perspectives on and of the past are visible, and, ultimately, whose are carried into 
the future. 
This latter observation is, of course, not entirely new. Media that came before social me-
dia platforms have shaped and are still shaping what, how, when, and who we remember 
as societies and individuals and still provide versions of the past that dominate others. 
This idea has been most explicitly explored by Neiger, Meyers and Zandberg (2011), who 
developed the concept of “media memory,” or “the systematic exploration of collective 
pasts that are narrated by the media, through the use of the media, and about the media” 
(p. 1). This study follows the tripartite differentiation of media memory by investigating 
the usage of media for memory work, narratives about media vis-a-vis the past, and how 
media themselves engage with the past. The study also goes beyond these authors’ ap-
proach, which is mainly focused on the broadcast era, by scrutinizing digital memory work.
In essence, I investigate something that is in constant transformation: the relationship 
between media and memory. One could argue that media and memory work are intrinsi-
cally connected to each other. This is a consequence of what media are and what they 
do—their ontology. “Media” is a complex term that invokes a wide range of associations 
and can mean, like memory, many different things. The foremost complexity of the term is 
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its plurality: media are, not is. Television, radio, newspapers, books, cave paintings, film, 
Facebook, but also calendars, watches, and money, are all media. But they all have their 
own specific ontologies, designs, logics, uses, and discourses. Not one logic invites, guides 
and shapes interactions with all of them. However, “what all media entail is a process 
that involves senders, messages and receivers as well as a specific social context in which 
they operate” (Albertazzi & Cobley, 2010, p. 7). Hence, throughout these pages, media are 
regarded as our primary technologies of communication and social interaction, leading to 
increasingly mediated, rather than face-to-face communication. 
As such, to follow McLuhan (1964), media extend human communication possibilities. 
They enable and mediate particular forms of communication and social interaction. They 
record reality and thereby shape our perceptions of it. Lastly, they can transmit knowledge 
and experiences across time and space and to different groups of people. However, like 
all technologies, media are not ‘just’ material means or instruments. Media are always 
shaped by their usage, ideas, and perceptions of them and are thus the result of specific, 
often commercial, ideologies. They are also not stable objects, but are continually made 
sense of, appropriated to fulfill certain needs, and used creatively. The same holds true for 
social media platforms. All media have specific reputations and are often seen to affect 
culture and society or to have an effect on behavior. This research project does not engage 
with the question whether social media have effects, but rather focuses on the question 
what people do with, in, and through social media. It asks how social media guide this 
doing. That is, this dissertation focuses on people’s practices and the cultural forms that 
are produced through these practices. Simultaneously, this study takes platforms seriously 
as technologies that invite, shape, and limit particular practices. Simply put, people do and 
are invited to do different things with a newspaper or television than with a social media 
platform. 
 This brings me to what is new about digital memory work. Throughout the following 
pages, I assert that digital media technologies such as social media platforms have given 
rise to new expressions and practices of memory and have refashioned, or “remediated” 
(Bolter & Grusin, 1999), existing forms of these. Specifically, this study scrutinizes very 
recent practices, technologies and forms of memory, roughly within the period 2010-2015. 
My aim is not to provide a history, but rather a critical examination of what memory work 
means and involves in ‘our time’. This must be seen in the light of recent calls for such 
academic work. As Garde-Hansen, Hoskins and Reading (2009, p. 3) state: 
The existing paradigm of the study of broadcast media and their associated tradi-
tions, theories and methods, is quickly becoming inadequate for understanding 
the profound impact of the supreme accessibility, transferability and circulation of 




Accordingly, the theoretical questions expressed in this dissertation are quite necessarily 
translated into empirical ones and vice versa. The “longing for memories, for capturing, 
storing, retrieving and ordering them,” the elements of a digital memory culture, according 
to Garde-Hansen, et al. (2009, p. 5), require both empirical observation and critical scru-
tiny.  Platforms may enable new forms and practices of memory work, yet, these media are 
also socio-technical assemblies with their own set of rules and protocols, affordances, and 
design that allow for new forms of participation in memory work. Concomitantly, this par-
ticipation is shaped by these assemblies. Memory work has always been caught between 
individual agency and socio-technical structure. Whenever we engage in memory work, 
individuals and groups alike draw on available techniques, technologies, and frameworks. 
In this, I argue, ‘things digital’ do not change our biological capacity to remember, but 
rather are part of the dynamic mnemonic process in which technologies, symbolic forms, 
and practices converge.
One way to rethink memory work in the ‘digital age’2 is to talk about “connective 
memory” in a “new media ecology.” This latter term is used to describe our contemporary 
sociotechnical and communicative environments (Hoskins, 2011). At the basis of memory 
work in a previous ‘broadcast age’ stands a linear trajectory of mass communication where 
a powerful medium sends a message that arrives, in one piece, at a heterogeneous group 
of receivers. Even though aspects of this view are debatable from the start (was there ever 
such a thing as a passive mass audience?), it is contrasted by today’s new, more active 
media ecology. This new media ecology is characterized by bottom-up, user-generated 
content appearing next to content produced by media professionals. It is populated by 
hyper-connected, transnational audiences using mobile media. Within a new media ecol-
ogy people are therefore confronted by a constant stream of updates from all around the 
world and from different kinds of people, wherever they are. Potentially, they are also able 
to produce their own content wherever they are. This connectivity “transforms memory as 
being radically strung out via a continuous present and past. Memory is not in this way a 
product of individual or collective remembrances, but is instead generated through the flux 
of contacts between people and digital technologies and media” (Hoskins, 2011, p. 272). 
Hence, researchers often describe digital memory work as being less institutional and 
more bottom-up. It is theorized as fluid, diffuse, easily revocable, and more accessible 
(Hoskins, 2009, p. 41). In this view, anyone with the appropriate (digital) tools at hand can 
construct and spread their versions of the past, which may ultimately lead to new voices 
being heard and the previously invisible being made visible. This dissertation, however, 
aims to nuance this slightly utopian perspective by scrutinizing the newly emerged power 
dynamics within digital memory work. There may very well be an increased participation 
2 The ‘digital age’ is a notoriously vague demarcation of a historical period that spans from the early 1970s, the 
introductory period of the personal computer, until the present. It describes the current period characterized 
by networked telecommunication technologies and global use of the internet. Similar terms include: ‘infor-
mation age’, ‘network society’ and ‘digital culture’.
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in memory work. It is undeniable that people engage in practices such as the recording 
and uploading of pivotal historical moments on YouTube. They come together to mourn 
and commemorate on Facebook. They produce accounts of historical events outside 
mainstream media and institutions on Wikipedia. However, these practices are as much 
restricted by these media technologies and their associated communities as they are 
enabled by them. Like all (media) technologies before them, social media platforms and 
their users leave their marks on the memory work of our time. As the case studies following 
in this dissertation aim to demonstrate, memory work is re-institutionalized, re-stabilized, 
re-centralized, re-structured, and closed in. This occurs through the dynamic interactions 
between users and platforms themselves.
Why study memory work in the digital age? Why is studying history or the social pro-
duction of knowledge not enough? Why should there be an academic and public agenda 
for the study of memory and memory work? These are legitimate questions in a time in 
which the humanities and social sciences (my disciplinary backgrounds) are criticized 
for not producing research that is immediately applicable or economically exploitable. 
The answer lies in the politics of memory work. If memory work involves, from the onset, 
social context, practices, and technologies, then it is related to the dynamics of power. 
Politics and power, here, are understood not as institutional—even though they might very 
well be—but as distributed and pertaining to everyday life. Along these lines, Eagleton 
(2007), following Foucault, writes that “power is not something confined to armies and 
parliaments; it is, rather, a persuasive, intangible network of force which weaves itself into 
our slightest gestures and most intimate utterances” (p. 7). To bring this reasoning into 
the public realm: what is visible and whose voices are heard are increasingly steered by 
platforms that present themselves as neutral intermediaries, but in fact heavily influence 
the “social construction” or “assemblage” of the past in the present. 
Bearing this latter observation in mind, I add a New Media Studies perspective to Memory 
Studies and a Memory Studies perspective to New Media Studies. The chapters do so by 
scrutinizing the technological procedures, practices, and cultural forms associated with 
specific social media platforms. In other words, this study takes seriously how platforms 
operate and what they want from their users. These two factors shape how users engage 
in memory work and also how platforms themselves engage in memory work. Thus, I see 
memory work as being distributed amongst people and technologies and I trace the vari-
ous human and ‘nonhuman’ agents involved in it. As chapter two will show, ‘traditional’ 
media have been taken seriously as agents or technologies of memory, yet social media 
platforms have only scarcely been studied as such (cf. Kaun & Stiernstedt, 2014; Hajek, 
Pentzold & Lohmeier, 2016). What is more, detailed empirical studies into digital memory 
work that take into account the communities, technological design and procedures, and 
practices associated with platforms are even scarcer. One of the aims of this study is to 
help fill this gap. Increased general dependence—for information, communication, ar-
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chiving and remembering—on these and other companies (and nonprofit organizations, 
in Wikipedia’s case) begs critical academic engagement. This makes research into these 
platforms not only relevant, but also necessary. 
Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation is to trace the agency of and interactions be-
tween platform users and platforms themselves. YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia—the 
platforms analyzed in the empirical chapters—can, I contend, be regarded as platforms 
of memory. I view platforms of memory as those social media sites that allow and are 
appropriated for memory work and which at the same time shape it in medium-specific 
ways. They are media, but also living archives and they re-present and re-construct the 
past from these archives. On these platforms, personal, collective, private, public, political, 
and cultural memories connect, converge, and collapse. This is a messy, dynamic, and 
unpredictable process. Yet, there is order in this mnemonic chaos: certain versions of the 
past become more popular and visible than others, and are then carried into the future. 
Following this line of thinking, the main research aim guiding this dissertation is to 
theorize how memory work is performed in the new media ecology. Yet, in order to inves-
tigate this new media ecology and its implications for memory work, it is crucial to shed 
light on the issue at stake on three analytical levels: practices, technologies and cultural 
forms. What should be kept in mind, however, is that this is a heuristic construct. Practices, 
technologies, and cultural forms affect each other and concomitantly constitute memory 
work. In line with this, this study addresses the following sub-questions: On the level of 
practice it asks, how are power and agency negotiated and redistributed in memory work on 
platforms? This question relates to how users use and appropriate a platform for memory 
work. It is also geared toward answering how norms and values emerge within memory 
work and how communities are shaped through practice (and how communities shape 
practice). On the level of technology, this study explores the following question: how do 
the technological affordances, mechanics, and operational procedures of platforms en-
able, shape and constrain memory work on them? This question pertains not only to how 
platforms structure human memory work, but also how platforms themselves engage in 
memory work. The third question relates to the outcomes of these practical and techno-
logical interactions: Why are certain versions of the past re-presented and transferred into 
the future on and by platforms? By answering these questions and relating each back to the 
others, I aim to paint a holistic picture of the dynamic interactions between human and 
‘nonhuman’ actors in digital memory work.   
Chapter structure 
Beginning with an overview and assessment of established theories and histories of the 
relationship between media and memory, this thesis moves toward three detailed empiri-
cal case studies. The concepts on media and memory work expressed in previous pages 
have a long history in academic research. Yet, as the first three chapters will show, they are 
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mainly human-centered and not well-suited for studying the hybrid spaces of communica-
tive interactions social media platforms offer. These first chapters are therefore devoted to 
mapping and critiquing existing theory, while also situating this dissertation within it. The 
three case study chapters that follow after build on these theoretical explorations.
In chapter one, I develop the concept of memory work, as a means to counter the many 
ontological debates about what memory is. Rather, this chapter focuses on how memory 
is always in a process of becoming: it is practiced, performed, constructed, worked. The 
chapter embeds this line of thinking in a rich academic tradition which finds its roots in (so-
cial) psychology, media studies, philosophy, cultural studies, sociology and history. Also, 
the chapter provides a brief historical overview of memory work. The three main questions 
that guide this chapter are: 1) How has memory been conceptualized in different academic 
fields? 2) How has memory been practiced and performed throughout history? 3) How can we 
rethink memory in a way that clarifies and renders the concept more productive for research 
in a new media ecology? This chapter thus functions as a literature review, while also laying 
the foundation for the theoretical framework that follows.
In chapter two I build up the theoretical framework further by introducing and criti-
cally engaging with three theoretical constructs that are key in discussing contemporary 
memory work. These are: media as technologies of memory, the mediatization of memory, 
and memory in a new media ecology. The chapter sets out to address the question how 
these concepts can help understand the dynamics of memory work in a media-saturated 
world. The chapter thus provides three theoretical “panoramas,” a term borrowed from 
Latour (2007), which are broad overviews of socio-historical and technological changes 
in relation to media and memory. As such, panoramas show much from a distance, yet 
at the same time provide no details. As Latour (2007) asserts: “panoramas gives [sic] the 
impression of complete control over what is being surveyed, even though they are partially 
blind” (p. 188). Nevertheless, they are helpful in positioning a phenomenon in a broader 
framework of scholarship: “They collect, they frame, they rank, they order, they organize; 
they are the source of what is meant by a well-ordered zoom” (Latour, 2007, p. 189).
In chapter three I move from grand panoramas to theories on practices, materiality 
and affordances. Here, I treat memory work as the product of both individual agency and 
sociotechnical structure and as the result of practical engagement with material environ-
ments. Memory work is something people do with objects and technologies, that each 
have their own perceived set of possible uses, or, in other words, affordances. At the same 
time, objects and technologies may engage in memory work themselves too. They may 
remember for us (Stiegler, 2010). The chapter asks: How do materiality, technology, and 
practices relate to one another in terms of digital memory work? The chapter thus further 
operationalizes the ideas offered in the first two chapters.
Chapter four forms the bridge between the first three and last three chapters by dis-
cussing the methodology of the case studies. The methods employed in the cases are 
discussed here in terms of their strengths and weaknesses and rationales are given for 
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why these methods were chosen in the first place. Textual analysis stands at the basis of 
the case studies. However, it is amended by critical analysis of the platforms’ features and 
operational procedures, an approach loosely defined as ‘platform analysis’. Lastly, the 
case studies themselves are introduced here. The first case study, chapter five, focuses 
on the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta, Syria. It investigates the memory work of 
witnesses and uploaders on YouTube. The second case study examines the dynamics of 
memory work on the Facebook page Justice for Mike Brown. The page was set up a day 
after the shooting of Michael Brown, which inspired the protests in Ferguson, Missouri, 
against racialized police brutality.3 The third and last case study analyzes the memory work 
of editors of the Wikipedia page on the downing of flight MH17. 
Within each of these case studies, I regard platforms as simultaneously enabling, shap-
ing, and partaking in memory work, due to their specific technological design and features, 
community dynamics, ideologies, and associated practices. These three platforms were 
chosen primarily because they are the most popular platforms for video storage, sharing 
and watching (YouTube), social networking (Facebook), and general knowledge produc-
tion (Wikipedia). The specific events were chosen because they are politically highly con-
tentious. They, therefore, incited heated debates about how they should be re-presented 
and remembered. The case studies are instrumental for answering the broad research 
questions posed. Yet, they are also stand-alone empirical research projects with their 
own specific research questions. Each case study, therefore, poses a set of questions that 
pertains to that specific case study. The generally inductive approaches used also allow 
theory-building, which amends and engages in conversation with existing research. 
In the concluding chapter, I relate the findings of the case studies back to the theoretical 
observations in the first three chapters. I also outline theoretical challenges and method-
ological roadmaps that can be applied in future research on digital memory work. What 
does it mean when memory work is done on, by, and through social media platforms? How 
does it differ from previous “media memory”? I argue that what is at stake are our pasts, 
and with these our futures. When we engage in memory work on social media platforms, 
or when much of our memory work is done by social media platforms, we trust our pasts 
partly to them. We should not forget that social media platforms are guided by specific 
(often commercially-driven) ideologies which will, in the future, come to shape contem-
porary memory. In line with the epigraph by Bowker at the beginning of this introduction, 
platforms imprint their own unique flavor to the memory or our time. Ultimately, we lose 
some part of control over our pasts and futures whenever we share something on and with 
a platform. As much as platforms remember, they also forget.
3 Chapter five was published as: Smit, R., Heinrich, A., & Broersma, M. (2015). Witnessing in the New Memory 
Ecology: Memory Construction of the Syrian Conflict on YouTube. New Media & Society, 19(2), 289-307. Chapter 
six was published as: Smit, R., Heinrich, A., & Broersma, M. (2017). Activating the past in the ferguson Protests: 
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Memory has been perceived as a wax tablet, a book, a sheet of paper, a labyrinth, and a 
loom. As the philosopher of psychology Douwe Draaisma (2010) has eloquently demon-
strated, throughout history, metaphors have been applied as heuristic devices to make 
sense of what memory is. Dominant metaphors have also been derived from the natural en-
vironment (clay and dirt, in the Christian Bible), hydraulic engineering, complex machines 
with springs and gears (as is apparent in the writings of Descartes and Hobbes), electricity 
and chemistry, and telecommunications (Draaisma, 2010; Epstein, 2016). However, since 
60 years or so, the most persistent metaphors to describe what memory is have come from 
the field of computing (e.g. storage, overwriting, search, retrieval, input, output, etc.). This 
is no coincidence, writes psychologist Robert Epstein (2016, para. 16), “each metaphor re-
flected the most advanced thinking of the era that spawned it.” Metaphors about memory 
both enable but also restrict thinking about it. Especially the research into cognition has 
not only perceived but also treated memory as an essential part of the human “computer” 
called the brain. However, as Epstein (2016) critically remarks, our minds are not comput-
ers. This is something we should not forget when we talk about memory.
Is it possible to think about memory in a way that does not cloud, but enrich our un-
derstanding of it? Memory, both as a concept and capacity and process in the human 
brain and body, is slippery, something that can never be fully grasped. Hence, it might 
not be fruitful to conceive of memory as something that is, but rather as something that 
is practiced, performed, produced, and constructed in the present. This train of thought 
will be the focus of this chapter’s first section. In the second section, I present the concept 
of ‘memory work’ as a more productive way of thinking about interactions with the past. 
Memory work is defined here as the engagement with the past through and by specific prac-
tices, technologies, and cultural forms. This broad definition thus clearly locates memory 
as something distributed and as a site of action which concerns the present and future as 
much as the past. Moreover, it is an inclusive definition, meaning that anyone and anything 
can potentially and unintentionally engage in memory work.  
Memory work is of all times and all places. However, it is affected by the social, cul-
tural, and technological contexts of these times and locales. The third part of this chapter 
therefore provides a short overview of the state and status of memory work at different 
times in history. The goal in this part is to show how different practices, technologies, 
and cultural forms shape memory work, while they are also part of it. Conversely, it also 
engages with the question how ideas about memory—the value and status attached to 
it—affect memory work. Fourth, the chapter embeds this dissertation within a wider range 
of scholarly work and traces some of the guiding insights about thinking of memory as an 
active construction in the present back to their academic roots. The focus of this chapter 
is therefore setting the scene by focusing on the ontology, history, and epistemology of 
memory. Memory’s connection to media will be the focus of the next chapter.
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Can memory be?
There is no such thing as memory, because there is wide variety of different things 
we mean by memory. 
(Olick, 2012)
Indeed, every fiber of our bodies, every cell of our brains, holds memories—as does 
everything physical outside bodies and brains, even those inanimate objects that 
bear the marks of their past histories upon them in mute profusion.
(Casey, 1987, p. xix)
What do we mean when we use the word ‘memory’? This question has intrigued and frus-
trated many philosophers. For example, Aristotle already noted that personal memory (a 
universal human faculty) can be simultaneously perceived of as a neuro-biological capac-
ity (mnēmē, memory) and a process (anamnesis, recollection) (Nikulin, 2015, pp. 7-8).4 In 
this dualistic conception, the former pertains to the brain and body, the latter to the mind. 
Recollections, essentially, are mental representations of a past experience or something 
that was communicated to us. Memory is therefore closely linked to imagination (Pickering 
& Keightley, 2012). However, memory and recollection cannot be pried apart from each 
other; that is, they only exist apart from each other heuristically and lexically, like notions 
such as brain and mind, nature and culture.5 Without memory, recollection is not possible 
and when we ‘access’ our memory, we always recollect. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ 
memory, because the moment it is called upon it is being ‘(re)written’—a popular, yet 
problematic metaphor as we will learn later—in terms of the present. 
This dual nature of memory is important to note, because it shows that memory is an 
internal as well as an external process. Notwithstanding the fact that memory is a neuro-
biological, universal human trait, it is embedded within linguistic, technological, cultural 
and social contexts that change over time and differ per place. Not only does this context 
provide the subject matter for future recollection (the things we actually remember), the 
moment and circumstance of recollection is situated in this context. “Each recollection,” 
write psychologists Merck et al. (2016) “is built out of not only an internalized potential to 
remember but also external factors, including social factors. As a result, memories are not 
stored in the head, encoded in some yet understood way in neurological tissue. Rather, 
4 A similar distinction in Dutch is made between geheugen and herinnering and in German between Gedächtnis 
and Erinnerung. Competitors in memory contests train their memory so that the areas in the brain tasked for 
recollection work more efficiently (Foer, 2012).
5 Terry Eagleton, for example, in The Idea of Culture (2005) eloquently argues that it is in our nature to have a 
culture and that our culture affects our nature. Likewise, memory as a capacity and process in the brain en-
ables remembering, yet simultaneously ‘blank’ memory does not exist, not even as a MRI visualization on a 
computer screen. 
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they grow out of the interactions between the internal and external” (p. 285). This is also 
acknowledged by social psychologists Middleton and Edwards (1990) who observe that, in 
remembering, “significance and contexts are intrinsic to the activity, constitutive of it and 
constitutive by it, rather than casually influential upon some other thing called ‘memory’” 
(p. 42). Memory, therefore, can be regarded as a process of social construction.
What does it imply to say that memory is a process of social construction? For one, the 
phrase suggests that knowledge of the past that is recalled—reconstructed—in the present 
is affected by the social, cultural, historical, and technological environment of the remem-
bering individual. When people remember, they do so with the building blocks provided 
to them by language, socialization and interaction with the world surrounding them. The 
philosopher of science and information Geoffrey Bowker (2008) pointedly critiques ap-
proaches to memory that focus on internal processes in the brain:
We don’t analyze the movements of icebergs by studying the bit that appears above 
the surface of the sea; nor should we study memory in terms of that which fires a 
certain set of neurons at a determinate time. We as social and technical creatures 
engage in a vast span of memory practices, from entirely non-conscious to the 
hyperaware. (p. 8)
This observation is recognized in many disciplines that investigate memory, ranging from 
psychology (learning and development) and philosophy (being and the human condition) 
to law (witnessing) and neuroscience (structures in the brain) (Roediger & Wertsch, 2008). 
Human memory can be said to not only be socially constructed, but also materially 
distributed. Since the advent of molecular biology, French philosopher Bernard Stiegler 
(2010, pp. 73-74) asserts, the dominant scientific view is that there are two types of 
memory in living beings: that of the species (located in the genome, DNA) and that of 
the individual being (located in the central nervous system; the memory of experience). 
Humans, however, have the “possibility of transmitting individually acquired knowledge in 
a non-biological way” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 74). Human memory, therefore, involves practices 
and technologies of recall and inscription and externalization of the present into the future 
(which can be media). Memory is an associative and ongoing process that is distributed 
among other people, things, and places that are historically situated. A remembering indi-
vidual is always embedded within a constantly changing network of interaction between 
people and things, while, at the same time, memory would not be possible without a body 
that remembers. 
The social materiality of memory is repeatedly stressed in contemporary studies of 
memory, from psychology to history to sociology. Summing up their comprehensive his-
tory of memory and memory studies, Olick et al. (2011) state that:
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The new insight of memory studies is thus not merely that memory is omnipresent 
but that it is at once situated in social frameworks (e.g. family and nation), enabled 
by changing media technologies (e.g. the Internet and digital recording), confronted 
with cultural institutions (e.g. memorials and museums), and shaped by political 
circumstances (e.g. wars and catastrophes). (p. 37, emphasis mine)
The fact that memory is situated, enabled, confronted, and shaped by external forces and 
circumstances—i.e. that it cannot be disconnected from unique contexts—suggests its 
fluidity and malleability. 
Recent studies in neuroscience and cognitive psychology underwrite philosophical and 
social constructivist approaches to memory as being changed or forged anew in each new 
associative context, because of the changes in our brain formed by new experiences that 
came after the event that is reconstructed mnemonically6 (Merck, et al. 2016; Hoskins, 
2016b; Bourtchouladze, 2002; S. Johnson, 2004; Finkenauer et al., 1997; Prager, 1998; Van 
Dijck, 2007). This blurs the line, often drawn in the literature on memory, between personal 
or individual and collective or social memory. In the words of Misztal (2003): 
Such a perspective, by pointing out that individual memory is socially organized or 
socially mediated, emphasizes the social dimension of human memory, without, 
however, necessarily being a straightforward projection of the shared remembering 
[…] [While] it is the individual who remembers, remembering is more than just a 
personal act. (pp. 5-6)
The past is not simply stored as a coherent, chronological film in our minds, but rather “it 
must be articulated to become memory” (Huyssen, 1995, p. 3). Memory is consequently 
formed through a blend of practices, technologies, and cultural forms—whether they are 
language, a ritual, a film, a tweet, a YouTube clip, a Wiki, or a Facebook post—and is thus 
connected to not only self but also others. This idea will be the focus of the next chapter, 
which dives deeper into the relationship between memory and media.
The ‘social’—in ‘social construction’—could thus be used inclusively and actively: indi-
viduals interact with the people and objects surrounding them, which shapes memory. 
Association might thus be a more suitable term than social interaction (Latour, 2007, p. 
8). Actors, both human and ‘nonhuman’ change ‘the social’ itself in and through each 
interaction. This also leads to the observation that memory is caught in the dynamics 
of power. The what, when, why, how, who of memory is informed and shaped by actors 
with which they associate. These actors range from national institutions and historians 
6 Whenever the term mnemonic is used in this text it should not be mistaken for having to do with “memetics” 
or “memes.” Mnemonics are the strategies and tactics people use to remember while memetics is a develop-
ing field within social biology and cognitive science that attempts to describe processes of cultural transmis-
sion of ideas and practices. 
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to political activists and media. Besides “social,” the word “construct” implies action and 
practice, something people do, using the resources available in their environment, while 
simultaneously this environment affects their very doing. As a result, “memory is a matter 
of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated but 
are structured by social arrangements” (Olick and Robbins, 1998, p. 109). 
Consequently, groups actively shape memory and memory can shape groups. When-
ever memory is externalized—that is, practiced, expressed, or performed in one way or 
another—it enters into the public realm by drawing from it and feeding into it. Many names 
have been given to the type of memory under consideration here: collective, cultural, 
communicative, social, public, and popular memory are just a few. Memory in the form of 
invented traditions is essential to the functioning of societies (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2012) 
and every family, class, or religious community actively shapes a memory of its own (Halb-
wachs, 1992). This affects the form and content of individual memory. “‘Nation,’ ‘tribe,’ 
‘society’ are general names whose sole substance lies in their actual members who share 
common myths, traditions, beliefs, etc.” (Gedi & Elam, 1996, p. 35). In this sense, collectives 
do not have a mind or will on their own. Rather, the individual actors within collectives 
adhere and live by the idea or image of the collective. They “imagine” their community 
(Anderson, 2006). 
This does not mean that these abstractions do not have any real-world effects. A sense 
of a shared past may also act as a resource for present action. Individual and collective 
actions often rely upon ideas and feelings that are the result of memories of belonging to 
a group. For example, political action relies on shared memory of discontent in order to 
take place (cf. chap. 6). The imaginative group can instigate individual action; for example, 
people fight for their nations, celebrate the anniversaries of tribes, or live according to 
society’s norms and values. The idea of the existence and belonging to a bigger group is a 
force with considerable strength. Shared memory may bring people together or separate 
them. ‘Collective’ memory, like ‘the social’ or ‘society’, is therefore not fixed but a process 
of contestation and (re)negotiation. Collectives do not possess a memory of their own; 
rather, the idea of the collective is carried, (re)constructed, and expressed by individuals 
within a social framework who uses certain objects, symbols, technologies, rituals, prac-
tices, and techniques of remembrance. Consequently, the idea of shared past experience 
or knowledge functions as a common denominator that may inspire (political) action and 
interweave with personal memory. 
In summary, memory comprises the capacity and process of re-constructing and re-
presenting the past in the present, or preserving the present for future recall. It is a process, 
because it is never fixed, static, or finished. It is a reconstruction, because it utilizes and 
requires various resources, practices, techniques, technologies, and experiences. It is 
a representation, which implies that it is encoded with meaning, decoded, and recoded 
within existing cultural contexts. It is a capacity of the individual human body and mind, yet 
it is social through and through, because it is never just a capacity. It is always in a process 
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of becoming, connected to and associating with the outside world. Memory is therefore 
always partly personal, partly collective. The ontology of memory—its being—is fluid. We 
will never quite grasp what it actually is. Like the past, as soon as we ‘fix’, ‘label’ or ‘capture’ 
memory, or use metaphors to describe it, we disregard or do not do justice to another 
aspect of it. We therefore need a different lens through which we can make sense of our 
engagements with the past. To this end, this dissertation employs the concept of memory 
work.
Memory work 
Connecting the words ‘memory’ and ‘work’ is a fruitful exercise because it shifts our at-
tention toward memory’s dynamic, interminable, and performed nature, instead of seeing 
memory as a static ‘thing’ that ‘is’. The word ‘work’ has a number of meanings and different 
connotations that are relevant with regard to memory. According to the dictionary, work 
may mean an activity “in which one exerts strengths or faculties to do or perform some-
thing” or that an individual “engages in regularly to earn a livelihood” (Work, n.d.). It might 
mean “effective operation,” something “produced or accomplished by effort, exertion, or 
exercise of skill” or “something that results from a particular method of working, operat-
ing.” Work could also be “energy expended by natural phenomena” or the “result of such 
energy,” as in “dunes are the work of sea and wind.” In plural form it might mean “a place 
where industrial labor is carried on,” “the moving parts of a mechanism,” a “performance 
of moral or religious acts” and when something is “in the works” it is “in process of prepara-
tion, development, or completion.” Work in each of these definitions connotes dynamism, 
interminableness, practice, and performance.  
Memory work can be more personal or more collective, but always simultaneously 
involves individual agency and societal structure, just like any type of ‘work’. On a personal 
level, when we engage in memory work, we exert our faculty to remember in order to 
construct the past in the present. Memory work involves the body and mind and might 
therefore be the result of bodily energies and efforts. Memory work might require skill 
and exercise of skill, or involve particular methods or operating procedures. On a societal 
level, some people engage with the past in order to earn a livelihood; they are professional 
memory workers, such as archivists, curators, or historians. They help carry certain inter-
pretations of and reflections on the past into the future. Memory work might be performed 
industrially or following industrial logics, as in the case of the ‘nostalgia industry’, which 
includes cultural forms such as films, books and TV-series. What is true on both levels is 
that memory work always involves a process of preparation, development, and comple-
tion. Yet, when a past is ‘completed’ through memory work it is ready to be broken down 
again and to be built upon; new pasts are always in the works.
The term memory work has been employed across disciplines, but despite its casual use, 
it has only sparingly been theorized and not one, unequivocal definition or application of 
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the term dominates academic discourse. Most discussions on the concept, though, see 
memory work as something strictly human and as something intended, purposive, and 
conscious. Annette Kuhn (2010, p. 303), for example, suggests that memory work is a “con-
scious and purposeful staging of memory” and that it is an “active practice of remembering 
that takes an inquiring attitude towards the past.” Correspondingly, the past, and memo-
ries thereof, is “material for interpretation, to be interrogated, mined, for its meanings and 
its possibilities” (Kuhn, 2010, p. 3). Memory work, or memory-work, is also a social science 
research method developed by feminist scholar Frigga Haug and others in the 1980s (Onyx 
& Small, 2001; Haug, 1987). The method helps explore “the process whereby individual 
women become part of society, and the ways in which women themselves participate in 
that process of socialization” (Onyx & Small, 2001, p. 773). It thus uses participants’ in-
dividual memories of lived experience in order to reflect on and critically examine how 
they socially construct their identities. Most explicitly, Lohmeier and Pentzold (2014, p. 
778) conceive of memory work as “bundles of bodily and materially grounded practices 
to accomplish memories.” As such, memory work “involves purposive practices in and 
through which the past is expressively and consciously represented, interpreted, reflected 
and discursively negotiated” (Lohmeier & Pentzold, 2014, p. 779). 
Even though memory work can be purposive human engagement with the past, this 
dissertation argues that memory work is not only restricted to humans and not always 
purposive. Rather, objects, things, technologies, places, forms and content can be part of 
and engage in memory work too. That is, agency in memory work is not only reserved 
for humans, but is distributed among people and things. Objects, cultural and symbolic 
forms, and technologies may ‘steer’ and shape memory in peculiar ways, may contain it, 
and may remember for us.
This latter thought is inspired by actor-network-theory (ANT) and the work of Latour. In 
ANT, what is meant by ‘social’ differs from common usage of the term, both in academic 
and popular discourse. As Latour (2007) writes: “In most situations, we use ‘social’ to mean 
that which has already been assembled and acts as a whole, without being too picky on 
the precise nature of what has been gathered, bundled, and packaged together” (p. 43). 
That is ANT is “based on the assumption that ‘reality’ as we encounter it, is the product of 
complex interactions between human and non-human actors (e.g., technologies and arte-
facts)” (Van Loon, 2008, p. 114). Controversial in this theory is that agency is not reserved 
for human beings, as Van Loon (2008) writes: 
Actors can be humans, animals, technologies, angels and gods. That is, the nature 
of an actor is not predefined, it is simply linked to act, which in turn solely depends 
on whether the impact of its actions has consequences for other actors. Action is 
thus not tied to intentionality. (p. 115)
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In ANT, the social itself is deconstructed and not taken for granted as an essential structure 
or force. Latour (2007) argues that “there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, 
but there exist translations between mediators that may generate traceable associations” 
(p. 108, emphasis in original). These mediators translate, that is, they transform, distort, or 
alter the meaning or elements they transport within the network (i.e. they are not neutral) 
(Latour, 2007, p. 39). By treating actors and ‘nonhuman’ actants as mediators, social ties 
are problematized, yet simultaneously made less abstract and not taken for granted. 
Mystifying notions such as “social force” and “social dimension” are thus broken down. 
Likewise, memory work is a ‘social’ process wherein connections are made, and continu-
ally remade, between mediating and associating people, technologies, objects, and ideas. 
What is meant by this is best illustrated by an example. Consider the following scenario: 
In January 2013, Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands announced she would abdicate the 
throne in favor of her son, then Prince Willem-Alexander. Together with my wife, I watched 
the Queen’s address to the nation on TV. Millions of people watched it with us. We agreed 
that we saw Beatrix as a nice grandmother and exchanged our personal memories of her. 
We showed each other pictures of last year’s Queen’s Day on our phones. I sent a WhatsApp 
message to my mother, who is a royalty fan, and asked what she thought about the abdica-
tion. She said she was touched and told me how her just deceased father was a supporter 
of the royal family. I looked at my Facebook Newsfeed and concluded that joking memes 
were already being created. Much more happened during and right after the address, but 
this small amount of information provides more than enough material to make the point 
clear: the memory of Beatrix was reconfigured and reassembled collectively at the moment 
of her abdication, by people (Beatrix, my partner, me, my mother), by groups (the Dutch 
nation, me and my partner, Facebook users, cameramen), and materials (TV, memes, 
photographs, phone). Each of these nodes within this particular network of interaction, 
reassembled—some to a higher degree than others—my own memory of Beatrix, other 
individuals’ memory, and that of various groups.
The materiality of memory, or, rather, the intricate connections and translations between 
technologies of memory and actors engaged in memory work, begs more illustration in or-
der to lure it out of abstraction. In a provocative essay, Katrina Schlunke (2013) asserts that 
material objects can produce ever-changing “memory effects” and that they are therefore 
active in the translation and mediation of the past into the present:  
To think memory as also material, and so as memory effects, provides us with a 
more telling idea of why memory constantly exceeds any easy division between 
individual and collective and between the unconscious and conscious—for ‘effects’ 
are not divisible into any binary nor curtailed by any linear order of time. (pp. 253-
254)
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The physical and temporal dimensions of objects “order” or “structure” memory. Schlunke 
illustrates this by two different technologies of memory, in terms of physicality and tempo-
rality, concerning Captain Cook. One is a matchbox copied on which is displayed a minia-
ture version of E. Phillips Fox’s painting Landing of Captain Cook at Botany Bay, 1770. The 
other is a huge statue of Cook in Cairns, Australia. Both objects produce different effects in 
different times: where once the statue stood proud, it is now producing a memory effect 
that is no longer wanted: colonial oppression (2013, p. 259). In the case of the matchbox 
Cook is “inscribed in the ordinary”; miniaturized, Cook is to be played with and “no longer 
doing the national historic work of being an iconic and untouchable symbol of colonial 
control” (2013, p. 255). What becomes apparent in Schlunke’s examples is that the mate-
rial, in its mere presence, is capable of changing our ideas and attitudes towards the past. 
The insight that agency in memory work does not only lie in humans changes the way we 
can think about intentionality in memory work. A cultural object might be designed with 
a specific purpose in mind, but it might have unintended mnemonic effects. For example, 
a statue of a historical figure whose name we do not know might trigger a host of unex-
pected memories and associations. What is more, an object or symbolic form that was not 
intentionally designed or produced to carry particular knowledge or experience from one 
point in time and place to another might just do that. Van Dijck (2007, p. 7) describes these 
varying degrees of intentionality well: 
We can take a picture just for the sake of photographing or to later share the pho-
tographed moment with friends. While taking a picture, we may yet be unaware of 
its future material form or use. However, any picture—or, for that matter, any diary 
entry or video take—even if ordained to end up in a specific format, may materialize 
in an unintended or unforeseen arrangement.
This dissertation follows Van Dijck’s (2007, p. 5) definition of memory work as involving 
“a complex set of recursive activities that shape our inner worlds, reconciling past and 
present, allowing us to make sense of the world around us, and constructing an idea of 
continuity between self and others.” Van Dijck thus points at the dynamic and relational as-
pects of memory work—involving a set of practices, cultural forms and technologies—and 
at its function of bridging past and present. 
Following this line of thinking, memory work always involves processes of mediation and 
association on a number of levels. First and foremost, memory work mediates, on a tem-
poral level, between past and present and between present and future. On the one hand, 
the past is reconstructed in the present through memory work, which may include selec-
tion, interpretation, and meaning-making vis-à-vis the past. On the other, memory work 
designates the transference of the present and past into the future. Whereas documenting 
and registering the present are aimed at future recall, commemorating and reminiscing go 
back in time, linking the past to the present and vice versa. On a relational level, memory 
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work involves processes of mediation between people, between individual and group, 
and between people and ‘nonhuman’ things. On both the temporal and relational levels, 
this mediation can be done by the communication technologies we call media, but it is 
important to remember that memory work may involve (and always has involved) a vast 
range of mediators. 
Conceptually, memory work comes close to remembering. However, using the phrase 
‘memory work’ instead of ‘memory’ or ‘remembering’ is not a mere semantic trick. While 
remembering is often perceived of as the personal act of bringing something to mind again, 
memory work, from the start, involves practices, technologies, and cultural forms—it is 
socially embedded, materially distributed, shaped culturally, and mediated. The concept 
of memory work immediately points at the ‘social’ aspects of engaging with the past in the 
present, or carrying it, in specific form, into the future. The concept emphasizes the proce-
dural character of engagements with the past. By employing the idea of memory work, this 
dissertation clearly demarcates the terrain under investigation, instead of getting lost in 
all the different ways we might think of memory and remembering. Memory work, instead 
of ‘memory’ or ‘remembering’, immediately indicates the past as something ‘under con-
struction’ by not only individuals and groups, but also technologies and objects, who are 
socially and culturally embedded. Memory work is of all times and places, but is shaped 
by historical circumstances. The next section will explicate this idea by providing a short 
history of memory work.
A short history of memory work
Memory work has taken different shapes throughout human history. Technologies, prac-
tices, and cultural forms differ per time and place and have affected the shape of memory 
work. Simultaneously, memory work shapes these technologies, practices, and cultural 
forms. This section aims to show that memory work has always involved processes of 
mediation and association between people, things, ideas, places. Moreover, the goal here 
is to demonstrate that the past has always been an assemblage in the present and that 
technologies (especially media) have always imprinted their specific characteristics on 
memories they carry and transfer into the future. 
Such an overview is necessary in order to show that digital memory work—the focus of 
the rest of this dissertation—is a product of evolution, rather than revolution. Simultane-
ously, it allows investigations into what is new about digital memory work, how it differs 
from previous eras in which different media were dominant. That is, how digital memory 
work can be seen as constitutive of a new era of memory. Throughout the below, the goal 
is not to answer the question what memory is in terms of the internal workings of the 
human brain and its cognitive functions. The goal here is to show that memory work is 
constituted by practices, technologies, and cultural forms, ranging from the oral tradition 
and mnemotechniques to the book and electronic and media today. In memory work, 
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political forces and power structures in the present as well as the past continue to affect 
what knowledge and experience is transferred and reconstructed but also how and why: 
“the past […] is not a dry, neutral record of what went before but an ideologically inflected 
cultural resource that communicators draw upon in their interactions with others” (Blair, 
2006, p. 57). 
An excellent guide for this short but necessary trip through the history of memory can 
be found in the work of Annales School historian Jacques Le Goff (1992). Le Goff (1992, p. 
54) distinguishes four phases in the history of memory that lead up to a fifth, the contem-
porary “overflowing” of memory: “(1) ethnic memory in societies without writing, called 
‘primitive’; (2) the rise of memory, from orality to writing, from prehistory to Antiquity; (3) 
medieval memory, in equilibrium between the oral and the written; (4) the progress of writ-
ten memory, from the sixteenth century to the present.” Le Goff’s historical periodization is 
based upon the work of French paleontologist Leroi-Gourhan, who divided up the history 
of memory according to dominant forms of communication: “oral transmission, written 
transmission with tables or indices, simple file cards, mechanical writing, and electronic 
sequencing” (cited in Le Goff, 1992, p. 54).7
Although Le Goff´s approach to the history of memory discusses dominant attitudes to-
ward the past and memory work, these phases are not cleanly separated from each other 
but flow into each other, both in space and time. Of course, we still orally transmit knowl-
edge and experiences of the past. However, our dominant means of transferring the past 
into the future have radically changed. Instead of “memory specialists” such as historians 
of the court, elders, and priests, who would authoritatively pass on what was important for 
society to remember, contemporary societies use semi-automated, technology-supported 
means of memory work. These shifts have had implications for the power dynamics at 
play in memory work. Whereas the power to interpret and re-present the past lay, for the 
largest part of human history, in the hands of the socio-political élite, it has gradually come 
to involve different and more actors. However, to say that memory work has been truly 
liberating throughout history is a fallacy: certain actors have had and will have a stronger 
voice in memory work than others, depending on their capital (economic, cultural, social), 
practices and access to and use of resources and technologies.
Le Goff first discusses societies that did not have a system of writing. These societies 
(constituting the greater part of human history) consisted of small, closely-knit and often 
tribal groups who transmitted their pasts from generation to generation through oral his-
tories. These “ethnic memories” often had a genealogical character and were infused with 
7 What must not be forgotten is that Le Goff’s classification of memory is focused on Western culture and his-
tory. Nevertheless, his approach is useful to provide a structured overview of the state and status of memory 
throughout history. The goal of this section is therefore not to provide an in-depth discussion of the various 
periods of memory, but rather to demonstrate that the state and status of memory differ and are dependent 
on dominant sociotechnical and communicative arrangements of societies in time. Even though Le Goff’s 
work will be central in this section, it will be amended by views from other historians of memory. 
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myth (Le Goff, 1992, p. 55). A group’s past was carried by elders and was therefore “living,” 
in a sense that it was not, or barely, archived or stored (Hutton, 1993, p. 17). Thus, memory 
was also granted “more freedom and creative possibilities”; it was free and vital (Le Goff, 
1992, p. 57). Therefore, Daniel Lowenthal (1985) writes in an important study, for people 
living in these societies “the past was not a foreign country but their own” (p. 13). Ancestral 
spirits played a role in the everyday lives of people within societies with oral traditions. At 
the same time, the past had to explain present events and relationships. Memory work was 
instrumental in this; it was central to judging current and past events and it legitimatized 
social order in the present (Evans-Pritchard, 1986, p. 105). Key in this mnemonic social 
cohesion were habit, ritual, custom and performance, which structured the knowledge 
of the past and were prompted by “the felt need to reiterate the wisdom bequest by the 
past” (Hutton, 1993, p. 17). Memory was highly valued because these cultures without 
script depended on it to be the keeper of custom, tradition, and rules, but also, the basic 
knowledge of the practices of everyday life (Carruthers, 2008, p. 12). Therefore, Rose (2003, 
p. 70) writes, “people’s memories, internal records of their own experience, must have been 
their most treasured—but also fragile—possessions.”  
The second phase in the history of memory Le Goff (1992) distinguishes is that of so-
cieties in which literacy existed but was far surpassed by individual memorization as a 
technique of keeping the past. Memory work in Antiquity was more a matter of technique 
than technology. In Greek and Roman antiquity, memory as human capacity was highly 
valued and treasured among philosophers and the intellectual élite. For example, Plato 
(427-347 BC) remarks that all “knowledge is but remembrance” and Cicero (106-43 BC) 
states that memory is “the treasury and guardian of all things” (qtd. in Misztal, 2003, p. 
31). Memory work was seen as an art on which a life of learning was based. Cicero saw 
individual memory as something that needed to be trained in order for one to become a 
good orator and before him the Greek poet Simonides of Ceos (c. 556-468 BC) developed a 
technique of mental image-places, memory palaces, in which mnemonic objects could be 
placed for later retrieval (Le Goff, 1992, p. 65; Hutton, 1993, pp. 27-28).8 
The ancient philosophers were skeptical of using writing for memorizing. Plato—writing 
down the thoughts of his teacher, Socrates—makes this point clear in his famous allegory 
of the God Teuth who exhibits his invention of writing to the king of Egypt, Thamus. The 
latter, unimpressed, reacts: 
Those who acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful; they 
will rely upon writing to bring things to their remembrance by external signs instead 
8 Today, this technique is still used by participants in memory contests, as Joshua Foer demonstrated in his 
bestseller Moonwalking with Einstein. Additionally, an incredible amount of self-help books concerning mne-
monics also exists. Apparently, memorizing has become gimmicky in our present societies, in which mass 
digital storage and recording has replaced our efforts to remember by heart.   
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of on their own internal resources. What you have discovered is a recipe for recollec-
tion, not for memory. (Plato, 1973, p. 96)
Writing, especially in ancient Greece, was regarded subordinate to memorizing things in-
ternally. The technique, or art, of memory was seen as the basis of all learning and all true 
knowledge and, therefore, was thoroughly studied and esteemed, whereas the technolo-
gies of memory, for example the wax tablet and writing on paper, were reluctantly used 
(Hacking, 1995, p. 203). Writing did enable commemoration and documentary recording to 
emerge as mnemonic practices, but on a small scale (Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 114). 
Behind the technique of remembering advocated and practiced in the ancient world 
lay a deeper mode of thinking. The paradigm through which thinkers and orators made 
sense of the world was wholly based on this systematic training of individual memory. 
Memorized knowledge was the master key, the clavis universalis, to understanding of the 
universe (Hutton, 1993, p. 29). The memory places or palaces described above functioned 
as the prime technique of memory work for some 2000 years. It was considered an art, Ars 
Memoriae, and was explained in books such as Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero’s De Oratore, 
and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (Yates, 1966; Carruthers, 2008). Historian Frances Yates 
(1966) shows that the art of memory has been used for different purposes and through 
different philosophical lenses, from the ancient Greeks to the Renaissance Neo-Platonists. 
In his History as an Art of Memory, Hutton (1993) extends Yates’s thesis by arguing that the 
early Neapolitan historian Giambattista Vico (1670-1744) reinterpreted the art of memory 
as a “technique to uncover forgotten origins understood as lost poetic powers,” an idea 
that resonated in the poems of the Romantics (Hutton, 1993, p. 35). Early written texts 
formed Vico’s body of study, as he tried to unveil the mysteries and truths about the oral 
tradition. Ultimately, Hutton (1993, p. 51) argues, Vico’s approach to the history of mem-
ory was an art of memory in itself, “for it enabled historians in the modern age to unlock 
memories hidden in the recesses of a distant past in which ideas and images were directly 
connected.” Hutton shows that the art of memory has transformed throughout history and 
has been used for different purposes within changing societal, scientific, and philosophical 
paradigms. One of the most important factors in the changing faces and uses of memory 
was writing, something Vico has also argued.
However, not until the third phase within the history of memory Le Goff (1992) describes, 
a growing balance between literacy and internal memorization can be found. Even though 
oral traditions and trained memory practices were still important and highly valued in 
pre-modern European societies, written materials about the past were increasingly being 
spread which resulted in a “tension maintained between those two forms” (Innes, 1998, 
p. 3). Like societies with an oral tradition, memory in medieval peasant communities was 
local and familial, rather than national (Fentress & Wickam, 1992, p. 153). Memory work re-
volved around Christianity, from being structured by the church calendar to being shaped 
by religious education (Le Goff, 1992, pp. 68-72). Moreover, “[i]n the Middle Ages, memory 
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enjoyed a high status not only because it was valued enormously as a container of virtues 
and an instrument of thought, but also because of concerns about loss of knowledge” 
(Misztal, 2003, p. 36). In similar vein, Carruthers (2008, p. 14) states:
The choice to train one’s memory or not, for the ancients and medievals, was not a 
choice dictated by convenience: it was a matter of ethics. A person without memory, 
if such a thing could be, would be a person without moral character and, in a basic 
sense, without humanity. 
In her fascinating work on memory in the Middle Ages, The Book of Memory, Carruthers 
(2008) argues that “medieval culture was fundamentally memorial” and that training of 
memory was the basis not only of learning but also of “character, judgment, citizenship and 
piety” (pp. 9-11). Books, which were valuable and often not in possession of the scholar, 
were used to memorize from, instead of being used as a reference. Memory, or memoria 
as Carruthers (2008) describes mnemonic culture, was much more than just a technique 
of memorization; it was a “rich complex of practices and values” (p. 16). Thus, individual 
memory acquired through training was still, like in Antiquity, trusted over the externaliza-
tion of it through writing. During the Renaissance, the ancient art of memory was, like the 
arts in general, reborn and gave rise to a renewed interest in the past (Hutton, 1993, p. xiii).
The fourth phase within the history of memory roughly emerges around the time of the 
introduction of the printing press. Elizabeth Eisenstein (2012) argues that the use of the 
printing press ushered in subsequent standardization and increased dissemination of the 
text. This resulted in the gradual stability of a vision of the past. On multiple levels, but very 
apparently so on that of commonly held beliefs and knowledge, the printing press was an 
agent of change. This period was marked by a new type of text-based historical conscious-
ness and shared memory which “depended on the readers’ awareness of temporality, and 
this in turn led to the recasting of mnemonic schemes, previously conceived spatially, onto 
timelines on which historical events served as places of memory” (Hutton, 1993, p. 19) and 
the realization that “knowledge, even the most important parts of it, could no longer be 
held in memory” (Yeo, 2001, p. 78). 
Important to note is that this process of change from memory based on an oral tradition 
to textual literacy was a gradual process affected by many historical actors, both emergent 
and residual. Innovations converged with traditional ways to re-present the past, capture 
the present, and transfer it into the future. For example, Eisenstein (1966) notes that “the 
mythical and historical remained blurred for a full two centuries after printing” (p. 51). Le 
Goff’s (1992) distinction of the different historical modes of memory are similar to Hutton’s 
(1993) linking of changing modes of communication to historical perspectives on memory: 
“orality with the reiteration of memory; manuscript literacy with the recovery of lost wis-
dom; print literacy with the reconstruction of a distinct past; and media literacy with the 
deconstruction of the forms with which past images are composed” (p. 16). 
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The widespread use of the printing press and subsequent rise of print culture steered a 
number of historical factors that cumulated in the emergence of a national consciousness 
and the imagined community of the nation (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawn; 
1990). Memory work played an important part in this from the 19th century onward. Gellner 
(1983) and Anderson (2006) argue that the national language of print instigated a common 
and stabilized language in which common national denominators could be expressed. In 
other words, citizens could “think the nation,” something that was impossible before the 
existence of a common print culture and a capitalist system of production and dissemina-
tion that supported it (Anderson, 2006, pp. 44-46). Anderson (2006) takes the formation of 
the United States of America at the end of the 18th Century as an example. He argues that 
“pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial creole printmen played the decisive role” in 
the struggle for independence from the old world and the creation of the image of the 
nation, not economic interests, Liberalism, or Enlightenment (p. 65). 
New world bureaucracies and the creation and spread of local newspapers, which 
represented local and regional imagined communities, were economically beneficial for 
businessmen of the new world—printer-journalists had a good market in the colonies—but 
it was the content of these newspapers that created a sense of colonial community that 
differed greatly from a continental one. In the colonies’ footsteps, during the early 19th Cen-
tury in Europe, with rising literacy rates, starting among the Bourgeoisie, “it became easier 
to arouse popular support [for the Revolutions], with the masses discovering a new glory in 
the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along” (Anderson, 2006, p. 80). 
Language is crucial in imagining a community and building “particular solidarities” upon 
which nationalism is constructed, but “[p]rint-language is what invents nationalism, not a 
particular language per se” (Anderson, 2006, pp. 133-134).9
With the spread of nationalism came the idea of expressing the nation in historical terms. 
Great men and glorious battles were the “pearls strung along a thread of narrative” of an 
invented ancient national past (Anderson, 2006, p. 109). In the writing of coherent national 
narratives in 19th century Europe, the resurrection and appropriation of historical figures 
and events for the uses of the present becomes apparent (Hobsbawn, 1990, pp. 52-57). For 
example, past leaders who did not even speak the language of the imagined nation they 
historically represented were used for the construction of present nationhood, or a specific 
date coupled to an event was chosen as the founding of a nation (Anderson, 2006, pp. 109, 
137). In modern nations, historical heroes are remembered, but their specific historical 
contexts and existences are forgotten (Anderson, 2006, pp. 201-203). 
Especially Anderson’s treatment of imagined communities can be extended beyond 
the context of the nation and the rise of nationalism. His ideas about history, memory, 
and forgetting are crucial in the coherence and unity of the ideas about a group’s past 
9 However, what Anderson calls the “Last Wave” of nationalism was able to bypass print-language through new 
means of communication, thus reaching literate and illiterate masses simultaneously (p. 140).
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and their identity (Broersma & Koopmans, 2010). Communication technologies, like the 
printing press in Anderson’s case study, can help produce and disseminate ideas about an 
imagined group present and past existence. Doing so, they can temporarily fix and stabilize 
a certain people’s associations with each other in the present and to an imagined past that 
helps strengthen these associations. Group identity can be formed through these stabi-
lized associations between people and past and present, like Anderson shows in terms of 
the nation.
The idea that there have been clean historical and cultural discontinuities in the types, 
ways, places, and forms of memory work throughout the past is an artificial, yet helpful, 
construction. Today, people still visit museums, libraries, and archives, watch the eight ‘o 
clock news, celebrate national memorial days, write personal diaries, and still take pictures 
for individual use only. Simultaneously, however, they share memoires on their Facebook 
pages, visit memorial websites, write blog entries, link to each other’s and televised stories, 
and edit and spread iconic news photographs that help shape particular group memories. 
In other words, the types, ways, practices, places and forms of memory work change 
alongside media and communication technologies. Media, as technological carriers of 
information, change: some are forgotten, influence each other, given new meaning and 
some are invented anew. This leaves its marks on memory work. The present and past are 
made sense of and used both in ‘old’ and ‘new’ ways, and by mixes of ways. This has been 
true throughout the past. As we have seen in this section, from oral cultures through print 
culture to today, techniques, and technologies played an instrumental role in memory 
work and the status of memory at different historical moments. Insights such as these have 
a long history in sociology, cultural studies, history and what has fairly recently been called 
memory studies. The next section will therefore delve deeper into the epistemological 
ground laid under the concept of memory work.      
A short history of memory studies
Any history of memory work is a history of memory studies. The historians of mnemonic 
practices, objects and forms are themselves embedded within intellectual environments 
and traditions that are specific to their times. Whereas the first three sections of this chap-
ter developed the idea of memory work and its variations throughout history, this section 
will trace the intellectual lineages of the idea. The goal of this section is not only to show 
how theorists have thought about the “social dimension” of memory and memory work, 
but also how theoretical concepts such as “collective memory” (Halbwachs, 1992) and 
“cultural memory” (Assmann, 1995, 1997) are products of their time and require updating 
and rethinking in the digital age. How memory work can be “rethought” is the topic of the 
next two chapters and the short history of the field that follows in this section provides the 
basis for these chapters. 
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In the example of the rise of nationalism, memory studies’ own historical context be-
comes ostensible. Since the 19th century, which saw a rapid increase in scientific research 
and academic activity, the scientific and philosophical inquiry first into history and then 
into memory was starting to become more popular. With the spread of nationalism in 
this century came monuments, national holidays and an increased interest in national 
histories (Anderson, 2006, p. 194; White, 1973, pp. 135-143). The studies of memory in the 
nineteenth century that were the result of this interest were not detached from research 
in biology and natural science, but were seen as extensions of it (Olick et al., 2011, p. 12). 
Examples of this are studies by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Ewald Hering, Samuel Butler, and 
Richard Semon who used insights of (evolutionary) biology to explain cultural traits, using 
terms like “species-memory” and “mnemes” (Olick et al., 2011, pp. 11-12). It was not until 
1902, however, when the term “collective memory” was first used by Austrian novelist Hugo 
von Hofmannsthal who wrote of “piled up layers of accumulated collective memory,” but 
this was a poetic rather than an academic use of the phrase (qtd. in Olick & Robbins, 1998, 
p. 106). 
With the formal institutionalization of sociology at the end of the nineteenth century a 
rather new approach to memory emerged. In the 1920s and 1930s, historian Marc Bloch 
used the term collective memory in his studies of feudal society; art historian Aby Warburg 
applied the term social memory to art as repositories of history; and pioneering psycholo-
gists Pierre Janet and Lev Vygotsky approached memory in the light of the experience of 
time and as being wholly influenced by culture (Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 106). A student of 
both philosopher Henri Bergson and sociologist Émile Durkheim, Maurice Halbwachs pub-
lished his landmark study Social Frameworks of Memory in 1925, which still is considered 
to be a foundational text in collective memory studies. Halbwachs developed his theory of 
the social frameworks of memory while he worked at the University of Strasbourg. Here, his 
ideas were shaped in a rich and progressive intellectual climate. Halbwachs sparred intel-
lectually with historians such as Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, but also with psychologist 
Charles Blondel (Coser, 1992, pp. 5-6). This is important to note because especially his 
Legendary Topography of the Gospels of the Holy Land is very much a response to these 
intellectuals who attacked Halbwachs for his Durkheimian approach to the social.10
Halbwachs’s Social Frameworks of Memory is often quoted throughout the literature on 
memory, but is sparsely discussed at length. While it is not the aim here to thoroughly 
critique Halbwachs, his work has been highly influential in studies of memory and memory 
work. His basic point is that “one may say that the individual remembers by placing himself 
in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group real-
izes and manifests itself in individual memories” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 40). In other words, 
10 Lewis Coser’s introduction to On Collective Memory describes how Halbwachs was part of a young and aspir-
ing group of interdisciplinary scholars in France right after the First World War. The discussions these intellec-
tuals had are very similar to academic debates over interdisciplinarity today.
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“memory is a collective function” (p. 183). This implicates, explains Pentzold (2009, p. 258), 
that: 
Memory is constructed in the individual during communication with other mem-
bers of a given social constellation. It lives and sustains itself in communication 
processes. Moreover, memories act like social order parameters or frames (cadres 
socieaux). An individual places his/her thoughts in given frameworks and therefore 
participates in a collective memory so that he/she is capable of the act of recollec-
tion. 
Without others, or the social frameworks subjects are formed by and interact with, there 
is no structure or coherence in memory, Halbwachs argues: memories are “recalled to 
us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things 
concerned. In reality, we are never alone,” he writes (1992, p. 23). People cannot think 
about a past event without using a structuring language. “Discoursing,” Halbwachs calls 
this and to discourse “means to connect with a single system of ideas our opinions as well 
as those of our circle” (1992, p. 53). Consequently, memories are collective even though 
others might not have shared them. “It suffices,” Halbwachs (1992, p. 53) writes, “that we 
cannot consider them except from outside—that is, by putting ourselves in the position of 
others—and that in order to retrieve these remembrances we must tread the same path 
that others would have followed had they been in our position.”
Halbwachs continues deliberating three important social institutions that constitute so-
cial frameworks of memory in his time: the family, the religious group, and social class. He 
discusses rules, codes, and conventions in each of these social settings that guide interac-
tion and structure feeling, which in their turn direct a certain worldview and sense-making. 
Additionally, he shows that through traditions, ceremonies and rituals the specific group 
is held intact and reaffirms a subject’s place in it. Through these processes a “traditional 
armor” is created that shows to which group a certain person belongs and simultaneously 
carries around and is reminded of (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 59). Pivotal in this idea is that: 
There is no point in seeking where they are preserved in my brain or in some nook of 
my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the 
groups of which I am part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon 
condition, to be sure that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, 
their way of thinking.  (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 38)
Halbwachs repeatedly tells his readers that underlying the mechanisms of the institu-
tions he discusses are the deeper structures of society. This is also the case for collective 
memory. Even though groups reconstruct the past “with the aid of the material traces, 
rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that past,” but simultaneously, and maybe more 
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importantly, “with the aid moreover of recent psychological and social data, that is to 
say, with the present” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 119). Halbwachs argues against Freud’s ideas 
on memory that had become popular around that time. Freud (1966) believed that all 
memories were unconsciously stored as in an encyclopedic archive and could actively be 
retrieved through psychoanalysis. Halbwachs, by studying his own dreams, argued that in 
the unconscious state of sleep it is impossible to remember coherently and, consequently, 
a social framework is needed to do so (Coser, 1992, p. 23; Halbwachs, 1992, pp. 41-42; 
Hutton, 1993, p. 78).    
At this point, it is vital to remind that Maurice Halbwachs was heavily influenced by 
Émile Durkheim’s ideas on sociology and society. Durkheim has often been criticized of his 
conceptualization of society as an abstract, metaphysical being that is disconnected from 
the individual subjects that collectively constitute it. Historians Gedi and Elam (1996) are 
right in stating that “all ‘collective’ terms are problematic—and ‘collective memory’ is no 
exception—because they are conceived of as having capacities that are in fact actualized 
only on an individual level, that is, they can only be performed by individuals” (p. 34). In 
Durkheim’s sense, social forces and deep social structures steer society and its individuals, 
rather than the ever-shifting associations—that can be located in symbols, representa-
tions, documents, institutions, working practices, artifacts, talk, etc.—between individuals 
that are called groups or collectives (cf. Tarde, 2000; Latour, 2007; Olick et al., 2011, p. 20). 
Halbwachs is more careful than Durkheim in his distribution of social power in societies, 
but it is crucial to note that there is the danger of hyperbole when it comes to the descrip-
tion of collective memory and thus making it otherworldly. Gedi and Elam (1996) go as 
far as to argue that “the inconcreteness of ‘collective memory’ is the stumbling block in 
Halbwachs’ theory” (p. 38). Indeed, collective memory is constructed by people, materials, 
practices, institutions, and places; or, to put it simply, memory is made of ‘stuff’ that can be 
tracked, traced, and studied. It is not mystical or placed outside the associations between 
individuals, things, and organizations. 
These associations do, however, influence ideas and actions and why, what, where, when 
and how individuals in collectives engage in memory work. Consequently, there is always 
a political or ideological layer to memory work. After Halbwachs, and especially from the 
1980s onwards, a host of memory researchers have rightly focused on the materiality, poli-
tics, and ideology of memory, lifting the mystical aura of collective memory to show that 
“collective memories do not exist in the abstract” (Neiger et al., 2011, p. 3). Nevertheless, 
Halbwachs laid the foundation for these socio-political inquiries into memory. 
The early work by Halbwachs, other Durkheimians, and the (social) psychologists of the 
first two decades of the 20th century was followed by a relatively quiet period in the history 
of sociological inquiries into memory, but it is a myth that Halbwachs’ work was largely 
forgotten, only to be rediscovered during the late 1980s (Olick and Robbins, p. 107; Olick et 
al. p. 139, p. 157). Halbwachs’ empirical study of collective memory, La topographie légen-
daire des évangiles en terre sainte, translated as The Legendary Topography of the Gospels 
Chapter 1  |  From memory to memory work 
40
in the Holy Land was published in 1941, four years before his death in a Nazi concentration 
camp.11 The heritage of his thoughts can be found in studies by sociologists and anthro-
pologists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss’s The Savage Mind (1962), Lloyd Warner’s The Living 
and the Dead (1959), E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s famous book The Nuer (1940) and maybe most 
explicitly in Roger Bastide’s The African Religions of Brazil (1960). These landmark studies 
use the foundation of Halbwachs’s work in order to further examine memory work and the 
function of the present in the shaping of the past.
Although an in-depth examination of the theories expressed in these works is out of 
reach here, it is essential to note that these authors all reevaluated the concept of time 
in relation to memory. Their case studies of religious, city, and tribal communities focus 
on the rituals and traditions with regard to the past and veneration of ancestors. Memory 
is reinterpreted as myth, often religious, and is considered to be a well of timelessness, 
tapped into and kept alive through rituals and traditions whose origins are lost, but at the 
same time have a present social function to keep the group intact. Simultaneously, living 
memory, that is, the memory of living generations passes into myth over time and the 
markers and places that carry memory are dependent on the present socio-geographical 
situation of the group. Therefore, collective memory of a specific group can only survive 
“insofar as they can insulate themselves in the existing frameworks of society” (Bastide, 
2011, p. 162). Bastide and his contemporaries wrote their studies of tribal memory in a time 
in which the broadcast media, and especially television, gained influence within the media 
landscape. Media theorists started to analyze in what ways electronic media influenced 
society and cultural practices therein. From the 1970s onward this type of investigation 
also turned its critical lens toward memory, which cumulated in the so-called ‘memory 
boom’ of the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most important concepts developed in this 
new surge of research are part of what Le Goff (1992) has called the “contemporary revolu-
tions” of memory. 
Research into the politics of identity and ideology and the social construction of knowl-
edge and society were—and still are—pivotal to the understanding of memory work in 
these terms.12 In their excellent delineations and histories of the field of memory studies, 
Olick et al. (2011) and Olick and Robbins (1998) show that the interest in collective memory 
has its roots in new ways of examining issues of power, identity, ideology, and other mat-
ters of social organization. The conception that “identities are projects and practices, not 
properties” and that they are socially and historically constructed within the dynamics of 
normalization and contestation has been extended to the realm of memory (Olick & Rob-
bins, 1998, p. 122). Olick et al. (2011) write:
11 A short biography of Halbwachs can be found in Lewis Coser’s introduction to On Collective Memory and here 
(in German): http://www-classic.uni-graz.at/sozwww/agsoe/lexikon/klassiker/halbwachs/22bio.htm
12 Countering the surge of cognitive studies into memory at the end of the 1980s, John Shotter (1990), for ex-
ample, eminently argues for social constructivist approaches to memory.
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We now take for granted ‘constructionist’ approaches that emphasize the ways im-
ages of the past distort, are deployed for instrumental purposes, propagate myths, 
and so on. In the process, however, we should not forget the novelty and power of 
such perspectives, nor should we reduce them to a version of ‘lies my country told 
me.’ (p. 42)
This insight led to studies of memory that focused on practices, (social) institutions, 
places, and objects and their relation to overarching themes like identity and ideology. For 
example, well-known studies that examine the socio-historical construction of the nation 
in terms of national memory are Nora’s (1989) inventory of French sites of memory (Lieux 
de mémoire) and similar projects in other countries like the United States, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (Loewen, 1995, 1999; François and Schulze, 2005; 
Winter, 1995; Van Vree et al., 2010). These large projects can be connected to the “intense 
and widespread interest” to the linking of memory and national identity and the con-
temporary memory industry (Kammen, 1991, p. 3). On the topic of American Presidents, 
themselves emblems of the American nation, Thomas Johnson (1995) and Barry Schwartz 
(2000), respectively, argued how the image of Nixon and Lincoln has been remodeled 
under the hammer of time.
Jan Assmann (1995, 1997) developed the influential term “cultural memory,” in order to 
tackle the difficulties of memory with regard to the individual and the collective, ideology 
and identity, and contestation within groups and society at large. Refining and updating 
Halbwachs’s theory, Assmann (1995) defines collective memory as “a collective concept 
for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive frameworks of 
a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and 
initiation” (p. 126). He distinguishes cultural memory from communicative memory which 
is constituted by “those varieties of collective memory that are based exclusively on every-
day communications” (p. 126). As such, the latter form is non-specialized, role-reciprocal, 
thematically instable and disorganized. Moreover, communicative memory has a moving 
temporal horizon of three to four generations, or about 80 to 100 years, as it is dependent 
on living, communicative subjects and has no fixed or binding point in time (pp. 126-127). 
Communicative memory can, however, pass into objectivized culture, for example texts, 
monuments, and rites. In this process of transition, the link to the group creating this refer-
ence is not lost, Assmann (1995) contends, because through this “concretion of identity” 
groups derive “formative and normative impulses” that reproduce their identity (p. 128).   
The subsequent cultural memory that emerges from this process of transition has 
a fixed point and is marked by a distance from everyday communication. In this sense, 
cultural memory is transcended ‘lived’ memory that is maintained through cultural forms 
(texts, rituals, buildings) and institutional communication, which leads to the “culturally 
institutionalized heritage of a society” (Assmann, 1995, p. 130). The stabilization of cultural 
memory through objectification supports a clear demarcation of the group and thus cre-
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ates a sense of belonging and identity. This does not mean that cultural memory cannot be 
reconstructed in order to relate to the present. Here, the archive of stored objectifications 
of the past acts as a “total horizon” of uses of the past and it enables a “mode of actual-
ity” (p. 130). Of course, this is a process of institutionalized selection, specialization, and 
cultivation and it generates a “clear system of values” and attributes different degrees of 
importance to certain symbols (p. 131). The last point that Assmann makes in his descrip-
tion of cultural memory is its inherent reflexivity. Common practices are made sense of and 
given meaning through proverbs, rites, values, etc. Moreover, cultural memory “draws on 
itself to explain, distinguish, reinterpret, criticize, censure, control, surpass” information 
about the past (p. 132).
Assmann’s model of cultural and communicative memory can be critiqued in the light 
of digital technology. Zierold (2008), for example, asserts that “recent memory processes 
in fact cannot be discussed as part of ‘cultural memory,’ as this is defined as referring to 
founding myths of an absolute past” (p. 401). The vast pool of electronically and digitally 
recorded memories of the past 80-100 years—the timespan of communicative memory 
Assmann identified—cannot be regarded in these mythic terms. Therefore, Zierold (2008) 
argues, “a more abstract, non-normative concept of memory which accepts that the forms 
of social memory change together with the development of the media broadens the hori-
zons and brings into focus just those kinds of contrary and paradoxical developments we 
experience today” (p. 402). Moreover, the constant hyperlinking, sharing, friending, liking, 
online can be seen as active practices with both a communicative and a cultural dimension 
that help shape our understanding of the past—as will be discussed more in depth later. 
In response to Assmann’s model, Marita Sturken (1997) defines cultural memory as 
“memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled 
with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning” (p. 3). Thus, Sturken shows how 
the meaning of individual memory changes when it is shared publicly and how cultural 
texts and objects are intertwined with history. She also stresses the importance of popular 
culture in the formation of cultural memory. Sturken’s idea of cultural memory is similar 
to popular memory, a notion first introduced by Michel Foucault. Popular memory, closely 
related to Foucault’s notion of counter-memory, is the historical knowledge of a group 
that is placed outside official historical discourse (Foucault, 2011, pp. 252-253). Today, 
this popular memory is being reprogrammed by television and cinema, “[s]o people are 
shown not what they were, but what they must remember having been” (Foucault, 2011, p. 
253). Being concerned with power and control throughout his work, Foucault argues that 
the control over what people watch and thus remember about themselves is a powerful 
tool in politically positioning groups: “if one controls people’s memory, one controls their 
dynamism. And one also controls their experience, their knowledge of previous struggles” 
(p. 253). 
Foucault’s concerns were shared and methodologically extended and applied by the 
Popular Memory Group, a research team at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
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Cultural Studies, between 1979 and 1980. Looking at popular memory as a “dimension of 
political practice” the Popular Memory Group (1982) examined oral histories and media 
texts (p. 211). They underwrote the importance of telecommunications in the construc-
tion of collective forms of memory, something that will be further elaborated on in the 
next chapter. They stated: “of all parts of the historical apparatus the electronic media are 
perhaps the most compelling and ubiquitous” (Popular Memory Group, 1982, p. 209). By 
the 1980s, television and, more broadly, visual culture, had become one of the key popular 
providers of information about the past, which led to studies of popular memory such 
as George Lipsitz’s Time Passages (1990) and Edgerton and Rollins’s edition Television 
Histories (2001). 
The abovementioned authors are all primarily concerned with the relationship between 
popular conceptions of history, shared ‘unofficial’ memories, and the mediation of the 
past through cultural object and technologies. They focus on identity politics, resistance to 
dominant ideologies, social power and control through memory work. The past, in these 
views, is very much the battleground of present interests. This dissertation ascribes to 
these insights, but also aims to update and appropriate them to the study of contemporary 
memory work. What happens when memory work takes place in a media-saturated world? 
How do our pasts change when our practices, cultural forms, and technologies that are 
used to express and carry it are increasingly digital? And, how is the power to shape our 
pasts re-distributed within a society in which media are omnipresent and pervasive? Have 
we entered a “fifth stage” of memory, as Le Goff (1992) would phrase it? And, if the answer 
is yes, how do the dominant media of our time enable, shape and partake in memory 
construction? Such questions will be the focus of the next chapter.

2
Memory work in a new media ecology
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We do know that the media do not transport public memory innocently. They shape 
it in their very structure and form. 
(Huyssen, 2003, p. 20)
The previous chapter conceptualized memory work as the engagement with the past 
through and by specific practices, technologies, and cultural forms. This chapter expands 
this conceptualization by scrutinizing the role of media in memory work. Media are seen 
here as our primary, material technologies of communication. They enable and shape spe-
cific practices and produce particular cultural forms. Technology in this sense is regarded 
in terms of usage and practice, not as something static. Technologies are supportive but 
also adaptive; they can be strategically used to certain ends and play an active role in 
the recording of the present and the reconstruction of the past. Therefore, media can be 
described as technologies of memory with particular characteristics that enable, shape, 
and restrict memory work, yet are themselves altered through their use. 
Technologies, however, are never “merely” material instruments. They are supported 
and produced within industries, have an institutional basis, and are surrounded by par-
ticular discourses. A vast range of norms, values, and social practices are connected to 
technologies: they have a social and cultural status and reputation. This is especially true 
for the technologies we call media. Media, while technologies, are also organizations that 
help construct reality by representing it. Moreover, they exert influence over other social 
institutions, ranging from politics to sports, and they shape practices of everyday life. This 
makes media powerful actors in the ways in which societies are organized and cultures 
operate.    
Following this line of thinking, media not just contain or transfer our past but actively 
shape it. For one, media may create the sense of a shared past. They also allow individuals 
to share past experiences with others. In both cases, they help carry particular experience 
and knowledge of the past into the present and future. In other words, media are technolo-
gies of memory (Huyssen, 2003; Van House & Churchill, 2008; Sturken, 2008), an idea that 
will be developed in the first section of this chapter. The second section introduces the 
panoramic theory of mediatization, a highly debated term that, described simply, aims 
to fathom the consequences of the increasing pervasiveness and infiltration of media 
in everyday life and other social institutions. The question that this sections sets out to 
answer is how mediatization theory can help us make sense of contemporary memory 
work. The third section peruses the notion of ecology, both in discussions of media and 
memory. An ecological approach to media and memory may be helpful in studying their 
relationship after what Hoskins (2011a, 2011c) has called “the connective turn,” the shift 
towards mobile, participatory, and personal media that foster and monetize connectivity 
(Van Dijck, 2013). The chapter thus moves from theories pertaining to broadcast media to 
those relating to digital platforms. However, the chapter attempts to show continuity next 
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to emergence. Indeed, as Gitelman (2008) has shown, new media are never truly new, nor 
is the memory work associated with them. 
Media as Technologies of Memory
One way we can think of media is as the technological means that enable, facilitate, dis-
seminate, and preserve communicative forms and symbolic content. Communication 
here is seen as the foundation of culture and society. It is the process that is the basis of 
all socialization and the social construction of reality (cf. Williams 1958, 1981). Media as 
carriers and enablers of communicative forms and content are therefore essential in the 
meaning-making process. Their disseminative quality supports communication within and 
beyond groups and helps create new ones. Media are both material technologies—such 
as video cameras, books, or phones—and social organizations and they idiosyncratically 
support and shape particular kinds of communication within different social settings. Fur-
thermore, this section argues, they can be active agents in the shaping of memory work 
as technologies of memory: “what is remembered individually and collectively depends in 
part on technologies of memory and the associated socio-technical practices, which are 
changing radically” (Van House and Churchill, 2008, p. 296). 
What should not be forgotten, however, is that media are not just vessels that carry 
memories. Even “memories” captured by recording media are actively given meaning and 
negotiated by its consumers. Moreover, writes Marita Sturken (1997), following Foucault, 
“technologies are social practices that are inevitably implicated in power dynamics” (p. 
10). Certain versions of the past are more powerfully communicated by these technologies 
than others and might have higher cultural credence. Sturken eminently demonstrates 
how cultural objects—which she calls technologies of memory—can be appropriated for 
mnemonic means. These can be as far-ranging as memorials, souvenirs, ribbons, televi-
sion images, or the body itself. Especially in today’s visual culture, memory is “produced 
by and through images,” which are highly mobile and changeable technologies of memory 
(Sturken, 1997, p. 11). In short, technologies of memory mediate the past and are part of 
it. They are not mere carriers or represent stable visions of the past: they are actively used 
and renegotiated in the present. The technologies we call media are specifically designed 
to transfer cultural and communicative forms and content in time and space, which makes 
them highly viable as technologies of memory.
This latter thought can be unpacked further. Garde-Hansen (2009) argues that to regard 
media as technologies of memory is to acknowledge that media produce archives, are 
technical archiving tools, are “self-archiving” phenomena, and are creative archives for re-
mixing (p. 72). First, media can be institutionalized and professional producers of memory. 
As such, media organizations produce and select from an archive representing historical 
and subjective knowledge of a certain topic. Second, media can be seen as the technical 
means that capture a present that will be a past at some point in time. They are the mate-
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rial dimension of memory, ranging from cave paintings to IPhones. Third, media can be 
self-archiving and self-referential: “they use themselves to remember themselves” (Garde-
Hansen, 2009, p. 72). Fourth, they provide the resources, both technically and discursively, 
for creative remixing. These can be scrapbooks, photo albums, or mash-ups on YouTube. 
In all these dimensions media technically mediate the past; they come in between sender 
and receiver and, consequently, shape, and add to the communicative act.  
Media organizations and producers may select from and present the past in certain ways. 
This process of selection is highly political since it involves deciding what is important and 
relevant in terms of the present: 
With little adaptation, it seems fair to suggest that struggles over power in social 
groups often are waged under the sign of memory—what the group will choose to 
remember, how it will be valued, and what will be forgotten, neglected, or devalued 
in the process. (Blair, 2006, p. 57)
This memory work performed by media has been studied extensively in relation to histori-
cal atrocities. Scholars have especially focused on media’s memory work pertaining to the 
Holocaust, instigated by the numerous re-presentations of it since the 1970s. Before, dur-
ing and after the appearance of landmark productions such as the TV miniseries Holocaust 
(1979), the documentary Shoah (1985), and the film Schindler’s List (1993) intense debates 
over the question how to represent the unrepresentable were held.13 Also, it has been ar-
gued that the period right after the War was a period of forgetting, resentment, repression, 
latency, trauma and looking towards the future (Bauman, 2000; Améry, 1986; Novick, 2000). 
Marianne Hirsch (1996) argues that, in the case of memories of the Holocaust, people who 
live in a world dominated by the traumatic histories of the time before they were born 
are inspired to “secondary, or second-generation, memory, ‘postmemory’” (p. 662). In 
somewhat similar vein, Alison Landsberg (2004) demonstrates that certain versions of the 
past represented in film and television can act as “prosthetic” memories which replace 
or alter personal memories of events or create a sense of having experienced them and, 
consequently, can lead to better understanding of, for example, Holocaust survivors and 
the families of the victims (pp. 111-156). 
As Hirsch (1996) and Landsberg (2004) show, media possess the ability to influence per-
ceptions of reality, feelings of lived experience, and senses of authentic memory. Television, 
cinema, newspapers, and other media of mass communication continuously represent the 
past and present in different—and also often remarkably homogenous—ways and thereby 
alter accounts and experience of events in time, whether they are personal or public, hap-
13 This issue has been addressed throughout the literature on the topic. A good starting point might be Miriam 
Bratu Hansen’s essay Schindler’s List is not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism and Pub-
lic Memory.
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pened in a distant past or just now. People can be “haunted by the traumas that others 
have experienced” (Kammen, 1995, p. 259). Hirsch’s term postmemory and Landsberg’s 
idea of prosthetic memories can help explain how “deep memory,” as opposed to “ordi-
nary memory,” can be instilled in people who did not live through or directly experienced 
a critical incident and this memory cannot be detached from a sense of self and belonging 
(Langer, 1991). Ideas like these are powerfully explanatory in the discussion of individual 
agency in memory work: media, as technologies of memory, allow individuals to connect 
and relate their experience and knowledge of the past to mediated re-presentations, or 
may share and spread this by means of media. 
Important media events have provided ample material for research into the dynamics 
of memory in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. They can prompt so-called 
“flashbulb memories,” a concept drawn from psychology (Finkenauer, et al., 1997). As 
Brown and Kulik write in 1977: 
Flashbulb Memories are memories for the circumstances in which one first learned 
of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event. Hearing the 
news that President John Kennedy had been shot is the prototype case. Almost 
everyone can remember, with an almost perceptual clarity, where he was when 
he heard, what he was doing at the time, who told him, what was the immediate 
aftermath, how he felt about it, and also one or more totally idiosyncratic and often 
trivial concomitants. (p. 73)
From the 1990s onward, many studies have focused on the role of important media events 
in public memory. For example, Michael Schudson (1992) has investigated the shape, 
place and function of the Watergate scandal in American memory; Barbie Zelizer (1992), 
as examined memory work in relation to the televised and heavily covered Kennedy assas-
sination. Because its brutal yet distant reality is very easily disrupted and altered, war has 
provided inspiration for many studies into memory and its relation to media. For example, 
Arthur Neal (1998) interpreted war and other national events and its impact on society 
through the concept of national trauma; Sturken (1997) demonstrated how personal and 
mediated collective memories of the Vietnam and Gulf Wars proliferate in commemorative 
spaces and mediated texts; Maltby and Keeble (2007) devote a chapter of their book to the 
processes of remembering and forgetting war; and Hoskins (2004) argued that a collapse 
of memory has occurred which can be demonstrated by the examples of the Gulf War, 9/11, 
and the 2003 Iraq War and, together with Ben O’Loughlin (2010), that war, like the memory 
thereof, is currently diffuse. 
A recent reconceptualization of the relationship between media and memory comes 
from Neiger et al. (2011). These authors define “media memory” which suggests a three-
way exploration of media: as producers of memory, as tools to produce memory, and as 
historical objects of study and critique in memory studies. Through these different angles, 
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media can be seen as memory agents (how is the past shaped by different media?), operat-
ing within certain social and cultural settings (how do specific social, historical and politi-
cal circumstances shape media memory and vice versa?) that change over time (Neiger et 
al., 2011, p. 2). 
Of course, the specific ontologies and epistemologies of different media at different 
moments in time must be taken into account in these modes of analysis. Radio’s role and 
impact as a technology of memory today is not what it was 60 years ago and comparing 
a news website on the same scale, in terms of material and social conditions of memory 
work, with a pamphlet distributed in the 18th century glosses over the specificities of 
historical context. Like there is no such thing as the media, there is no such thing as a 
media memory. However, “there can be no ‘collective memory’ without public articula-
tion” (Neiger et al., 2011, p. 3). The understanding of the past that flows out of the (public) 
interaction between producers and users and, increasingly so, “prosumers” (Bruns, 2009) 
of media memory, should be seen, it is argued in this dissertation, within the broader ma-
terial and social networks of symbolic creation and interaction. Technologies of memory 
and memory work, in whatever forms, never emerge in isolation, but are conditioned by 
their time and place, which are, increasingly, pervaded with media. This requires theories 
that help explain the contemporary context in which memory work takes place. One such 
theory is mediatization.
The Mediatization of Memory?
When memory work increasingly involves media, can we speak of the mediatization of 
memory? Mediatization14 is a highly debated term within contemporary media studies. So-
cial psychologist and media scholar Sonia Livingstone (2009b, p. x) describes the phenom-
enon as follows: “‘Mediatization’ refers to the meta process by which everyday practices 
and social relations are historically shaped by mediating technologies and media orga-
nizations.” Mediatization can therefore be seen as a panoramic, sensitizing concept that 
attempts to grasp the role of media in shaping social processes and institutions. Using the 
example of the most important institutions in the process of socialization of young people, 
Friedrich Krotz (2009, p. 21-22) shows that over the last thirty years the family, peer group, 
and school have come to involve media up until the point that “we should speak now of 
new mediatized forms of socialization and growing up in or into a mediatized society.” 
Indeed, at least in modern, ‘Western’ societies many areas of social life are permeated 
by media. In such societies, reality is increasingly constructed in the media and through 
the use of media. Moreover, many aspects of our culture and society involve media—rang-
14 In the original sense, the term mediatization was used by Fredric Jameson (1991), who wrote of a “process 
whereby the traditional fine arts are mediatized: that is, they now come to consciousness of themselves as 
various media within a mediatic system in which their own internal production also constitutes a symbolic 
message and the taking of a position on the status of the medium in question” (p. 162).
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ing from our love lives to religion. This is not to say that the social shaping of reality is 
determined by media, but rather that they ‘set the stage’ for communicative interaction. 
Mediatization theory holds that practices, institutions, work, group formation, socializa-
tion itself have come to involve media and that they leave their marks on these aspects of 
everyday life (Krotz, 2009, p. 24). 
 Mediatization is commonly regarded (cf. Altheide & Snow, 1979) to be “a distinctive 
and consistent transformation that […] can be understood properly only if seen as part 
of a wider transformation of social and cultural life through media operating from a single 
source and in a common direction, a transformation of society by media, a ‘media logic’” 
(Couldry, 2008, p. 376). However, as media sociologist Nick Couldry (2008) argues, the influ-
ences of media on (the institutions of) daily life are too intricate, various and complex to 
reduce to a single language or logos, “as if they all operated in one dimension, at the same 
speed, through a parallel mechanism and according to the same calculus of probability” 
(2008, p. 378). This highlights the problem of the term: it covers too many transformations 
and is too heterogeneous to fully account for media influence on social organization, the 
practice of everyday life and communicative (inter)action. 
In his Cultures of Mediatization media scholar Andreas Hepp (2013) brings together 
insights from various studies into media and society in order to elaborate on the phrase 
“media cultures.” He argues that much of the work done in cultural and media theory 
makes simultaneously too grand and too poor claims about the role of media in daily life 
today. Hepp (2013) defines media cultures as “those cultures whose primary resources are 
mediated by technological means of communication, and in this process are ‘moulded’ in 
various ways that must be carefully specified” (p. 5). Avoiding extremes and simplifications, 
Hepp argues that these cultures are “omnipresent, but not a mass culture,” “marked by 
a medium, but not dominated by one media,” “constitutive of reality, but no integrative 
programme,” and “technologized, but not a cyberculture” (pp. 8-28). Consequently, media 
cultures are not simply standardized and mass produced, but openly contested, contra-
dicted, and negotiated (p. 11). They are not confined and guided by the dominance of one 
medium, but rather produced through multiple forms (pp. 16-17). Such cultures do not 
simply distort our perception of reality or have an effect on behavior (as in media effects 
research), but rather house many contradictory and dysfunctional elements that confuse 
a one-directional process of socialization (pp. 22-23). Lastly, contemporary media cultures 
are not digital utopia achieved, nor are they left unaffected by the influence of digital or 
internet culture; rather, the influence of networked media and life on screen should not be 
overestimated nor underrated in research into contemporary media cultures (p. 28).    
Hepp (2013), together with many authors writing about mediatization, quotes Thomp-
son’s seminal work The Media and Modernity (1995):
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By virtue of a series of technical innovations associated with printing and, sub-
sequently, with the electrical codification of information, symbolic forms were 
produced, reproduced and circulated on a scale that was unprecedented. Patterns 
of communication and interaction began to change in profound and irreversible 
ways. These changes, which comprise what can loosely be called the ‘mediazation 
of culture’, had a clear institutional basis: namely, the development of media orga-
nizations, which first appeared in the second half of the fifteenth century and have 
expanded their activities ever since. (p. 46, emphasis mine). 
Thompson shows that technological innovations in media provide the means for the 
distribution and dissemination of (locally) produced symbolic forms—whether they are 
language, ways of dress, norms and values, etc.—to a wide and broad audience. In similar 
vein, Hjarvard (2008) contends that “once an abstraction, community has, thanks to media, 
become concrete experience” (p. 128). Hjarvard elaborates on the “common experiential 
frame of reference” that is created by media, meaning that mass communicated messages 
enable individuals to experience the world from perspectives that are not necessarily con-
nected to his or her subjective time and space.15 Moreover, as Nick Couldry (2003) argues, 
media provide ideologically infused categorical lenses through which people view the 
world (p. 29). This process, which Thompson calls mediazation and Hepp mediatization, 
appears in historical waves, is not historically specific to the digital age, and transforms 
not just media, but also the symbolic forms and ways of communication attached to them 
(Hepp, 2013, p. 31). Fundamentally, the study of mediatization is about the “theorization of 
a highly complex communicative relationship between actors standing one with another 
in direct communication, which relationship then alters when media become part of this 
mediation process” (Hepp, 2013, p. 34).
This latter point shows that mediatization is a conceptual troublemaker; where does 
mediation stop and where does mediatization begin? Mediatization and mediation do not 
describe the same thing. Both concepts can simultaneously exist, as Hepp (2013) writes:
While mediation is suited to describing the general characteristics of any process 
of media communication, mediatization describes and theorizes something rather 
different, something that is based on the mediation of media communication: 
mediatization seeks to capture the nature of the interrelationship between histori-
cal changes in media communication and other transformational processes. (p. 38, 
emphasis in original)
15 This has been part of the general “dissembedding” of social structures that is one aspect of modernity, as 
theorized by Anthony Giddens in The Consequences of Modernity.
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This distinction between the different processes both concepts try to cover is also ex-
pressed by Stig Hjarvard (2012): 
Mediation denotes the concrete act of communication by means of a medium and 
the choice of medium may influence both the content of communication and the 
relationship between sender and receiver. The process of mediation itself, however, 
usually does not change culture and society. By contrast, mediatization refers to 
a more long-lasting cultural and social transformation, whereby society’s institu-
tions and modes of interaction are changed as a consequence of the growth of the 
media’s influence. In short, mediation is about communication and interaction 
through a medium, mediatization is about the role of media in cultural and social 
change. (p. 32)
Mediatization, in Hjarvard’s sense, is a “new social condition” in which media form an in-
stitution on their own and simultaneously affect social institutions (or ‘fields’ in Bourdieu’s 
sense) through medium-specific features and power dynamics (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 105). For 
example, media may today partly set the political agenda or politicians take into account 
the modus operandi of media, ranging from emphasizing their personal lives to anticipating 
deadlines and the news cycle (Hjarvard, 2013, pp. 43-44). Media have become so ingrained 
in the daily lives of people that they cannot be seen as located outside other cultural and 
social institutions; they are not separate but integral to cultural and social life. 
Hjarvard (2008) calls for an empirical and concrete analytical application of the theory 
of mediatization in specific cases that clearly demonstrates how “various institutions” and 
“spheres of human activity” are affected by this process (p. 113). The “media logic” that is 
applied in interaction and communication between people in diverse situations—whether 
these are institutional or personal—guides the sender, shapes the content, and directs the 
receiver of messages in whatever form.16 However, the term media logic might mislead-
ingly be seen as “a unitary logic ‘behind’ the media” (Hepp, 2013, p. 45). Moreover, the 
phrase suggests a uniform and “specifically institutionalized social system charged with 
the function of public communication” (Hepp, 2013, p. 45). 
To counter this problem, Hjarvard (2008) comes up with two modes of mediatization, 
direct and indirect. Both forms play a role in the media logic that permeates other social 
fields than the media (p. 114). For example, a game of chess is directly mediatized when it 
is played on a computer rather than a chess board. The rules of the game stays the same, 
but a whole range of new options open up: the game can be played with an opponent 
from a distance, the game can be played against a computer, and matches can be saved. 
16 As Hjarvard duly notes, mediatization is mostly a process that appears in highly industrialized, modern, and 
chiefly western societies. However, it has a global outreach that rapidly spreads via worldwide communica-
tion networks and a global media culture. In this sense, mediatization is related to globalization (Hjarvard, 
2008, p. 113)
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This, in turn shapes new practices and experiences of playing chess. When other institu-
tions, such as sports of politics, play according to the rules of the media, they are indirectly 
mediatized. Hjarvard’s uses the example of eating a burger at Burger King or McDonald’s. 
A visit to these fast-food restaurants does not only consuming a burger but also consum-
ing media: “the cultural context surrounding the burger, much of the attraction of visiting 
the restaurant, and so forth have to do with the presence of media, in both symbolic and 
economic terms,” writes Hjarvard (2008, p. 114). Hjarvard approaches media as producing 
effects in social spheres, thus explaining what is meant by the term media logic. Addition-
ally, mediatization is described as being embedded within the particular contemporary 
historical conditions of this day and age: media today form an autonomous institution 
that is interconnected to other institutions and exert power in this relation (Hjarvard, 2008, 
p. 110). Seen in this light, it makes sense to talk about media as a social institution whose 
logic steers other domains of social life in particular ways, yet research needs to specify 
and unpack what this logic entails. 
Media theorist Mark Deuze (2012) goes beyond Hjarvard’s, Hepp’s and Couldry’s theoreti-
cal exploration of mediatization: “If anything, today the uses and appropriations of media 
can be seen as fused with everything people do, everywhere people are, everyone people 
aspire to be” (p. x). Deuze does not argue that media guide our every step—that would 
be technological determinism—or that humans are today left unaffected by the natural 
realities of the body and the environment. Rather, he proposes that media have become 
an integral part of the practices and perceptions of everyday life. At least in urban settings 
around the world, screens surround us and communication devices are carried around 
intimately. However, to live in media suggests more than “just” watching hours of televi-
sion, spending years of a lifetime texting, messaging, and phoning. The phrase suggests 
that it redefines our very look on the world and every act and interaction. In other words, 
we “are always already tied up in media” (Deuze, 2012, p. 5). Deuze’s work assumes or takes 
for granted a society in media, whereas the primary concern of mediatization theory is how 
it is getting there or has gotten there. 
What usage of mediatization is most appropriate for the argument here and why should 
it play a role in the discussion of memory work in the digital age? Most authors writing on 
the term see mediatization as a metaprocess. The term, then, fits in a line of conceptual 
constructions such as individualization, globalization, and commercialization (Hepp, 2013, 
p. 47). These concepts are not readily measurable, but help the researcher to generalize 
processes. A theory of mediatization, therefore, is not empirically verifiable in its entirety, 
yet it tries to provide a general theoretical construction that rests in part on empirical 
findings (Hepp, 2013, p. 49). Flowing out of this is the idea that mediatization is not just 
an academic concept but also something that is experienced (through practice) in daily 
life, both on the level of institutions as in the individual. Being a “panorama of a sustained 
metaprocess of change,” mediatization requires empirical investigation in specific settings 
and of specific media in use (Hepp 69).
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Although the debate on mediatization is still very much open-ended, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the literature. For one, mediatization describes the his-
torical process of how media increasingly set the parameters of communication, enable 
particular forms of communication, and create possible spaces of communicative interac-
tion. As a result, they shape (in medium-specific ways) the social institutions that rely on 
communicative interaction, ranging from politics to religion, leisure to work. Furthermore, 
our everyday lives have come to involve not only more media, but also those media have 
shaped our practices in it. Mediatization can be properly studied on precisely this level, 
because practice is the bridge between individual agency and social structure (see chapter 
3). At the same time, we should not forget that we shape the tools that shape us. In other 
words, while we practice media we shape media as much as media shape our practice.
What does the theory of mediatization bring to the study of memory? As was argued 
earlier, memory is distributed, articulated, expressed, externalized, or mediated by and 
through technologies. It is part of a process of communicative interaction, which is, in es-
sence, social. Memory is always worked, under construction in the present. Moreover, the 
same process operates vice versa as well: externalized, mediated memory finds its way to 
the internal worlds of its recipients. Here, we may talk about the mediatization of memory, 
a process in which the technological, institutional, and organizational aspects of media 
shape knowledge of the present and past in particular ways. This goes beyond mediation, 
not only because technical and institutional media are central to this process (and not 
“mere” face-to-face communication) but also because it can alter, affect or even replace 
experienced reality (cf. Landsberg’s prosthetic memory). 
Researching memory work in mediatized culture and society requires researchers to un-
pack the procedural logics of media. How do both their specific technological design and 
their reputations as institutions enable, shape, and restrict memory work? In other words, 
what happens to our pasts when media pervade personal, everyday life and, simultane-
ously, as social institutions, powerfully interact with other fields of cultural production? 
Memory work has always been involved a process of mediation in order to be publicly 
expressed or socially transmitted. However, the mediatization of memory goes beyond the 
“mere” transmittance of a message through a medium. Certain memory schemata guide 
reconstructions of the past and these are “at the very least informed by the mass media 
who themselves build up repertoires of images and narratives” (Hoskins, 2009c, p. 38). On 
an instrumental and functional level, technical media afford, enable and allow specific 
types of memory work: a monument communicates the past differently than a historical 
documentary. Hence, to combine the theory of mediatization with the theory of memory 
is asking a seemingly easy question: what role do media—both as social institutions and 
material technologies—play in memory practices when they saturate our daily lives to 
such a degree that “everything” is mediated (Livingstone, 2009a). Or, to borrow from Hepp 
(2013), how do media “mold” memory work and how does this process affect understand-
ing of the past?  
57





This latter question is even more important to ask in the face of ‘new’ media’s “more 
immediate and extensive interpenetration with the everyday on an individual, social, 
and continual basis” (Hoskins, 2014, p. 667). These media may “transcend and transform 
that which is known, or thought to be known, about an event” (Hoskins, 2014, p. 669). 
Illustrative examples of this are the emergence of new video material, nine months after 
the MH17 disaster, showing a BUK rocket launcher near the crash site; or, the way activists 
in Syria purposively document everything that is happening in Syria for future recall (see 
empirical chapters below). The next section will move closer to this dissertation’s object 
of study—digital memory work—by amending mediatization theory with and ‘ecological’ 
approach to new media.
Structural components of a new media ecology
Where mediatization theory is mostly concerned with the gradual transformation of culture 
and society under the influence of media, a ‘media ecology’ approach asks how people 
and media technologies are connected to each other and co-constitute an environment of 
interaction. Media ecology is therefore a universal approach to the associations between 
human beings and their technologies and techniques of communication; humans have 
always existed in media ecologies. Therefore, we might argue that media ecology comes 
before mediatization; it is about our intricate connections with and dependence on in-
frastructures of communication. The concept allows us to reassess our relation to media 
today, when our media are deeply, intimately, and often visibly interconnected with us, not 
just as prostheses of our communicative capabilities, but also as environments (Postman, 
1970, p. 161). What does an ecological approach to media imply for the study of memory 
today? And: what does the new entail in “new memory ecology”?
To regard media as environments means taking their structuring agency toward culture 
and society seriously. As Hoskins (2011c, p. 24) writes: 
Media ecology is then the idea that media technologies can be understood and 
studied like organic life-forms, as existing in a complex set of interrelationships 
within a specific balanced environment. Technological developments, it is argued, 
change all these interrelationships, transforming the existing balance and thus 
potentially impacting upon the entire ‘ecology’.
A statement like this can be seen to lean toward technological determinism—the idea that 
technology directly changes society and behavior therein. However, as in natural ecolo-
gies, environments shape the individuals and groups as much as these individuals and 
groups shape environments. Likewise, media ecologies consist of a vast array of interlinked 
people, technologies, and practices that mutually shape each other. Also, as in natural 
ecologies, when one of the elements within an ecology changes, this might affect the other 
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components. Related to media ecologies, this means that “at the time of the introduction 
of a new medium there is always a period of adjustment, or settling down, or appropriation 
of the established by the emergent,” writes Hoskins (2016a, p. 15).   
This section is devoted to what I regard as interlinked, structural aspects, or environ-
mental conditions, of a new media ecology that shape the environmental conditions for 
contemporary memory work. It is important to stress, though, that “new” media did not 
emerge out of thin air, nor do I argue that “old” media like television or radio are dead. 
There might very well be a new golden age of television due to streaming technologies; 
radio is resilient due to its adaptive qualities; and newspapers are still central in the 
production and dissemination of news. Furthermore, as media philosopher John Durham 
Peters (2015, p. 15) asserts: 
Compared to mass media, digital media did seem like an enormous historical rup-
ture. But if we place digital devices in the broad history of communication practices, 
new media can look a lot like old or ancient media. Like ‘new media,’ ancient media 
such as registers, indexes, the census, calendars, and catalogs have always been 
in the business of recording, transmitting, and processing culture; of managing 
subjects, objects, and data; of organizing time, space, and power. 
Thus, the current media ecology is—like natural ecologies—the result of evolution, 
rather than revolution. New media are never fully new, but are remediated forms of older 
media (Bolter & Grusin, 1999; Gitelman, 2008). Scrutinizing a new media ecology means 
investigating how new media record, transmit, and process culture in specific ways; how 
they manage subjects, objects, and data idiosyncratically; and how this new environment 
organizes time, space, and, ultimately, power. 
According to Lievrouw (2011, p. 7), new media are “information and communication 
technologies and their social contexts.” As such, they contain the three interlinked compo-
nents that characterize all media:
1) The material artifacts or devices that enable and extend people’s abilities to communi-
cate and share meaning.
2) The communication activities or practices that people engage in as they develop and 
use those devices; and
3) The larger social arrangements and organizational forms that people create and build 
around the artifacts and practices. 
Obviously, all communication systems contain these three components. Therefore, 
Lievrouw (2011) identifies four features of new media that distinguish them from “older” 
media. First, new media are hybrid or recombinant technologies, meaning that they “resist 
stabilization,” due to the fact that they are a combination of older systems and innova-
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tions. Second, new media are formed by and are part of networks of individuals, technolo-
gies and organizations. This is in direct opposition to the linear path of communication 
followed by mass or broadcast media. Third, on the level of outcomes for culture and 
society, new media encourage ubiquity. Notwithstanding the existence of a “digital divide” 
in the world, new media are everywhere and pervade every aspect of our everyday life, 
ranging from the sharing of ultrasound images of unborn children on Facebook to playing 
multiplayer games while taking a sanitary stop. These last examples also exemplify the 
fourth characteristic element of new media, namely their interactivity, which is stimulated 
by their immediacy, responsiveness, and social presence (pp. 6-16).
A second, related process Lievrouw (2011) calls reconfiguration, or users’ modification 
and adaptation of “media technologies and systems as needed to suit their various pur-
poses and interests” (p. 6). That is, media can be tactically used for purposes that were not 
thought of by their designers. New media respond to how they are used in practice. The 
reason why we can keep calling new media new is, according to Lievrouw (2011) that they 
“are the product of the continuous interweaving of innovative activities, services, systems 
and uses that blend or even eliminate familiar distinctions” (p. 7). In other words, media 
remain new because they are adaptable and adaptive, never stable, in constant and rapid 
flux, which, to large extent, is related to their digital nature. Their adaptability, ubiquity, 
non-linearity, and mobility make it possible for them to move into every nook of everyday 
life. 
Following Lievrouw (2011), it is argued here that the current, new media ecology is 
marked by a number of related, fundamental evolutionary steps away from a former media 
ecology that might be called the broadcast era: 1) the shift from analogue to digital media 
technology; 2) the move from top-down, centralized production of media content to peer-
to-peer and distributed production; 3) the emergence of digital, ‘living’ archives; 4) the 
emergence of connective, “social” media that capitalize on user activity and steer flows of 
information and data, collectively called Web 2.0; and 5) the shift from centralized “static” 
media to highly mobile, networked technologies such as smartphones and tablets. A new 
media ecology is thus constituted by networked technologies and ubiquitous mobile and 
digital media that allow for bottom-up production of media content stored in archives 
that are partly curated by users. However, this new environment is no utopia achieved. 
Rather, a relative small number of companies are at the top of the food chain and shape 
this environment in powerful ways. These companies thrive on the user input, up to the 
point that they cannot exist without it (Gehl, 2011). Below, each of the components of the 
new media ecology is discussed in terms of their consequences for memory work. Digital 
media, digital archives, peer-to-peer production, mobile and networked technologies, and 
‘social’ media stand at the basis of digital memory work.
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Digital media technology
Firstly, a new media ecology mainly consists of digital technologies and content. Fun-
damentally, our everyday communicative exchanges, ranging from private conversation 
on Whatsapp to watching the latest news, are packaged into binary code that can be un-
packed by computational technology and made readable to users again through graphical 
user interfaces. Media theorist Lev Manovich (2001) identifies five fundamental aspects of 
digital media that make up the “language of new media.” First, all digital media objects 
are “composed of digital code” and are therefore “numerical representations”; accord-
ingly, any digital object can be described formally in a mathematical function and, due 
to algorithmic manipulation, is programmable (Manovich, 2001, pp. 27-30). Second, new 
media are modular, meaning that every element of a media object can be taken apart be-
cause it is independent from the whole (pp. 30-31). Third, the first two principles allow new 
media content creation, manipulation and access to be automated by steering programs 
or algorithms (pp. 32-36). Fourth, new media objects are subject to variation, because 
their programmability and modularity enable (even automated) recreation and remixing 
of components in databases (pp. 36-45). The fifth and last principle is that computerized 
media are a transcoded form of cultural logic into computer logic and vice versa. Both 
layers, as Manovich calls these logics, influence each other through usage and give rise to 
a “new computer culture” (pp. 45-48). 
Manovich’s principles of digital objects, whether they are html code, a social media plat-
form, or a digital film, are far-reaching. Together, they constitute a language which provides 
the basis of interaction between humans and digital media and, as the latter become more 
prominent in our daily lives, this language becomes the lingua franca. For example, the 
meanings and actual practices of copying, cutting and pasting, saving, sharing, searching, 
and deleting are drastically changed in a digital media environment. Consequently, the 
language of new media underlies technologies of memory and memory work. To name 
just a few varying examples: conversations on various platforms, from WhatsApp to Weibo 
become recorded memories of communicative practice; iconic images are resurrected and 
appropriated (e.g. photoshopped) by social movements on social networking sites; people 
create memorial websites and open up digital spaces for condolences and remembering; 
and witnesses record and store their experiences in immense databases that can be tagged 
and searched. Manovich’s principles—numerical representation, modularity, automation, 
variability, and transcoding—underlie and make possible each of these practices.
Media production by and in ‘networked’ publics
Digital media allow for the relatively easy (re)creation by and spread of content among 
networked groups and individuals. This signals a shift in the production model of media 
content and results in a renegotiation of power relations between “old” and “new” media 
producers. In a post on his weblog, media scholar William Merrin (2008) attempts to grasp 
these changes. The post-broadcast era he characterizes in the following way:
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In place of a top-down, one-to-many vertical cascade from centralised industry 
sources we discover today bottom-up, many-to-many, horizontal, peer-to-peer 
communication. ‘Pull’ media challenge ‘push’ media; open structures challenge 
hierarchical structures; micro-production challenges macro-production; open-
access amateur production challenges closed access, elite-professions; economic 
and technological barriers to media production are transformed by cheap, democ-
ratised, easy-to-use technologies.  
Hence, digitally networked technologies force us to rethink concepts such as audiences 
and consumers. Mizuko Ito (2008) sees “networked publics” as an alternative to terms such 
as audience or consumer. It “references a linked set of social, cultural, and technological 
developments that have accompanied the growing engagement with digitally networked 
media” (Ito 2). According to Ito, publics “foregrounds a more engaged stance,” emphasizing 
that it consists of “reactors, (re)makers and (re)distributors” (p. 3). Four elemental aspects 
of networked digital media enable networked publics to emerge. First, accessibility to the 
digital tools of production and networking are essential. At least in industrialized areas 
in the world (but also increasingly globally) content is being produced on sites such as 
Flickr and YouTube and on SNS (social networking sites) new and old connections are 
made. Second, the open “end-to-end (E2E)” architecture of the Internet allows the new 
forms of “peer-to-peer (P2P)” and “many-to-many (M2M)” distribution to emerge (p. 7). This 
causes a decentralization of communication networks and information exchange, hence 
challenging top-down and mass communication models. Third, these two changes lead to 
value being created at “the edges,” meaning that “niches, peer cultures and special-interest 
groups” are served in networked publics. While previously unheard voices are potentially 
heard now, this trend also may lead to a “fragmentation in common culture and standards 
of knowledge” (p. 11). Fourth, a new infrastructure of aggregation has developed, creating 
pockets of specialized and personalized information (p. 11-13). Recommendations on 
websites and personalized advertising are vivid examples of how the market responds 
to a fragmented, yet interconnected consumer. Accessibility, P2P and M2M distribution, 
value at the edges, and aggregation have changed the face of the audience. The notion of 
networked publics encapsulates these new possibilities for the audience (how exactly, will 
be further explained in chapter 3). 
Digital archives
Digitization (converting non-digital objects into digital form) and the omnipresence of 
digital content, technologies, and practices (and the subsequent emergence of a digital 
culture) have inspired scholars to rethinking the role of the archive. Echoing the work of 
thinkers such as Jenkins (2009), much of the emergent literature on memory work in a 
digital new media environment is optimistic about its democratic and participatory po-
tential. For example, in her book Rogue Archives, De Kosnik (2016) perceives a shift in the 
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preservation and re-production of cultural forms and content within a new media ecology. 
“Media users have seized hold of all of mass culture as an archive, an enormous repository 
of narratives, characters, worlds, images, graphics, and sounds from which they can extract 
the raw matter they need for their own creations, their alternatives to or customizations of 
the sources” (De Kosnik, 2016, p. 4). Memory in the digital age, in De Kosnik’s words, has 
“gone rogue.” Rogue archives—freely accessible online archives produced and managed 
by ‘amateurs’—therefore enable “vast quantities of cultural content to be preserved and 
made accessible”; it allows “subcultural and marginalized groups to have archives of their 
own”; it empowers mass audiences to “invert the sociocultural hierarchy that places them 
at the bottom of the power structure of media”; and it permits “memory-based making in 
the mode of repertoire—that is, an everyday making, an individualized and personalized 
style of performance, a holding-in-common of all culture as shared resource and property” 
(2016, p. 10). As De Kosnik shows in her book, fans create their own archives holding their 
remixes and productions. This has, within each ‘amateur’ community, been the case. How-
ever, what happens to the cultural productions and remixes uploaded to platforms that 
can today be said to be mainstream? 
Social media platforms are not only media but are also archives: they systematically 
order and represent content that is produced and often tagged, titled, described, and/
or referenced by their users. Databases—stored collections of information—are “not in 
themselves archives,” writes Robert Gehl (2011, p. 13). Yet, especially in the case of social 
media platforms, users organize material by “affectively processing” it (Gehl, 2011). On-
line users share content, make connections, rank cultural artifacts, and produce digital 
content and, moreover, they are engaged in curating these connections, artifacts, and 
content, thereby readying these for automatized selection, filtering, and presentation by 
algorithms. Hence, these platforms, in collaboration with their users, structure data sets 
into archives. By means of this process, some materials become more visible than oth-
ers, up to the point that power and authority over our archives is centralized in new ways 
“hidden away beneath the abstractions of the smooth Web 2.0 interface” (Gehl, 2011, p. 
13). As a result, many digital media produce popular, dynamic, living archives. Platforms 
like YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia are hybrid technologies that combine aspects of 
traditional media (e.g. television, diary, and encyclopedia, etc.) and archives. They are 
media because they come in between a sender/producer who encodes a text in a specific 
way and a receiver/consumer who decodes (and recodes) this text. Digital platforms are, 
however, not merely media that come in between sender and receiver, but are also vast, 
interconnected archives of mediated material and user data. Users are not only actively 
invited to contribute content, but are also part of the categorization of it, readying it for 
storage. 
Schwarz (2014) develops the metaphor of “neighborly relations” to describe how in a 
digital culture in which the database—unlocked by search and guided by algorithms—is 
central: users easily (re)connect to representations of the past at unexpected times and 
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in unexpected places. Consequently, authorship and ownership of representations of the 
past become fluid. Instead of possession, Schwarz (2014) argues, we should conceptualize 
our encounters and interactions with memory objects in digital networks and media as 
“neighborly” (p. 12). Indeed, the language traditionally associated with neighbors when 
it comes to object-centered interaction—sharing and borrowing—“fit” in a digital media 
environment. In a sense, what Schwarz (2014) describes can be seen as the postmodern 
phenomenon of the free-floating signifier: cultural forms and content (Schwarz calls this 
“memory objects”) stored in digital databases are essentially detached from what they 
signify, what they refer to. The meaning of memory objects—and which and whose past 
they refer to—may change in different contexts and interpretative communities. Even 
though this process may have historically always been the case, this “play” with meaning, 
reference, and signification is more present than ever; it is intrinsic to digital culture.
Web 2.0
The shift toward bottom-up production (advocated in early Web communities) of the many 
is embraced within the ideology and design of what Bill O’ Reilly (2005) has called Web 
2.0. Web 2.0 is characterized by 1) folksonomies (the free classification of information, e.g. 
affective processing of data), 2) rich user experience (dynamic, interactive websites such as 
Google Maps), 3) user as contributor (users are invited to review, evaluate, and comment), 
4) long tail (offering a broad range of niche products and content), 5) user participation 
(users help create content) 6) basic trust (a legal principle that allows the easy sharing, 
reusing, redistributing and editing of content), and 7) dispersion (the delivery of content 
through multiple channels. 
The Web 2.0 paradigm in website design has had enormous consequences for what the 
Web looks like today. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) write that the direct results of such think-
ing are social media, “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological 
and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of 
user-generated content” (p. 60). Social media can take many forms, but underlying them all 
are the characteristics of Web 2.0: Blogs, microblogging sites (e.g. Twitter), social network-
ing sites (e.g. Facebook), collaborative websites (e.g. Wikipedia), content communities/
creative works sharing sites (e.g. YouTube), business networking sites (e.g. Linkedin), social 
news and bookmarking sites (e.g. Reddit), social gaming and virtual worlds sites (e.g. Eve) 
(Goff, 2013, p. 19).
The concept of networked publics and the rhetoric, technologies, and practices of Web 
2.0 fit very well with the language associated with memory. Garde-Hansen, Hoskins, and 
Reading (2009) demonstrate, that, opposed to history, memory “is more peer-to-peer […] 
in its dissemination. Families and friends form close networks and share memories, both 
personal and collective. Likewise, it is participatory, as mourners visit graves, monuments 
and memorials. It is accessible not elitist” (pp. 8-9, emphasize mine). Indeed, the media 
technologies within a new media ecology, but also a broader participatory culture (Jen-
Chapter 2  |  memory work In A new medIA ecology
64
kins, 2007), may lead to bottom-up memory work. Such views should be placed in their 
intellectual context as well. During the first decade of the 2000s many authors were hopeful 
of the democratizing aspects of the Web and digital media, also regarding memory, in the 
sense that more people could engage in representing the past (cf. the above quotation). 
In the short period of about ten years, the media ecology has been colonized by a handful 
of extremely large companies that capitalize on peer-to-peer production, networks, and 
user participation. How this recent development affects the dynamics of memory work, 
however, remains relatively unanswered in the literature. One of the goals of the empirical 
chapters is tracing these shifting power dynamics.
Mobility
The increase of Web 2.0 platforms and peer-to-peer, bottom-up production goes hand 
in hand with the omnipresence of mobile media technology, whether they are tablets, 
smartphones, smart watches, or smart glasses. The mobile phone is simultaneously a per-
sonalized physical archive, a means of communication, and a technology that can capture 
and record reality. Anna Reading (2009a) argues that it contributes to an emergent form 
of digital memory, namely the memobile: “Mobile digital phone memories or memobilia 
are wearable, sharable multimedia data records of events or communications. They are 
captured on the move, easily digitally archived and rapidly and easily mobilized” (p. 81). 
Because a mobile phone is portable and allows direct connection to others, mediated 
experience potentially has direct impact on the ways events are remembered:  “the mobile 
phone is accelerating our ability rapidly to transform our personal impressions into public 
memories independent of the individual” (pp. 90-91). For example, as Reading’s research 
has shown, the mobile phone is used in creating digital witness videos that can be altered 
or remixed, shared with others in different places and made public on social media plat-
forms (pp. 88-89). This happens in time and place (synchronous digitally shared spaces) 
and through time and place (using old materials for new purposes).   
“As material devices,” writes Martin Hand (2014, p. 15) smartphones “are mobile, connect-
ed, practically and emotionally to bodies, and have the capacity to capture and distribute 
an extraordinary range of personally produced visual, locative, and textual data.” These 
“persistent traces,” however, require further memory work to become memory objects or 
memories themselves. Smartphone users, as Hand (2014) shows, might actively engage 
with their digitally produced material by remediating, curating, changing, or deleting it (pp. 
11-13). This does not take away, though, from the potentiality of traces to be reactivated 
by users or companies alike at unexpected times and places (cf. Schwarz, 2014). Because 
smartphones and similar devices are carried on the body, the variety of potential memory 
traces is enormous and this can range from the quantification of everyday life and self to 
the recording of world-changing events. Hence, new connections between personal and 
collective memory become possible, from visualizations of past user activity at certain 
times and places, to a personally recorded video “going viral.”
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Memory work in a new media ecology
Mobile, digital, and networked media create an environment in which connection is cen-
tral. In The Culture of Connectivity, José van Dijck (2013) demonstrates how the intercon-
nectedness of social media platforms has given rise to a new “ecosystem of connective 
media” that reshapes sociality into a “platformed” sociality (p. 4-5). In other words, digitally 
networked, and especially “social” media redefine (“engineer” in Van Dijck’s terminology) 
what it means to be social up to the point that it equals connecting to others and products 
through socio-technical practices such as liking, following, and sharing. The subsequent 
connectivity of individuals has become a resource that can be sold to third parties. The 
“culture of connectivity” is a culture in which is it the norm to be connected to social media 
platforms, all the time, during each activity; it is a culture that binds people to platforms 
and platforms to platforms. 
The culture of connectivity also changes our memory work. In a series of articles and 
chapters, Hoskins (2004, 2009a&b,&c; 2011a&b; 2013; 2016a&b) even argues that connec-
tivity radically transforms memory itself, as it is “strung out via a continuous present and 
past. Memory is not in this way a product of individual and collective remembrances, but 
is instead generated through the flux of contacts between people and digital technologies 
and media” (2011a, p. 272). Thus, Hoskins (2016a) later explains, memory is “made and 
lost through an ongoing dynamic trajectory of hyperconnections rather than being merely 
residual (in brains, bodies, media) and also inevitably in decline” (p. 18). Hoskins argues 
that digital and networked media environments change not only our conception of what 
memory is, but also its very being. 
Autobiographical, personal, collective, cultural, and media memories entangle in a new 
media ecology. The internet and its wide range of technological advances have trans-
formed “the temporality, spatiality, and indeed the mobility of memories” (Hoskins, 2009, 
p. 93). Hoskins (2001) describes this type of digital memory as “new” memory because 
“[t]he ‘collective’, that is, the consistent pivotal dynamic of memory forged in the pres-
ent of today, is manufactured, manipulated and above all, mediated” (p. 334). In a new 
media ecology memory is still located in and interacted with using objects, exhibitions, or 
museums, which “stand in” for memory, but also much more by tactical practice, namely 
the shaping, adding, and editing of memories individually and collectively. As can be read 
above, memory has always been practiced, embodied, or performed, yet the scale, vis-
ibility, speed and diversity with which institutionalized forms of memory are reshaped and 
contested characterize this “new memory.” 
This dissertation consciously avoids stepping into the discussion whether or not the 
matter and ontology of memory changes under the influence of media as to avoid both 
technological determinism and thinking in media effects. As the previous chapter has 
shown, memory has never been “merely residual,” never finished and always dynamic, it 
is the product of constant engagement, of work. We might never know what memory is 
or how it changes under the influence of media. Rather, it might be more worthwhile to 
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study how memory is worked, practiced, and performed in societies and cultures in which 
media permeate. In other words, how do people engage with the past for present or future-
oriented goals in a new media ecology?
The pervasiveness of networked, digital, archival, and mobile technologies and the 
widespread use of connective media characterize a new media environment. This ecol-
ogy shapes the ways in which we interact and communicate with each other to the point 
that it redefines what is meant by sociality. If memory work is, from the start, a process of 
social construction within specific groups, externalized, distributed, and, entangled with 
places, objects, media, and others—our ecologies of life—then we need to ask how these 
ecologies affect this construction. Schwarz (2014) correctly typifies the past not as a “stable 
object that lies within the individual (an archive, file drawer or wax tablet), but rather as 
an achievement, produced by the interactions between humans and non-humans and the 
practices that regulate these interactions” (p. 8). 
However, what happens when media technologies and media-related practices in-
creasingly shape the subjects of our memory work, steer our engagements with the past, 
hold specific understanding and experience of the past, and in the process progressively 
become part of memory work? Can we still speak of memory as an achievement? Or, is 
memory increasingly achieved for us? In an ironic turn of events, have the very technolo-
gies that meant to “liberate” us from top-down media institutions and inspire bottom-up 
participation instead given rise to a mnemonic culture in which certain versions of the past 
(still) dominate others? These questions, which flow out of the literature on the new media 
ecology, will be addressed in the empirical chapters. The next two chapters, however, will 
revolve around the question how to answer such questions in the first place.
3
Between practice and materiality: Seeing memory work 
through the lens of practices and affordances 
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Technologies may constrain, but they do not determine […] Technologies lead 
double lives.
(Silverstone, 2003, pp. xi-xii)
The matter, nature, and function of memory never changes as a result of technol-
ogy; rather, the concomitant transition of mind, technology, practices, and forms 
gradually impinge on our very acts of memory. 
(Van Dijck, 2007, p. 49)
The previous chapters discussed rather ‘grand theories’ of the relationship between mem-
ory work and media. In this chapter, I introduce two approaches or ‘middle-range theories’ 
that take us a step closer to the empirical analysis of this relationship: practice theory and 
affordance theory. Practices are the bridge between individual agency and societal struc-
ture, since they comprise individual, yet shared patterns of action. Practice theory allows us 
to see memory work as something people do—with or related to media—within a broader 
space of social interaction in which certain norms and values emerge. The second section 
discusses affordances as a dimension between practice and technology. Affordances are 
theorized here as the perceived possibilities for interaction with technology. As such, af-
fordances both invite and shape certain practices vis-a-vis technologies such as media. 
At the same time, affordances also leave open the possibility for unintended practices to 
emerge. The third section brings practices and affordances together and locates memory 
work as situated in between practice and materiality and realized in cultural forms.
Media and memory practices
Both media and memory work are tied to practices, which are, according to Schatzki (2001, 
p. 11), the “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized 
around shared practical understanding.” Similarly, anthropologist John Postill (2010, p. 1) 
defines practices as “the embodied sets of activities that humans perform with varying 
degrees of regularity, competence and flair.” Practice suggests action and creation on the 
part of the individual, but also on the part of the group as ritualized and/or normalized 
behavior. Practice, as a definer of self and being, is a strategic concept that bridges indi-
vidual agency and societal structure. It also allows for a concretization of the theories of 
mediatization and media ecology, since it is on the level of practice that these becomes 
apparent: practices such as playing, reading, consuming, sharing, and learning increas-
ingly have come to involve media or take places within mediated spaces. This is also true 
of the practices associated with memory work, ranging from mourning and memorializing, 
to curating and documenting.
Nick Couldry (2004) proposes to view media “as an open set of practices relating to, or 
oriented around, media” (p. 117). Regarding media as practice, Couldry (2012) argues, 
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brings about four advantages in researching the topic. First, practice is concerned with 
a “regularity of action” (p. 33). In other words, when media are used repeatedly, at par-
ticular times and in specific ways, a certain practice evolves from that. Media practice is 
intertwined with our routine and it partly defines our lifestyle. Second, practice never takes 
place in isolation; it is social: “Practices are not bundles of individual idiosyncrasies; they 
are social constructions that carry with them a whole world of capacities, constraints and 
power” (Couldry, 2012, p. 34). Practices take place in contexts and contexts are affected by 
practices. Practices thus can be seen as socialized and socializing action. Third, practice is 
intrinsically connected to what is dominantly considered as “need” (p. 34). In that regard, 
media as practice are needed in various kinds of interaction and coordination within 
groups and communities. Additionally, in the context of Western modern democracies and 
global capitalism, media practices are shaped under pressure of assumed “basic needs” 
such as freedom and trust (p. 34). Fourth and last, seeing media as practice guides us 
into discussions about how we should live with media. Here, the question of normativity 
concerning media practices arises. Norms appear through socializing action in the form of 
practice and when practice is standardized, it needs to be legitimized within a collective 
of practitioners. Underlying the practice approach to media is one seemingly simple ques-
tion: “what are people doing that is related to media?” (p. 35).        
In a reaction to Couldry’s view of practice, anthropologist Mark Hobart (2010) prefers 
to “think of practices as those recognised, complex forms of social activity and articula-
tion though which agents set out to maintain or change themselves, others and the world 
about them under varying conditions” (p. 63). This broad definition of practices invites a 
classification or categorization of “media-related practice,” rather than media as practice. 
Hobart clearly delineates what he means by his approach to media-related practice by an 
example:
In answer to the question ‘Is television viewing a practice?’ we cannot decide a 
priori, but must inquire about kinds and degrees of viewing, for what purposes and 
according to whom. I consider my flopping in front of the television after a hard day 
at work an activity, but a practice if I am critically watching an ethnographic film. So 
accounts of (usually) men watching news as part of making themselves informed 
citizens might be considered a practice in some situations, as might the couch-
potato life of the British TV series, The Royle Family, where television watching is 
constitutive of their social life and roles. (p. 72)
Hobart’s example shows that not every media-related activity is a practice. Hobart’s view 
suggests a certain purposive engagement with media and its content and the resulting 
change in the lives of their users. This also includes “women cooking their meals so the 
family can view favourite programmes; family decisions about capital investments in radio, 
television or computers” (Hobart, 2010, p. 63).  
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A problematic conceptual phrase such as the “mediatization of everyday life” can be 
reified on the level of media-related practice. The question is here: how do everyday prac-
tices change because of the existence and implication of ubiquitous media? This is not to 
say that action, practice and behavior are steered by a mediated center; media can very 
well be at the peripheries of practice yet do exert influence over that practice, for example 
when children ‘play’ their favorite TV-characters, when families have TV-diners, or when 
students study while listening to Spotify’s ‘study music’ playlist. As a result, research is 
currently shifting from focusing on moments of viewing, reading, listening, and interpreting 
media to practices of remixing, sharing, talking about, being a fan of media and to the 
more “ephemeral ‘moments’ of audience activity” (Bird, 2010, p. 88). Thus, media-related 
practices can be “more deliberative and conscious” (e.g. fan practices), the result of an 
“unconscious performance of mediated scripts” (e.g. weddings become like weddings in 
a film), or simply emerge by chance (e.g. trivial media content “goes viral”) (Bird, 2010, p. 
100). 
There is room for play in practice, however. Couldry’s analysis of practices does not 
account well for imagination, improvisation and spontaneous practice to appear—char-
acteristics of a new media ecology in which people carry their media on their bodies and 
spontaneity and play are interwoven with everyday media practice. Couldry’s analysis of 
practice is informed by two assumptions, argues Ursula Rao (2010): “firstly, practices are 
ordered; and secondly, this order is transparent and can be understood through (academic) 
reflection” (p. 149).
Resistance to everyday ordering mechanisms of practice can powerfully be theorized 
as tactics, as introduced by Michel de Certeau (1988). De Certeau (2009) calls a “strategy 
the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that become possible as soon as 
a subject with will and power (a business, and army, a city, a scientific institution) can be 
isolated” (pp. 35-36). A tactic, on the other hand, is a “calculated action determined by the 
absence of a proper locus” and it comes into being as a “guileful ruse” (De Certeau, 1988, 
p. 37). In De Certeau’s original sense, individuals use tactics of bricolage, assembly, and 
customization in order to negotiate the strategies set out for them by institutions such as 
businesses, the government or city planners. In order to appropriate things and surround-
ings for personal use—to make them “habitable”—individuals employ different tactics. De 
Certeau uses the example of the city in order to illustrate his point: cities are designed and 
planned strategically in particular ways. Yet, when a person moves about in the city she 
uses short-cuts, a favorite route instead of the fastest or runs a red light. Thus, she tactically 
engages with the environment strategically planned for use (De Certeau, pp. 91-110). 
This theoretical lens can be adopted and adapted to the analysis of media practices, and 
more specifically to the new media ecology in which content production springs not only 
from the hands of the powerful and the few. Audiences have the possibility to creatively 
interact with media content or create their own content, hence practicing media tactically. 
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Bottom-up production and remix might be added to De Certeau’s tactical toolbox of brico-
lage, assembly, and customization: 
People are playfully engaging in media production practices in different ways and 
with different motivations, including political activism, fun, fame, creating social 
bonds or even the pleasure of playing with the media system itself [ ] The point is 
here that media produced by ordinary people must be considered a constitutive 
part of media practices that are rooted in creative production processes from the 
very beginning, not as secondary practices [ ] but as primary sources. (Ardèvol et al., 
2010, p. 261) 
Remixes, peer-productions and other interactions with media texts are practices that are 
tactical expressions of the audience vis-à-vis institutionally mediated texts and society at 
large. They are “appropriative practices” that enable audiences to make media their own 
(Ardèvol, 2010, p. 266). This argument comes close to what De Certeau (1988) calls “poach-
ing”: an individual audience member takes from any text what she wants and uses it for 
her own benefit. However, De Certeau was writing before the digital era and he calls these 
poaching practices “quasi invisible” (p. 31). At least in part, this changed with the rise of 
digital spaces in which appropriative practices have become increasingly visible and part 
of “the media.” 
Even though De Certeau’s distinction between strategies and tactics is still valuable in 
the discussion of practice, his theory might need amendment when applied to the new 
media ecology. Basing his argument on The Practice of Everyday Life, Lev Manovich (2009) 
asserts that, on the level of practice within the Web 2.0 paradigm, “the logic of tactics has 
now become the logic of strategies” (p. 324). Institutional strategies are today explicitly 
developed to facilitate customization of any kind and therefore strategies and tactics are 
linked interactively (Manovich, 2009, p. 323). In other words, technological design of new 
media explicitly promotes bricolage, assembly, customization, remix and user-generated-
content. Thus, bricolage and play has been appropriated and incorporated by new media 
owners and designers. This view curbs some of the (academic) enthusiasm about sponta-
neous and affective production springing from imagination and creative practice. 
What does a practice approach bring to the study of memory work? As could be read 
in chapter one, memory work has always involved practice, whether it is training of the 
mind (memory techniques) through memory exercises or rituals such as dances, sacrifices 
or celebrations (memory performances). Yet, today, memory practices have increasingly 
become media-related or taking place within media(ted) environments. On a functional 
and conscious level, for example, people store information on their personalized media 
for later usage and write blogs for autobiographical purposes. Memory practices have 
also become scripted by media images and events; mass-broadcasted media texts such 
as historical documentaries and televised funerals or anniversaries steer audiences in 
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certain directions of remembering events and persons; they provide schemata or frames 
of remembrance (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). To remember, to mourn, to indulge in nostalgia, to 
discuss and talk about the past, to reenact it, and to challenge it involve media in implicit 
and explicit, direct and indirect ways. Moreover, we increasingly use media to remember 
for us, or to capture, save, and archive recorded experience. 
Investigating practices involves studying the dynamics of power on the level of people’s 
sayings and doings. In terms of memory practices, this comes down to scrutinizing what 
‘right ways’ of remembering are, what is remembered and when and where. Thus, Sturken 
(2008, p. 74) argues: 
The concept of memory practices allows for an emphasis on the politics of memory, 
precisely because of the ways in which the production and construction of memory 
through cultural practices has as its foundation the notion that memories are part 
of a larger process of cultural negotiation. This defines memories as narratives, as 
fluid and mediated cultural and personal traces of the past. A practice of memory is 
an activity that engages with, produces, reproduces and invests meaning in memo-
ries, whether personal, cultural or collective. Thus, an emphasis on practices, rather 
than objects or sites of memory, highlights the very active aspect (and hence the 
constructed nature) of memories.
A question that flows out of Sturken’s observation is how media affect memory work. 
That is, how do they exert influence over how memory is practiced. In his landmark study 
How Societies Remember Paul Connerton (1989) differentiates between incorporating and 
inscribing practices, as two different types of practices by which humans remember and 
transmit knowledge about the past. Incorporating practices like smiling, gesturing, and 
handshaking require the presence of a body to communicate a certain message. Inscribing 
practices entail the storing and retrieving of information through devices such as media. 
Connerton (1989) is primarily interested in incorporating practices, when he writes: “cultur-
ally specific postural performances provide us with a mnemonics of the body” (p. 74). In a 
mediatized culture, however, incorporating and inscribing practices increasingly conflate 
and convergence. For example, the practice of recording, inscribing, an event or an action 
immediately has become the thing one does; it has become a gesture, a postural perfor-
mance in and of itself, with its own mnemonic functions and goals. 
Affordances and materiality
A practice approach to media and memory has a strong focus on the sociological dimen-
sion of action. Agency, in most practice theory, is located within human beings alone. The 
technological or material dimension of action is somewhat at the periphery in practice 
theory. However, materiality matters within social organization, especially when we regard 
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media as technologies of memory, since “the material properties of artifacts are precisely 
those tangible resources that provide people with the ability to do old things in new ways 
and to do things they could not do before” (Leonardi and Barley, 2008, p. 161). New media 
invite and enable new practices. Simultaneously, they shape and limit them. This insight 
is particularly important when rethinking the relationship between media technologies 
and memory work within a new media ecology, in which our environments are inhabited 
by technologies that shape our communicative interactions. In much research literature 
within the field of media studies, the concept of affordances has been applied in order 
to scrutinize the relationship between media users and media technology. This section 
presents some of the most important insights into this term and relates them to memory 
work.
Environmental psychologist James Gibson (1979) first coined the term affordances. He 
described it in the following way: “An affordance is neither an objective property nor a sub-
jective property; or it is both if you like […] It is equally a fact of the environment [artifact] 
and a fact of behavior [action]. It is both physical and psychical [social] […] An affordance 
points both ways, to the environment [artifact] and to the observer” (pp. 129-130). Put 
differently, “technology affordances are action possibilities and opportunities that emerge 
from actors engaging with a focal technology. Affordances are rooted in a relational ontol-
ogy which gives equal play to the material as well as the social” (Faraj & Azad, 2012, p. 
238, emphasis in original). This means, write Faraj and Azad (2012) that “an object in the 
environment will offer different possibilities of action depending upon the actor’s abilities” 
(p. 251). Notwithstanding the term’s wide usage, the term ‘affordances’ is applied in many 
different ways and in many different disciplines.
In an attempt to clarify the major positions in the study of the social shaping of technol-
ogy, sociologist Ian Hutchby (2001) further elaborates on the concept: “Affordances are 
functional and relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities 
for agentic action in relation to an object. In this way, technologies can be understood 
as artefacts which may be both shaped by and shaping of the practices humans use in 
interaction with, around and through them” (p. 444). This position Hutchby calls a “third 
way,” in between the constructivist view on technology, which favors human agency in 
shaping technology, and a realist view, which emphasizes the “constraining power of 
technical capacities” (p. 444). This makes the concept of affordances useful as a middle-
range theory for communication and media researchers that can “bridge observations 
about technology use with our broader understanding of technology at individual, group, 
and organizational levels” (Evans et al., 2017, p. 37). This is in line with Van Dijck’s view on 
technology (most explicitly argued in The Culture of Connectivity) but also with De Certeau’s 
(1989) theory of strategies and tactics. 
Affordances are where strategic design meets tactical usage. Technologies are designed, 
developed, configured, programmed, as well interpreted, decoded, and used. Both stages, 
design and use, are subject to negotiation: designers take into account and adapt to 
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perceived needs and desires, whereas users and consumers make sense and appropriate 
the designed object. This is as true for automobiles and bicycles as it is for television and 
Facebook. Obviously, different things can be done with an automobile than with Facebook 
and this is where affordances come in. Affordances “constrain the ways [technologies] 
can possibly be ‘written’ or ‘read’” (Hutchby, 2001, p. 447). Empirically, this dynamic and 
fluid relationship between writing and reading technology can be examined on the level 
of practice, because it is on this level that the negotiation between prescribed (or, better, 
inscribed) use and actual use takes place.      
When applied to media, affordances “facilitate, limit and structure communication and 
action” (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 121, emphasis in original). That is, media invite certain uses and 
practices and restrict them at the same time. Affordances are the potential and perceived 
uses of an object, depending on whether or not it “matches” with the user’s physique 
and needs (Hjarvard, 2013, pp. 27-28). It is important to stress, though, that technological 
features or design of media are not the same as affordances. Features are rather static, yet 
adaptable, whereas “affordances are dynamic, emerging from the relationship between the 
user, the object, and its features” (Evans et al., p. 40). Faraj and Azad (2012) explore this idea 
further: “If features are defined as technical attributes and ways of working inscribed in the 
artifact by technology designers, then affordances represent possibilities of using select 
features or combinations of features in a way meaningful to the user’s goals, abilities, and 
lines of action” (p. 254). The implication of such thinking is “to abandon the talk of generic 
users or to think of technology as bundles of features. Context such as user intent, abilities, 
social, environment, as well as the specifics of the situation will matter even more” (p. 255).
For example, “follow” and “like” buttons are features, while the affordance is connectivity 
(the ability to connect with a person or brand). Pertaining to memory work, the options to 
tag, title, and describe a video on YouTube are technological features, while the affordances 
here could be archiveability or searchability. Whether or not the technology is used in this 
way depends on the user’s intent, context, background, and perception of that technology. 
Designed or implied usage might not correspond with actual usage, or the relation a user 
has with a particular technology. Therefore, as Faraj and Azad (2012) point out, “[w]e will 
also need to abandon the view that affordances are about a technology or an object. They 
are about actions in the world that involve technology” (p. 255).  Affordances, then, are 
not only about the material technology or object itself, but as much about user’s actions, 
perceptions, and actual usage of that technology or object. Therefore, Evans, et al. (2017) 
regard affordances as a relational structure “between an object/technology and the user 
that enables or constrains potential behavior outcomes in a particular context” (p. 36). The 
concept is analytically useful because it allows research into “the attributes and abilities of 
users, the materiality of technologies, and the contexts of technology use,” which are often 
dynamic (Evans, et al. p. 36). 
An affordance perspective on media further validates the view that they are not static, 
unchanging technologies. An implicit, yet excellent application of the concept of affor-
Chapter 3  |  Between prActIce And mAterIAlIty
76
dances to media comes from a study by Lisa Gitelman. She (2008) argues that the media do 
not exist because this suggests a natural, stabilized body, while media and their attached 
protocols, rules and uses continuously change according to the historical circumstances—
time and space—in which they are being used. In Always Already New, Gitelman (2008) 
consciously chooses to work from her case studies because media “are very particular sites 
for very particular, importantly social as well as historically and culturally specific experi-
ences of meaning” (p. 8). Therefore, she defines media as
socially realized structures of communication, where structures include both 
technological forms and their associated protocols, and where communication is 
a cultural practice, a ritualized collocation of different people on the same mental 
map, sharing or engaged with popular ontologies of representation. As such, media 
are unique and complicated historical subjects (Gitelman, 2008, p. 7).
By showing how phonographs were described in the discourse surrounding the new tech-
nology, Gitelman demonstrates the “multifaceted process of design and domestication” (p. 
64). In Gitelman’s case study of the phonograph, media affordances are clearly explained. 
The intended usage—inscribed in the design—differs from actual usage. While intended for 
office usage, the affordances of the phonograph invited other uses and served a certain 
cultural need. “Like the discursive lives of those later media, the discourses making sense 
of recorded sound formed a matrix of heterogeneous, changing, and even contradictory 
messages” (p. 68). The Edison Speaking Phonograph Company targeted intended users 
in business, but the device was appropriated for entertainment and home use. Moreover, 
the medium was new in a society that was marked by a rapidly growing middle class and 
changing role perceptions of women. The phonograph fitted well in what Gitelman calls 
the “domestication of mechanical reproduction” at a time in which the woman was “the 
arbiter of musical activity within the home” (pp. 68, 74). 
What does an affordance perspective bring to the study of memory work in a new 
media ecology? Media scholar danah boyd identifies four affordances that emerge out of 
networked public’s engagement within digital environments. These are essential for the 
construction of memory in a new media ecology (boyd, 2011, p. 46):
Persistence: Online expressions are automatically recorded and archived.
Replicability: Content made out of bits can be duplicated.
Scalability: the potential visibility of content in networked publics is great.
Searchability: Content in networked publics can be accessed through search. 
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With persistence, boyd means that while spoken interaction is ephemeral, technologically 
mediated interaction is not: communication is saved, recorded, and archived.17 The writ-
ten word gradually changed the way literate peoples around the world communicated 
and thought and internet technologies are firmly located within the long line of other 
innovations within media history. The replicability of content is not new in media his-
tory, yet the scale and ease with which bits and bytes are copied make boyd argue that 
“copies are inherent” in networked publics. Print culture enabled vast dissemination of 
ideas: the scale and visibility of revolutionary thought in colonial America, for example, 
demonstrated the efficacy of the written word in the public sphere (Warner, 1990). The 
notion of scale in digital spaces also is about the potential of texts and ideas (in whatever 
form) reaching a large and broad audience. However, “scalability in networked publics is 
about the possibility of tremendous visibility,” not the guarantee of it (boyd, 2011, p. 48). A 
text “goes viral” only when it enthuses the collective. Lastly, the ease with which persistent 
and replicated content can be searched might be the most radical departure from previous 
media systems such as print and broadcast cultures. Especially since the popularization of 
mobile information technologies, online searching has become a practice that is ingrained 
in daily life. 
The affordances relating to digital communication in networked publics—persistence, 
replicability, scalability, searchability—are key in understanding memory work today. 
Persistence makes any communicative act and text online—in whatever form—a potential 
mediated memory; replicability makes it possible to duplicate and alter these stored or 
archived texts and creatively engage with digital content; scalability allows content to be 
potentially distributed widely and thus to be consumed and reconstructed more broadly; 
and searchability makes memory work “less a question of remembering and more a matter 
of where to look” or let the looking be done for you by a search engine (Hoskins, 2009c, p. 
29). 
Additionally, digital media’s principles as described Lev Manovich (2001)—program-
mability, modularity, variability—permits code, text and audiovisual material to be 
“frequently modified or remixed.” Also, “while remix is politically contentious, it reflects 
an active and creative engagement with cultural artifacts, […] amplifying ongoing efforts 
by people to make mass culture personally relevant by obliterating the distinctions be-
tween consumers and producers” (boyd, 2011, p. 54). Additionally, the present and past 
in digital spaces are subjectively, affectively and virtually produced and made sense of at 
the same time, or rather in and through time (Keightley & Pickering, 2013). This “possibility 
of simultaneity” reconfigures the tensions between institutionalized history and cultural 
memory, broadcast and new media, but also, on a broader philosophical level, individual 
experience and collective images, and space and time (Garde-Hansen et al., 2009, p. 8). In 
similar vein, Mark Deuze (2012) asserts that “space and place are best understood as under 
17 This, of course, does not hold true for technologies such as Snapchat.
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permanent construction (like any site online): something continuously and concurrently 
made, sustained, remixed and taken apart by the very people and things that make up that 
ecosystem” (p. 15). 
Media affordances concomitantly invite and steer certain forms of communication as 
much as they leave room for alternative applications, practices and employment. The 
theory of affordances allows for a tension to exist between planned, ideal, and intended 
use and appropriated and actual use. This suggests creativity, surprise, chance, improvisa-
tion, play, and a sense of freedom when it comes to using media. Affordances also bring 
into question the place of agency of the user and the technology concerned. Both human 
and non-human actors are active in constituting digital memory work. 
Trisecting digital memory work: practices, technologies, cultural forms
What are the implications of the theoretical insights provided above for the study of digital 
memory work? First, digital practices are viewed as those practices inseparably connected 
to digital technology or those taking place within the digital environment of the Web. 
Such practices may be platform-specific, such as tagging or describing a YouTube video, 
liking or commenting upon a Facebook post, or editing or referencing a Wikipedia entry. 
Second, broadly speaking, digital technologies are those technologies that can hold and 
produce information represented in binary code—ones and zeroes, bits—that can be read 
by computational systems. Social media platforms will be the main digital technologies 
under scrutiny in the following chapters. Digital cultural forms are seen here as artefacts 
and objects produced with digital technologies and within digital environments. The word 
‘form’ is used here to indicate a culturally recognizable category that may contain different 
modalities of communication—text, image, audio, or video. Examples of digital cultural 
forms are: memes, selfies, Facebook profiles, wikis, or emoticons. A danger of trisecting 
memory work, however, is that its components are seen as separate categories while, em-
pirically, they are inseparable: they produce and mutually shape each other. When people 
engage in practices in their material environments, they simultaneously interact with 
technologies and produce and make sense of cultural forms, whether they are internet 
memes, online memorials, or wikis. 
This latter remark requires somewhat more explanation before an answer can be given 
to the question how to analyze digital memory work. Memory work is practiced in the sense 
that it involves the sayings and doings of people in their interactions with the past. Out of 
these practices flow certain norms and values regarding memory work which are continu-
ally contested and renegotiated socially. Vice versa, norms and values underlie practices. 
Not only do ‘right’ or ‘convincing’ ways of representing the past in the present emerge 
in memory work, also the ways in which the past is transferred into the future is subject 
to normative struggle. The previous two sections have demonstrated that practices and 
technological affordances are relational: affordances are activated through practical en-
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gagement with technological artefacts. Technologies may be inviting, enabling, shaping, 
and restricting practices and cultural forms in memory work.
Following Baym (2010, p. 44), this dissertation holds that “the consequences of technolo-
gies arise from a mix of ‘affordances’—the social capabilities technological qualities en-
able—and the unexpected and emergent ways that people make use of those affordances.” 
As such, people (and their practices, cultural forms) and technologies are “interrelated 
nodes in constantly changing sociotechnical networks, which constitute the forms and 
uses of technology differently in different times and places for different groups” (Lievrouw, 
2006, p. 250). Practices, as ways of doing, and affordances, as perceived possibilities for 
action and engagement, relate to the material environment in which people live. Practices 
are about what people do with and within their material environment, affordances concern 
what people perceive they can do with and within their material environment (Nagi & Neff, 
2015). Practices are as attached to technologies as technologies are to practices.
 Cultural form and the content captured in that form can be seen as the result of people’s 
practical engagement with their social and material environment, which might include 
technologies. Practices produce, often with technologies, cultural forms. For example, 
the practice of cooking, which might involve knives and a stove, results in producing the 
cultural form of a meal, which contains particular dishes. The practice of photographing, 
which involves a photo camera, results in the cultural form of a photographic image which 
contains a particular depiction of a moment in time. Practices, in this regard, are inscribed 
in cultural forms. At the same time, however, cultural forms may shape practices as well. 
They can inspire action or change culturally held norms and values. 
Cultural forms carry symbolic content and meaning that may be transported in time, 
across different locales and contexts and through time, across generations. However, Hall 
(1998, p. 449) reminds us:
The meaning of a cultural form and its place or position in the cultural field is not 
inscribed inside its form. Nor is its position fixed once and forever. This year’s radical 
symbol or slogan will be neutralized into next year’s fashion; the year after, it will be 
the object of a profound cultural nostalgia. (emphasis mine) 
This implies that meaning is encoded, decoded, and recoded differently in time and 
through time, depending on the socio-cultural context in which recipients encounter cul-
tural forms. Thus, technologies involved in memory work are regarded here as the means 
by which cultural forms are contained and realized through practice, yet the ‘unpacking’ of 
cultural forms is an enduring meaning-making process. 
Moreover, it is important to stress again that this dissertation does not view technolo-
gies as neutral intermediaries in digital memory work. They are as much part of digital 
memory work as are cultural forms and practices. Obviously, without digital technologies 
there would be no digital practices and cultural forms, let alone digital memory work. As 
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a peculiar kind of technologies, social media platforms invite, enable, shape, and restrict 
communicative interaction and practice. Users can do different things with Facebook than 
with YouTube or Wikipedia and these platforms do different things with their users and the 
content they share on it as well. At the same time, users might use these platforms in ways 
unexpected by their designers. Therefore, this dissertation investigates realized practices 
on these platforms that are inscribed in cultural forms. 
Additionally, memory work as performed on social media platforms is a type of mediated 
interaction, which “should be seen as a new and eclectic mixed modality that combines 
elements of face-to-face communication with elements of writing, rather than as a dimin-
ished form of embodied interaction” (Baym, 2010, p. 51). The cultural form and content 
produced and shared in digital spaces is immediately saved and stored. Studying cultural 
forms online can thus be said to automatically involve studying practices and technologies 
and vice versa. Digital memory work involves the constant interactions between people, 
technologies, and the symbolic content these concomitantly produce. In summary, when 
we study memory work, we investigate how the past is communicatively constructed 
through practices, technologies, and cultural forms employed by various actors for par-
ticular goals. Memory work is, therefore, a particular discursive construction that is the 
result of a constant power struggle between the various actors involved in it. 
4
Methodology: Researching digital memory work
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As the previous chapters have argued, memory work, the object of study of this disserta-
tion, can heuristically be dissected into three components: practices, technologies, and 
cultural forms. This chapter sets out to operationalize the phenomenon of digital memory 
work into empirical research. This means answering three interlinked questions: What hu-
man and ‘nonhuman’ actors are involved in memory work on platforms? How do platforms 
themselves engage in memory work through their procedural logics and mechanics? How 
do platforms shape the practices and cultural forms users employ in memory work and, 
vice versa, how are platforms shaped by this? These questions aim to show the dynamic 
and complex interactions between platforms and users.
In order to answer these questions, different types of textual analysis (discourse and 
content analysis) are employed and amended with a critical approach toward platforms 
and their operational logics and mechanics. In this chapter, I outline how and why these 
two methods can be combined in order to operationalize research into digital memory 
work. In the second part, the three case studies are introduced and rationales are given 
for these choices. This is also the part in which the three platforms under investigation 
are briefly introduced: YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia. The methodological approach 
taken might be best described as a mixed method case study design, because, per case 
study, a single and specified phenomenon and period of time is under scrutiny, using a 
set of methods which suit the case. The case studies and their respective methodological 
approaches are outlined in figure 4.1.
Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3
Event Chemical weapons attack 
on Ghouta, Syria
Shooting of  Michael 
Brown and the protests 
in Ferguson
The downing of  MH17 
in Ukraine
Date 21 August 2013 9 August 2014 17 July 2014
Platform YouTube Facebook Wikipedia
Primary human 
actors







YouTube’s interface and 
search algorithm,
recording devices, editing 
software, camera phones
Facebook’s interface and 
algorithm, recording 
devices, editing software, 
meme generators, camera 
phones
Wikipedia’s interface, 
text processing software, 
Wikipedia’s CMS, 
editing software
Primary practices Video-witnessing, 









Witness videos, video 
mash-ups, photo 
slideshows
Videos, photos, memes, 
written posts and 
comments
Wikis, talk page entries
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Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3










Figure 4.1 – outline of case studies
How to study digital memory work?  
How can we operationalize theoretical ideas into research on memory work on, by and 
through social media platforms? Platforms invite different medium-specific practices. 
These are socio-technical, since users interact with a platform’s technological design and 
architecture whenever they tag, describe, like, comment, share, reference, or edit online. 
They also structure mediated material in so that the past is  re-presented in specific ways 
and that certain reconstructions of the past become more visible than others on them. 
At the same time, people may use platforms in ways unforeseen by their designers. As 
a consequence, memory work is studied in this dissertation as practiced in interaction 
with technologies and realized in cultural forms. Hence, the case studies revolve around 
the outcomes of interactions with the platforms’ technological design, their interfaces 
and features. That is, empirical chapters study 1) the traces users leave and 2) the content 
they produce on platforms: texts. One important methodological assumption of this dis-
sertation is that research can investigate practices and the outcomes of interactions with 
technologies by studying text.
The cases thus require methods that allow analysis of memory work on the level of 
practice, technology, and cultural form and content. The primary research approach 
taken in the case studies is qualitative. Qualitative inquiry is “an umbrella term used to 
describe ways of studying perceptions, experiences or behaviors through their verbal or 
visual expressions, actions or writing” (Salmons, 2016, p. 3). Brennen (2012, p. 15) also 
stresses the interpretative work qualitative researchers conduct: “Qualitative researchers 
understand that while words and concepts have important denotative meanings, they 
also have connotative interpretations that are important to consider.” Qualitative projects, 
thus, traditionally, have a human-centered focus. However, as has been argued before, 
research has to take technology seriously as an actor within a broader network of interac-
tion and association. Technology enables, shapes, and restrains perceptions, experiences, 
and behaviors, and assists and extends verbal and visual expressions, actions and writing. 
A weakness of a technology-based approach, Van Dijck (2013, pp. 26-27) writes, is that 
it “pays scarce attention to content and cultural form as a meaningful force in the con-
struction of technology and users. In the context of social media, content and form are a 
significant factor.” Therefore, the empirical chapters view human and nonhuman actors as 
mutually shaping each other and their memory work.
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In order to trace both the agency of human and nonhuman actors in digital memory work, 
two main methods are employed: textual analysis and platform analysis. The rest of this 
section explains why these methods were chosen and how they were generally employed 
in the case studies. An obvious critique of the choice of either methods that cover medi-
ated content or media themselves is that they do not engage with people directly. Is this 
dissertation not investigating memory, something that is located as much in individuals, 
as it is in groups? A reply to this critique might be that this study is interested in the role of 
media, as specific technologies of communication, influencing memory work, something 
that is increasingly mediated and involves media. Analyzing the media content and the 
materiality of media technologies allows researchers to draw conclusions about particular 
representations of the past and the role of technologies in shaping those representa-
tions. Important to remember is that this section means to give a broad overview of the 
approaches to research taken in the empirical chapters. Per case study chapter, specific 
methodological tools and steps will be discussed, as well as the limitations. 
Platform Analysis
While not fully committing itself to its agenda and procedures, this dissertation borrows 
elements from what has loosely come to be labeled as platform analysis. Stemming 
from software studies, platform analysis is a yet developing critical approach and theory 
geared towards the study of social media platforms. A consequence of its relative nov-
elty, platform analysis offers not a clearly defined methodological roadmap, but instead 
adopts a political-economic and critical-theoretical stance towards the design features, 
affordances, and operational logics of social media platforms. These characteristics are 
informed by platforms’ ideologies and business models. Platform analysis basically asks: 
what do social media want from their users in order to generate financial, social, and/or 
cultural capital?  
What do we analyze when we analyze platforms? An answer is provided by Van Dijck’s 
(2013, p. 29) definition of platforms:
Technologically speaking, platforms are the providers of software, (sometimes) 
hardware, and services that help code social activities into a computational archi-
tecture; they process (meta)data through algorithms and formatted protocols before 
presenting their interpreted logic in the form of user-friendly interfaces with default 
settings that reflect the platform owner’s strategic choices. (emphasis mine)
A platform-analytical approach can therefore focus on any of the components of platforms 
emphasized above. This dissertation concentrates primarily on interfaces, default settings, 
and the procedural logic of platforms, because these aspects actively invite, steer, and 
shape memory work on platforms to the extent that they are part of it. Following this line 
of thinking, the case studies scrutinize the ways in which the respective platform invites 
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and shapes specific user practices and content creation. This ranges from curating a video 
on YouTube, to commenting on a Facebook post, to editing a Wiki (see fig. 1). Especially 
interfaces (what do users see when using a platform) and technological features (what can 
users do with a platform) are important in studying memory work on them. The interface, 
writes Patelis (2013, p. 120), is a “non-neutral entity,” a “cultural text that aspires to power 
and that frames specific forms of interaction.” Interfaces are designed with a specific goal 
in mind. They are the perceived affordances from the designer’s perspective (reflecting 
their “strategic choices”) and users interact with them in ways that may follow intended 
usage or deviate from it. 
Social media platforms are highly templated; that is, users are given boxes to be filled in 
by them. Facebook asks “what’s on your mind?” Twitter asks “What’s happening?” Google 
and YouTube ask you to search or upload material. And Wikipedia would not exist without 
the continuous effort of its editors. Social media platforms continually ask for input that 
can easily be “read” by their owners, by means of, for example, algorithmic processing. 
Also, with Wikipedia as the notable exception, “social media have a congenitally double 
nature: on the one hand they are the loci of fulfillment of communications that are central 
to the functioning of democracy, indeed, for society as a whole; while on the other hand, 
they must realize profits” (Patelis, 2013, p. 118). They have been designed “on the basis of 
specific values and with the aim of specified interaction” (Patelis, 2013, pp. 119-120). This 
makes social media platforms ideological through and through. This latter thought drives 
this dissertation’s critical outlook on social media platforms. 
 Besides scrutinizing the technological and economic-ideological aspects of platforms, 
platform analysis might also involve so-called “digital methods.” Digital methods, writes 
Rogers (2013, p. 1) form a particular “methodological outlook for research with the web” 
that studies and repurposes “methods embedded in online devices” (p. 1). For example, 
algorithms determine visibility of content and “search engines author new orders of things 
in the sense that they rank sources for any topic” (Rogers, 2013, p. 6). Interpreting the hier-
archies in search results (what shows at the top of search results?) can, therefore, be a form 
of social research itself. In the case study chapters on YouTube (chapter 5) and Wikipedia 
(chapter 7) some basic digital methods support the main methods employed. More gener-
ally, this dissertation follows digital methods’ stance that social processes such as memory 
work can be ‘read through’ the lens of the device (or platform, in this case). This does not 
mean that social scientists need to become computer engineers. They can, however, 
investigate the outcomes of interactions with them, or how their procedural logics and 
interfaces present reality to their users. This is also noted by Bucher (2012) in her article on 
Facebook’s now-defunct algorithm EdgeRank, which ordered users’ Newsfeed. She writes, 
“what is important is not necessarily to know every technical detail of how a system works, 
but to be able to understand some of the logics or principles of their functioning in order to 
critically engage with the ways in which systems work on a theoretical level” (p. 14). 
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This dissertation follows Bucher’s way of thinking regarding the procedural logics of plat-
forms, yet it also moves beyond a focus on the medium itself. The central analytical focus 
in the case studies lies on the outcomes or products of user engagement with platforms: 
text. However, one of the methodological arguments here is that, on social media plat-
forms, text and technology are inseparable: whenever users engage with social media they 
produce text and vice versa. This is the reason why, in the case studies, textual analysis is 
amended by platform analysis as a means to make sense of realized practices.
Two types of textual analysis
Texts, writes Brennen (2012, p. 193) are “things that we use to make meaning from” and 
as such they “provide traces of a socially constructed reality.” Texts may reveal the “social 
practices, representations, assumptions, and stories about our lives” and through critical 
scrutiny and interpretation by the researcher these might be revealed (Brennen, 2012, p. 
194). ‘Texts’ on social media platforms are seen as ‘data’ or ‘content’ by platform owners; 
they constitute the material that is produced, changed and shared by users. This material 
can be used and/or monetized in specific ways, depending on the platform. In this dis-
sertation, texts are treated as culturally meaningful objects that take shape in particular 
cultural forms and are carried and re-presented through mediating technologies, in this 
case social media platforms. 
A “text” can be any type of cultural content (e.g. spoken, written or visual), as Rose (2012) 
writes. Textual analysis, therefore, can be mixed well with platform analysis: where the lat-
ter focuses on the carrier, the former focuses on the carried. Two types of textual analysis 
are applied in this dissertation: critical discourse analysis (CDA) and content analysis (CA). 
Below, both methods will be discussed in terms of their broad theoretical underpinnings. 
In the case study chapters, the procedural steps taken will be discussed in more detail. 
A downside of using texts, or “extant data” as Salmons (2016, p. 33) calls online written 
or visual text, is that it might not fully reflect people’s full points of view or experiences. 
The point in studying textually realized memory work, though, is that this will be carried 
forward into the future, rather than the potentially ephemeral acts of face-to-face com-
munication, for example.
Critical Discourse Analysis
In this dissertation, I employ a specific strand of discourse analysis, critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). This form of textual and contextual analysis sees language as social prac-
tice through which power relations are (re)established and performed. This aspect of CDA 
makes it an appropriate method as to reveal how different actors aspire to power through 
their textual interactions and products. Fairclough (1995), one of the founders of CDA, 
defines discourse as “(i) a language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text pro-
duction and text interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice” (p. 97). Practice is, in this view, 
inscribed in text. CDA thus allows an analysis of practice through textual analysis. Similarly, 
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Wetherell and Potter (1988, p. 169) write that people “do things with their discourse.” In 
other words, discourse functions toward particular goals such as explaining, justifying or 
blaming but also, more broadly, ideological effects that are legitimizing certain worldviews.
This is an important addition in the light of the object of study here, memory work. In 
essence, CDA revolves around the question how discourse “relates to and is implicated in 
the (re) production of social relations—particularly unequal, iniquitous and/or discrimina-
tory power relations” (Richardson, 2007, p. 42). As chapter one to three argued, what is 
re-presented in the present and carried into the future is the result of a continuous power 
struggle. CDA, as it is applied in this dissertation, aims at revealing this struggle. As such, 
CDA is both a theory and method and is used to study the dynamics of power—particularly 
pertaining to questions of voice and inequality—within particular discourses. This is piv-
otal, since I conceptualized memory work as a particular type of discursive practice, which 
is concerned with interpreting and re-presenting the past in the present, and carrying it 
into the future.
CDA, however, is not only concerned with how these power dynamics play out within a 
text. The method also concerns itself with the “social processes and structures which give 
rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which 
individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with 
texts” (Wodak, 2001, p. 3). This aspect of CDA makes it a suitable approach to, for example, 
show how a community of practice emerges within the context of Wikipedia. Through what 
people do and say on Wikipedia, a specific set of norms, values and hierarchies emerge, 
which, in turn, affect other Wikipedians’ doings and sayings, as chapter seven will further 
demonstrate. 
Another reason why discourse analysis is a well-suited method for analyzing textually 
realized memory work is given by Brennen (2012, p. 197): “[t]he use of the term discourse 
analysis reminds researchers that it is through our use of language that our reality is so-
cially constructed.” Memory work is preeminently a process of social construction that in-
volves language or another semiotic system of signification. As the first two chapters have 
demonstrated, we can only make sense of or attach meaning to our pasts through such 
systems; they are the building blocks for the social frameworks of memory, as Halbwachs 
would say. They guide the interpretations of and reflections on the past. As a method that 
focuses on language and text, discourse analysis is suitable to unpack the explicit and 
implied meanings and assumptions within memory work, specifically on the level of text.
This latter aspect relates to an important concept in CDA: intertextuality. Intertextuality, 
writes Rose (2012, p. 191) “refers to the way that meanings of any one discursive image or 
text depend not only on that one text or image, but also on the meanings carried by other 
images and texts.” Intertextuality, therefore, gives meaning to texts and practices, next to 
contexts of production and interpretation. As a range of discursive practices, memory work 
relies heavily on intertextuality. In the rich symbolic environment of platforms and the Web 
in general, intertextuality is key. Cultural forms that are important for memory work, such 
89





as iconic images or phrases, are encoded with meaning that can only be decoded (and re-
coded) by others sharing the same cultural frame of reference. CDA allows for the tracing of 
such meanings in relation to how social actors struggle for power in and through memory 
work.
Despite its established research agenda, argue Wodak and Meyer (2009), “rigorous 
‘objectivity’ cannot be reached by means of discourse analysis, for each ‘technology’ of 
research must itself be examined as potentially embedding the beliefs and ideologies 
of the analysts and therefore guiding the analysis toward the analysts’ preconceptions” 
(pp. 31-32). This constructivist remark is important, yet it must not be seen as hindering 
the analysis but instead as enabling it. It liberates the analysis from strict methodological 
confines and allows associative and inductive theory-building.
In the chapters in which CDA is applied (6 and 7), I operationalize the method in different 
ways. The main reason for this is that I analyze specific platforms which enable, shape, 
and constrain specific cultural forms and content. Also, chapter 6 (on Facebook) revolves 
around multimodal forms of discourse (written text, images, and videos), whereas chapter 
7 (on Wikipedia) is concerned with only written text. These differences require a tailor-fitted 
application of methods. I will elaborate on the specifics of these approaches in the meth-
odological sections of the empirical chapters.     
Content analysis
CDA can be assisted by the counting of particular categories in the content of archives, 
or the occurrence of words and images in them. This tells the researcher more about the 
occurrence and co-occurrence of themes and issues within memory work on platforms. 
In chapter 5 (on YouTube and Syria) and in chapter 7 (on Wikipedia and MH17), CDA is 
amended by such basic “content analysis.”  According to Bryman (2012), “content analysis 
is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts (which may be printed or visual) 
that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic 
and replicable manner” (p. 289). It is, therefore, a quantitative, deductive method that tests 
theories, rather than generates them, even though there are also forms of content analysis 
that are qualitative (Mayring, 2000). Bryman (2012) writes that “the process of analysis is 
one that means that the results are not an extension of the analyst and his or her personal 
biases,” but rather that “once formulated, the rules can be (or should be capable of being) 
applied without the intrusion of bias” (p. 289). Questions asked in content analyses are 
often relatively easily operationalizable: who, what, where, and how much (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 291). Content analysis can thus focus on different kinds of units of analysis, ranging from 
significant actors (who, what), words (how, why), subject and themes (how much, what, 
where, how), and dispositions (what, how, why) (Bryman, 2012, pp. 295-298). 
Content analysis employs coding schedules and manuals that allow other researchers to 
replicate the analysis. Reliability is guaranteed through inter-coder reliability tests (between 
different coders) and/or intra-coder reliability tests (testing the consistency of an individual 
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coder). The advantages of content analysis are that the method is very transparent, allows 
longitudinal analysis, is unobtrusive (that is, the researcher has minimum influence on the 
collected data), is highly flexible, and can generate conclusions about groups that might 
be hard to reach or analyze in real life (Bryman, 2012, pp. 304-305). Some disadvantages 
of the method are that it is impossible to have a coding manual that is completely free of 
researchers’ interpretation—they are themselves embedded within cultural contexts. And, 
most importantly, why-questions are hard to answer (Bryman, 2012, pp. 306-307). Content 
analysis is applied in chapters 5 and 7 mainly to assess the dominance of certain types and 
forms of texts.  
Introducing the case studies
Three platforms will be the focus of attention in the empirical chapters: YouTube, Facebook, 
and Wikipedia. These platforms were chosen because each of them has a dominant posi-
tion within the new media ecology, up to the point that, at least in ‘Western’ countries, they 
have become ingrained in everyday life. These platforms inform us about the world and 
allow us to share our own perspectives about it. YouTube is the go-to platform for video 
watching and sharing, Facebook for social networking, and Wikipedia for consultation and 
production of general (and sometimes specialized) knowledge on a wide range of topics. 
These platforms are different from ‘broadcast’ or ‘legacy’ media in the sense that their 
content is produced by users; without user input, they would not exist. This does not mean 
that they are disconnected from these ‘older’ media. Platforms and legacy media use each 
other. All three platforms under scrutiny present themselves as neutral intermediaries in 
the types of communication they enable. They all, however, have their own idiosyncratic 
ideologies, histories, and technological features and affordances, which this dissertation 
studies separately in order to demonstrate their roles in digital memory work. 
YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia are, besides social media platforms, also massive 
archives containing user-generated content, which is ordered and structured in specific 
ways. The content on YouTube is archived and made searchable by the curator-practices 
of users; Facebook re-presents and orders content on individual Newsfeeds and groups 
according to the principles of personalization and interaction with content; Wikipedia is 
a vast encyclopedia which contains lemmas on, among others, historical events, places, 
and people and is constantly updated and rewritten by its community of editors. All three 
are major platforms in the new media ecology: they attract many users and are important 
filters of information. In the following sections, brief descriptions of the platforms are pro-
vided, followed by a short introduction and rationale for the specific case. They are more 
thoroughly discussed in terms of their operational procedures in the case studies.
Even though the case studies are separate research projects, they are connected. They 
aim to show how specific human actors engage in memory work on social media platforms. 
Witnesses, activists and protesters, and Wikipedia editors construct the past in specific 
ways and often for specific goals. They share their versions and interpretations of and on 
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the past and actively strive to carry these into the future. Simultaneously, though, the goal 
is to demonstrate that these platforms themselves possess agency in these processes 
as well. Ultimately, the intention of these case studies is to show that both humans and 
platforms are concurrently involved in the politics of memory.
YouTube
On April 23, 2005, the first video was uploaded to YouTube. “Me at the zoo,” shows one of 
the platform’s founders, Jawed Karim, standing in front of the elephants at the San Diego 
Zoo and commenting on their long trunks. As in a classic dotcom success story, Karim 
and the other founders, Chad Hurley and Steve Chen, became multimillionaires a year and 
a half later, when Google acquired the company (Snickars & Vondereau, 2009, p. 9). Less 
than a decade after Karim’s original post was uploaded, YouTube grew out to become a 
culturally significant and economically profitable platform. Monthly, it has over 1 billion 
unique visitors, together watching over 6 billion hours of video. It operates in 56 countries, 
is available in 61 languages, and 70% of the material on it originates from outside the US, 
making YouTube a global phenomenon (Youtube Statistics, n.d.). According to web traf-
fic data site Alexa, the website is the second most-visited globally, right after its mother 
company Google. 
A video-sharing platform, YouTube aims to provide “a forum for people to connect, 
inform, and inspire others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original 
content creators and advertisers large and small” (About YouTube, n.d.). Beyond its eco-
nomic success and corporate aims, however, YouTube hosts a rich cultural archive. The 
site’s first slogan, “Your Digital Video Repository,” rather than “Broadcast Yourself” captures 
its essential function, namely being an archive produced and curated by users (Van Dijck, 
2013, p. 149). YouTube’s particular affordances, regulations, architecture and the practices 
related to them enable, support and shape this function. This makes the platform an es-
sential part of not only the new media ecology, but also the new memory ecology. As the 
case study contends, the platform does not only provide a gateway to the past, but also 
actively filters it through its algorithmic processing, which is partly based on users’ curating 
practices.  
The academic work on YouTube is growing steadily, but remains quite small in the light of 
the daunting figures stated earlier. The first book-length studies, YouTube: Online Video and 
Participatory Culture (2009) and The YouTube Reader (2009), provide critical readings of the 
platform as a key player in today’s media ecology. Both books point at the methodologi-
cal issues that arrive when analyzing an unstable research object like YouTube. Not only 
does the content (archive) of YouTube change, but also the interface and its uses vary. One 
strategy to face the problem of how to study YouTube is to focus on what its technological 
underpinnings are that invite and shape certain uses and practices. The affordances that 
make YouTube a success mainly relate to the archiveability and spreadability of its content. 
YouTube’s archival content is spreadable, because it is easily accessed, linked to, shared 
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and discussed. Jenkins, Ford and Green (2013) argue that the platform’s easy-to-use 
embed option, for example, makes content spread across the internet (p. 6). Automated 
embedding of YouTube clips on Facebook timelines and ready-to-copy embed codes allow 
for seamless diffusion of content from the platform to other places online. 
The chemical weapons attack on Ghouta
Besides millions of hours of pet and prank videos, YouTube’s archive also contains videos 
of politically significant events, many of which are made and uploaded by witnesses of 
these events. One such politically contentious event that was filmed by witnesses was the 
aftermath of the chemical weapons attack on the neighborhood of Ghouta, Damascus, on 
August 21, 2013. More details will be provided in chapter five, but what is important to note 
here is that much uncertainty ruled about whether or not it was actually a chemical weap-
ons attack and who were the perpetrators behind it. An important reason why this case 
was chosen is because professional reporters were not on site during or after the attack. 
The only footage available was produced by activists and civilians and hence provides an 
opportunity to investigate what happens with witness videos in a media ecology in which 
such material provide records of disruptive historical events.
The event and its circumstances are thus a case in point regarding the politics of memory 
work: the videos and their uploaders make powerful truth claims about what occurred dur-
ing and after the attack. Moreover, the case study explores the visibility of videos made by 
witnesses—a cultural form I call witness videos—of this atrocity in YouTube’s archive. Not 
only does the chapter investigate how these witnesses have recorded their experiences in 
specific ways and have made conscious choices about what to film, but also, importantly, 
how they made their videos findable in YouTube’s archive. Witnesses, after they have up-
loaded their videos on YouTube, make choices about how to tag, title, and describe them. 
The stages of memory work involved in this process—from filming to curating videos—are 
the central focus of this case study. Although the future memory of the attack is constituted 
by witness videos, it is powerfully shaped by various actors, both human and nonhuman.
This is, however, not where the analysis stops. Witness videos may be found by others 
who take parts of these videos and mix them with other scenes from other videos and 
curate these ‘remixed’ videos in ways that might make them more easily findable than 
their ‘originals’. On the level of recording, we can analyze practice by looking at the camera 
movement and angle and ways in which witnesses add to the veracity of their recordings, 
for example by focusing on details. On the level of curating, tagging, titling, and describing 
are important practices that are traceable in YouTube’s metadata. This gives insight into 
users’ realized interactions with YouTube’s interface and features. These mechanisms of 
memory work are empirically explored by qualitative and quantitative analyses of meta-
data and (remixed) content. 
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Facebook has come a long way since it launched as thefacebook.com from founder 
Mark Zuckerberg’s Harvard dorm room on February 4, 2004. According to Internet World 
Stats (2016), as of June 30, 2016, Facebook has 1,679,433,530 subscribers worldwide. Ac-
cording to Alexa, per June 2017, Facebook is the third most-visited website in the world. 
Zuckerberg and the Facebook’s co-founders Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz, Andrew 
McCollum, and Chris Hughes first designed Facebook as a service for Harvard student to 
create profiles and look each other up. Within months, the service spread to other elite US 
schools. By 2006 it was available to everyone with internet access and by 2008 it was avail-
able in Spanish, German, and French (Brügger, 2015). Where Facebook first started as a 
social network, it quickly grew into a platform where people can share what they are doing 
or “what’s on their mind” (as it now asks).18 User can share material on their personal pages 
or those of their friends (per default settings), or within closed and open group pages. 
Facebook has been a commercial enterprise from the beginning, when users were 
confronted by banner advertisements. Today, the platform essentially is a data-gathering 
company. The more Facebook knows about its users, the more precise the data it sells to 
third parties is. These third parties are mainly advertisers who use user data to personally 
target Facebook users. To this end, Facebook stimulates users to make connections in the 
forms of so-called ‘likes’. It’s principle of connectivity is still there, but connecting to prod-
ucts, places, and other media is now as much part of it as is ‘friending’ (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 
47). This technology-supported form of connectivity impacts what users see and do not 
see when they visit Facebook. Facebook actively filters information—on the basis of the 
principle of personalization—which is then presented on users’ homepages, or ‘Newsfeed’. 
Another aspect that determines visibility of content is their ‘weight’. Weight is determined 
by the level of interaction (likes, shares, and comments) there is with content (Bucher, 2012; 
cf. chapter 7). Thus, Facebook actively mediates information about the world, whether this 
is an update from a friend or a news story, to users on the basis of past behavior.
Justice for Mike Brown
The second case study investigates how Facebook users engage in memory work on the 
page Justice for Mike Brown and how the platform plays an active role in it. The page, set up 
a day after the police shooting of the African-American teenager Michael Brown on August 
9, 2014, aided in organizing and spreading information during the protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri. More contextual information will be provided in chapter 6, but the main reason 
why this case was chosen is because the page invited different types of memory work to 
emerge, ranging from commemorating Brown to appropriating iconic symbolic material 
from previous protests. Hence, this chapter rethinks the role of memory work within con-
temporary digital activism. 
18 For a comprehensive overview of the various stages in Facebook’s short history, see Brügger (2015). 
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Protest repertoires—the strategies, symbols, and practices protesters employ to achieve 
their goals and to construct their identity—have come to increasingly involve platforms. 
Memory work is an important part of this, especially in the case of protests against ra-
cial injustice in the US, which draws from the Civil Rights era. The chapter argues that 
this memory work provided the means through which protesters could identify with the 
movement, but simultaneously that Facebook’s technology leads to representing events 
within a minimum of reductive narrative frames. Protesters and activists have always been 
engaged in memory work, but what happens when this takes places on a platform such as 
Facebook?
Wikipedia
Created in 2001, Wikipedia, owned by the Wikimedia Foundation, is the oldest platform 
investigated in this dissertation. The platform is a collaborative encyclopedia created by 
and for users. Wikipedia’s About page reads that the English version houses nearly 5.5 mil-
lion articles and over 38 million articles in total, written in over 250 languages. As of May 
2015, the general website has 16.5 billon and the English page 7.9 page views per month 
(Wikimedia Report Card, n.d.). According to Alexa, per June 2017, Wikipedia is the fifth 
most visited site globally, right after Google, YouTube, Facebook, and Baidu. The platform 
was founded by Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger, as a branch of their presently terminated 
project Nupedia, an encyclopedia exclusively produced by experts. Wales and Sanger 
strived to create a system that was open to anyone and that was quickly filled with entries, 
unlike Nupedia, whose production process was tedious. This followed the principle of the 
wiki—“a website on which users collaboratively modify content and structure directly from 
the web browser” (Wiki, n.d.).
Like traditional encyclopedias, Wikipedia helps to transfer knowledge of past events, 
people, things and places into the future. Also like traditional encyclopedias, its contribu-
tors select what does and does not belong in it. Unlike traditional encyclopedia, however, 
anyone can, in principle, contribute to it. This makes the platform interesting in terms of 
memory work, especially regarding historically and politically significant events. By means 
of their practices, Wikipedia editors (Wikipedians) construct specific versions of events. 
This case study dives into the group dynamics behind these practices by investigating 
the archived talk pages—the space in which Wikipedians discuss and debate articles and 
their fellow editors’ choices. Talk pages provide insight into the process of memory work, 
because here editors engage into debate about how the past is re-presented in a wiki. 
Moreover, talk pages show how hierarchies play out and norms and values are shaped 
and negotiated. On the basis of this hierarchy, access is granted to technologies that can 
prevent or reverse editing. This is important in terms of memory work, because these tech-
nologies effectively silence alternative voices that do not fit within dominant discourse or 
do not comply with Wikipedia’s community ideology.
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The downing of MH17
The third case study concerns the downing of flight MH17 on July 17, 2014, and the wiki 
that was created after it. The downing of MH17 has been, up until this date, a contentious 
event that is intrinsically connected to broader geopolitical tensions between Russia and 
its allies on one side and, broadly speaking, the European Union and the United States on 
the other. This most visibly plays out in global media coverage, where facts and fictions col-
lapse and converge. Russian media coverage, especially that of RT (Russia Today, Russia’s 
state-financed news network) and state-owned press agencies, told significantly different 
stories about the events surrounding the downing than American and European media 
did. Moreover, there is evidence that Russia employed its “troll army”—paid bloggers and 
commentators that purposely disrupt online discussion—to spread misinformation on 
social media and throughout the Web (Sienkiewicz, 2015, pp. 213-215). On the other side, 
American government officials and news outlets were quick to point fingers at the Kremlin 
as being (in)directly responsible for the atrocity. Because Wikipedia entries are primar-
ily based on mediated content, this debate was also visible in the talk pages. Unlike the 
chemical weapons attack on Ghouta, video and photo material concerning the downing 
was scarce. Therefore, Wikipedians were extra vigilant about the sources that were used by 
fellow editors to verify information on the disaster. Wikipedians’ memory work regarding 
the downing of MH17, then, revolves around the inclusion and exclusion of information 
and its selection and appropriation in a form that fits Wikipedia’s standards and commu-
nity guidelines. Before we turn how these power dynamics within memory work play out 
on Wikipedia, however, the next chapter investigates how they take place on YouTube.

5
Witnessing in the new memory ecology: 
Memory work and the Syrian conflict on YouTube19
19 This chapter was published as: Smit, R., Heinrich, A., & Broersma, M. (2015). Witnessing in the New Memory 
Ecology: Memory Construction of the Syrian Conflict on YouTube. New Media & Society 19(2), 289-307. No other 
changes were made other than replacing “this article” with “this chapter.”
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Witnesses are pivotal agents in memory work. Because they ‘have been there’ and experi-
enced moments of political, legal, religious and historical significance, they are commonly 
considered credible and authoritative (Zelizer, 2007). The rise of mobile recording devices, 
which enable a new type of “citizen witnessing,” (Allan, 2013) now forces scholars to rethink 
the role of the witness in media discourses about the past. Disruptive events such as the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11, the 2004 Tsunami, the 2005 London bombings, and the ‘Arab 
Spring,’ demonstrate that witnessing has increasingly become something one does with a 
camera (phone) in hand. 
In this chapter, witness footage is analyzed concerning the chemical attack on Ghouta, 
a suburb of Damascus, which took place on 21 August 2013 in the midst of the civil war 
between the Syrian regime and opposition forces. Where professional journalists are often 
regarded as the bearers of information, reporters were absent in the immediate aftermath 
of the attack. The only footage of it was created by (opposition) activists and civilians. 
This makes the event a case in point concerning the role and function of witness videos in 
a “new memory ecology” (Hoskins, 2011b). Citizen witnesses increasingly replace profes-
sional journalists as “key producers of images that linger as historical markers of disruptive 
events” (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 148) and mediate events through video-sharing 
practices on YouTube.20
Speed as well as intensity of such coverage appears to have increased tremendously in 
recent years. Whereas it took weeks until Iraq’s genocidal chemical attack on the Kurds in 
Halabja in 1988 became known and visual material was scant (Darwish, 2007), video mate-
rial from Ghouta was accessible within a few hours on YouTube. This platform facilitates 
and enhances mass (self-)communication (Castells, 2009) and simultaneously is a mas-
sive—yet problematic—archive of audiovisual representations. Taking the “crowd-sourced 
video revolution” (Sasseen, 2012, p. 4) as a starting point, this chapter aims to move 
beyond the prevalent scholarship on transforming production practices to investigate 
how eye-witness accounts are remixed and curated online. Witness videos uploaded to 
audiovisual archives are inevitably caught in the politics of visibility and representation of 
a conflict. The enduring Syrian civil war has stirred international politics and the public, not 
in the least because of the horrific images of death and suffering covered in international 
news bulletins. As Pannti (2013, p. 16) argues “gaining access to the mainstream media by 
providing eye-witness images has been a key strategy of the Syrian opposition groups in 
their effort to mobilize the support of distant others.” The Ghouta attack arguably is the 
deadliest use of chemical weapons that was reported after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). 
Estimates of the death toll range from 350 to 1,500 civilians killed, amongst them many 
children (Sinjab, 2014). However, until today there is no clear evidence proving who was 
behind the attack. The opposition and most Western commentators point towards the 
20 While witness videos from Syria were uploaded on other platforms as well, most notably LiveLeak, we focus 
on YouTube because it is the dominant platform for video-sharing.
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regime but others, such as the Syrian regime and the Russian foreign ministry, suggest that 
opposition forces are to blame in an attempt to malign Assad (Abrahams, 2013). 
The aftermath of the attack was filmed by pro and contra Assad activists and neighbor-
hood residents. Such witness videos are records of what happened but are shot in line 
with particular ideologies. Furthermore, such videos often are placed online by various 
uploaders, who may or may not have altered or reassembled witness footage, yet claim 
truth on the basis of this material. Distinct agents shape and reshape witness videos of 
news events after they are uploaded on YouTube, and hence they actively try to construct 
future memory of these events. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the (re-)presentation of 
witness videos of the Ghouta attack on YouTube and, more broadly, their role and function 
in memory work. 
To investigate the process of memory work within digital archives and the role of specific 
mnemonic agents, this case study is guided by two interlinked questions: 
1. How do different agents (re-)present witness videos of the Ghouta attack on YouTube?
2. How do the affordances of YouTube and the sociotechnical practices associated with 
this platform affect memory construction of the conflict? 
The analysis consists of two steps. First, the chapter conceptualizes citizen witnessing 
news events by means of video sharing as a relatively new media practice and the wit-
ness video as an increasingly prominent cultural form within a “hybrid media system” 
(Chadwick, 2013). Moreover, the chapter argues that witness videos in popular archives 
such as YouTube are part of a broader shift in sociotechnical practices, constituting a “new 
memory ecology” (Brown and Hoskins, 2010; Hoskins, 2011a, 2011b). They authoritatively 
shape future memory of conflicts such as the Syrian civil war and it is therefore pivotal to 
understand by whom and how this material is used. 
Second, the study argues that witness videos are only sporadically re-presented in their 
original form on the platform. In this regard the implied promise of new media technolo-
gies to shape future memory is somewhat downplayed by realized forms and practices. 
YouTube’s living archive, which supports both the storage and spread of witness videos, 
is created and curated by its users, a diverse group ranging from mass media to activists. 
Uploaders, as “agents of memory” (Zelizer, 2008) edit, (re)post, comment, share, tag, title 
and ‘like’ from their own ideological positions, remixing—i.e. combining and manipulat-
ing—‘raw’ material and thus guide interpretations of witness footage. At the heart of these 
curating practices lie the affordances and technology of YouTube, which to a large extent 
affect which videos are found and watched and are thus essential to understanding how 
the archive is shaped. By focusing on the forms, practices and technologies of citizen wit-
nessing in relation to a “globital archive” (Reading, 2011, 2014), this chapter explores how a 
politically charged event like the Ghouta attack is constructed within a new media ecology. 
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New Witness Accounts, New Memory?
Witness accounts have always been used in news coverage (Rentschler, 2004; Peters, 2001; 
Zelizer, 2007; Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009), but with the rise of citizen-produced eyewitness 
footage, scholarly attention for its inclusion in mainstream media is growing (Wall & El 
Zahed, 2014; Mortensen, 2011; Andèn-Papadopoulos, 2013a, 2013b; Allan, 2013; Bock, 
2012). However, the role witness videos play in the construction of memory in a hybrid 
media system, in which ‘old’ and ‘new’ media interact and are interdependent on each 
other (Chadwick, 2013, p. 4) has so far received less attention (cf. Reading, 2009a&b, 2011). 
Nowadays, agents “create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and 
in ways that modify, enable, or disable others’ agency, across and between a range of older 
and newer media settings” (Chadwick, 2013, p. 4). These new dynamics inevitably change 
the “what, how, why, and when of remembering and forgetting” (Hoskins, 2011a, p. 279). 
Having their own means of production, witnesses increasingly replace professional jour-
nalists as credible providers of up-close and immediate reports. Purposively taking out a 
camera-phone or a similar device and record what is seen on the spot, has become a ritual 
which potentially transforms ordinary people into important actors in the news-making pro-
cess (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009; Allan, 2013; Bock, 2012). Hence, the observer’s subjective 
experience of the event (her ‘being there’) is seemingly objectively recorded: the responsi-
bility for what is represented is shifted “from a human practitioner to the perfect recording 
technology of a camera” (Bock, 2012, p. 644). The use of a medium (technology) by a medium 
(witness) makes the latter more authoritative: witnessing, quite literally, is objectified, giving 
the witness as text as well as the witness as person an aura of credibility (Peters, 2001, p. 709). 
By having been there and simultaneously ‘proving’ this by their videos, witnesses let the 
world know about a ‘real’ situation. This is the reason why witnessing with a camera (phone) 
in hand potentially becomes a political act in itself. As Andén-Papadopoulos (2013a, p. 4) 
convincingly argues, camera-witnessing offers the opportunity to “provide a public record 
of embodied actions of political dissent for the purpose of persuasion” and to bypass of-
ficial perspectives in (state controlled) media. It may be perceived as an evidential trace of 
atrocity. As in cases such as the Ghouta attack, these recordings become “mementos of a 
lived, embodied experience of a critical historical occurrence and, crucially, of the photog-
rapher’s own role in this event” (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 150). The media practice 
concurrently is a memory practice (Schwarz, 2014): the authority of presence appears to 
be inscribed in witness videos. This quality is particularly powerful when witness footage is 
used to reconstruct politically sensitive pasts.
The observation that witness videos are authoritative traces of a past reality prompts ques-
tions regarding the video-sharing sites in which witness videos end up. Reading (2009a&b, 
2011) conceptualizes these sites as globital archives. A conflation of global and bit, the 
concept is reified in the case of the Ghouta attack: videos and photographs were created 
with and saved on camera phones and other recording devices, uploaded and categorized 
on platforms such as YouTube, further disseminated by news organizations, and watched 
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on mobile devices and television. Correspondingly, Hoskins (2011c, p. 29) asserts that today 
“memory is lived through a media ecology wherein abundance, pervasiveness and acces-
sibility of communication networks, nodes, and digital media content, scale pasts anew.” 
Hand (2014, p. 2), following Hoskins, asserts that “the present epoch of potential memory in 
which huge numbers of traces are scattered across proliferating media types, [produces] an 
unpredictable ‘living archive’ through which unexpected ‘emergence’ of data about the self is 
always a possibility.” This memory potential is not restricted to data about the self, but leads 
to and is a product of the endless remixability of resources, objects and representations of the 
past: “digital objects are also fluid, rewritable, and arguably less “fixed” or “durable” than their 
analogue counterparts, meaning that traces are retrievable and also reconfigurable in ways 
that similarly problematize linear models of past and present” (Hand, 2014, p. 3). This leads 
to a confluence of classic theoretical dichotomies between personal and collective, private 
and public, historical and experiential, popular and official memory. An ecological approach 
to memory entails examining the interplay between the different media technologies, prac-
tices and actors that are involved in assembling, remixing and curating (visual) content. This 
is especially relevant because, as the discussion above has demonstrated, witness videos are 
potentially powerful building blocks in the reconstruction of the past. Which sociotechnical 
practices, memory agents and actors, then, are involved in this reconstruction?
Structuring Future Memory: Curating Practices, Algorithms and Visibility
The profusion of digital material uploaded by witnesses of the Ghouta attack holds, at 
least in theory, the promise of various reconstructions of this event based on videos shot 
from every angle and told by many voices. Yet, the globital archives that constitute a new 
memory ecology are not neutral spaces in which every witness is equally heard. Rather, 
they are shaped by powerful agents, invite and require specific sociotechnical practices 
and are enabled and restricted by platform-specific affordances. This chapter argues that 
curating practices on YouTube—giving titles, tagging, and describing content—are essen-
tially political practices that structure content and anticipate search behavior. 
On YouTube, users are “powerful curators in the process of categorization and classifica-
tion” (Gehl, 2009, p. 47). The “classificatory imagination” (Beer, 2009, p. 998) of an uploader 
partly determines whether or not her video turns up as a result of a search query because the 
algorithms—“encoded procedures for transforming input data into a desired output” (Gil-
lespie, 2014, p. 167)—supporting and guiding search queries on YouTube depend on these 
categorizations and classifications. In fact, they are more important, in terms of search results, 
than the number of views or the popularity of the user who uploaded the video (Gehl, 2009). 
Based upon these user-provided classifications, algorithms “provide a means to know what 
there is to know and how to know it” (Gillespie, 2014, p. 167). Thus, the interaction—through 
curating practices—between an uploader of a video and the algorithm ultimately determines 
the (in)visibility (Bucher, 2012) of certain videos within YouTube’s searchable archive. 
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By means of their curating practices, uploaders ready their videos for the algorithm. 
However, YouTube itself is an active agent in this process. First, YouTube search results 
are sorted by relevance. Relevance here signifies how well the search terms connect to 
the titles, tags and descriptions given to videos. Second, by letting uploaders choose to 
put their videos in predefined categories such as ‘news and politics,’ ‘activism,’ ‘people 
and blogs,’ and ‘nonprofits and activism’ the platform guides the uploaders through the 
first step of curation of their material. Third, on the level of visibility of certain videos, 
YouTube “algorithmically demotes” videos that are especially gory, effectively keeping 
them from showing up on most-watched lists or user home pages (Gillespie, 2014, pp. 171-
172). Fourth, on the level of search, YouTube, with technical support of its owner Google, 
algorithmically anticipates what a user is looking for by providing suggested search terms, 
an automated feature called ‘Autocomplete’ or ‘Google Suggest.’ Lastly, certain videos are 
automatically pushed on top search results by YouTube’s own channel, Spotlight, or by 
commercial partners of the platform. 
Some uploaders engage with YouTube’s algorithm in more effective ways than others. 
Gehl (2009) makes the distinction between “curators of storage” and “curators of display.” 
In curating lies authority, because the curator decides which content is shown in which way. 
Videos are uploaded by users (curators of storage), something that is popularly viewed as 
an activity that is in direct opposition to the hegemonic position of mass media as content 
producers and disseminators. “Without user participation in building YouTube’s archive, 
a site like YouTube would not exist,” Gehl (2009, p. 47) asserts. However, the potential au-
diovisual memory stored in YouTube’s archive is reassembled by “curators of display and 
exhibition,’ which often are large media companies, not ‘ordinary people’” (Gehl, 2009, pp. 
46-47). For example, by tagging themselves to the videos they (re-)upload, legacy media 
increase the chance of their videos showing up in the search results.
As soon as objects enter an archive, whether it is YouTube or a traditional archive, they 
are “liberated” from their complexity of use and meaning in a particular context (Gehl, 2009, 
p. 49). They are inherently decontextualized, meaning that, as historical traces, they are 
detached from the conditions and situations in which they were produced. Therefore, digital 
archives like YouTube are in need of authority to evaluate and display uploaded items within 
their ‘new’ context. Algorithms and uploaders cooperate in rearranging and reassembling 
items, thus reactivating mediated memory of past events in terms of the present. The typical 
sociotechnical practices associated with placing a witness video on YouTube—from shooting 
and using footage in other videos to tagging and titling—actively determine the visibility of 
videos and consequently which videos are dominantly represented in the memory ecology. 
To scrutinize memory construction on YouTube, it is therefore pivotal to study how “these 
representations of the past and their unique temporality are produced by heterogeneous 
networks consisting of people, computers, and algorithms that aggregate and sort the con-
tributions of different users” (Schwarz, 2014, pp. 7-8). In the analytical sections, this chapter 
explores these interactions between representations, actors and technologies.




In order to empirically examine memory construction on YouTube, this chapter conducted 
both quantitative and qualitative content analyses. The first part of the analysis focuses 
on the content of the videos, which allows us to draw conclusions about what content is 
actually visible on YouTube, and thus potentially constitutes future memory of the Ghouta 
attack. A coding scheme was developed to structurally categorize and deductively analyze 
both their form and content. Four variables were included: 1) Cinematic layer (which 
type of shots were used?) 2) Visual content (what is seen?) 3) Audio content (what can be 
heard?) 4) Extra-diegetic elements (uploader; number of views, likes, dislikes and shares). 
The coding scheme allows us to classify the videos in terms of distinct frames. Uploaders 
“select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the communicat-
ing text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 55). They thus try 
to guide the reception of a video.
Second, the tags, titles and descriptions—the textual results of curating practices of 
uploaders—were coded into open coding categories. Important to note is that although 
“the process of induction involves drawing generalizable inferences out of observation,” it 
contains a deductive element too because the researcher goes back and forth between text 
and codes (Bryman, 2012, p. 26). The titles and descriptions, as textual markers that might 
steer readings of the videos, were obtained from the respective sections in the YouTube in-
terface. Because the platform does not show the tags uploaders give to videos, the source 
code was searched for for ‘meta name=keywords.’ Most tags are written in English, but also 
in French, German, Italian and Arab. The latter were transferred from Arab language codes 
into characters and translated. This search resulted in 521 tags we categorized inductively. 
Two weeks after initial coding, both the videos and the textual meta-data were coded again 
in order to increase validity of the results. This two-step method allowed us to analyze who 
uploaded the most viewed videos, what the videos show, how this information is com-
municated, and how these videos are curated. 
Sample
A purposive sample of witness material about the chemical attack on Ghouta has been 
compiled. The sample includes both original witness videos and videos shared by other 
uploaders who used and remixed them. In the latter case only those parts concerning the 
Ghouta attack were analyzed. Seven search queries were used to compile the sample: 
‘Syria August 21,’ ‘Syria chemical attack,’ ‘Ghouta Syria,’ ‘Ghouta massacre,’ ‘Ghouta August 
21,’ ‘Syria gas attack,’ and ‘chemical weapons Syria.’ The top five results—in terms of view 
counts—after each search were included. Videos that showed up in the results but did not 
relate to the topic, or did not use witness material were excluded. This sampling method is 
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partly borrowed from Burgess and Green (2009, p. 41) and is inspired by their observation 
that popularity metrics are not only descriptive, but also performative: “they make calcu-
lable and measurable a simplified and atomized model of audience engagement.” After 




To understand how witnesses have documented the attack, the first part of the content 
analysis focuses on the witness videos themselves, including those embedded within 
news reports on Ghouta.21 What should be noted first is that original witness videos in 
the sample are very factual and almost technical. The camera is used here as an objec-
tive recording device to provide evidence that a chemical attack indeed took place. The 
witnesses appear to count on the power of the visual; barely any comments are audible. 
The ones that are made are “Allahu Akbar” (God is great) or express emotion by crying. 
This can be considered a rhetorical strategy: by not commenting, witnesses let the images 
speak for themselves. Conscious choices in the processes of filming reveal political stances 
toward the conflict as the videos disclose an awareness of what to film. Focusing on the 
effects of the nerve agent Sarin, for example, many videos aim to provide technical detail 
of symptoms. They contain detailed shots of runny noses, constricted pupils, and convul-
sive, spastic bodies. Often rows of dead bodies are shown (figure 5.1). Another strategy to 
increase the veracity and credibility of the videos is a focus on doctors helping people in 
the scene, or giving statements in front of the camera.
21 The average length of the videos in the sample is a little under four minutes. However, this average is distorted 
by three videos of twenty minutes or longer. Most videos are in between one and two minutes in length. The 
average number of views of the sampled videos is 179,911. This might seem small, but the use and spread of 
particular content is multiplied because the same witness video footage is used in many videos. Three videos 
were after closer examination excluded from analysis because they were partly identical to other videos. One 
video included in the sample has been removed from YouTube in between sampling and analysis. All videos 
have been accessed on 27 October 2014.
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Figure 5.1 – Screenshot from video showing detailed shot of eye (AFP)
Details in the videos ‘prick,’ thus making them more than a recording. This relates to Frosh 
and Pinchevski’s (2009, p. 9) argument that “this is a new kind of witnessing, one that is 
radically inclusive since it equally registers the principal subject and the extraneous de-
tail in the scene before the camera.” This dimension is gruesomely illustrated by the fact 
that all but five videos in the sample show children who are in incredible pain and barely 
breathing, or whose dead bodies are scattered across a floor, wet from the water that has 
been used to rinse the chemical agent off their bodies (fig. 5.2).
Figure 5.2 – Screenshot from video showing rows of dead children (VexZeen)
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They wear pajamas or oversized t-shirts and are apparently lifted from their beds. Show-
ing children in this way is the ultimate strategy to prove that the attack was not staged, 
which some commentators claimed. Additionally, or maybe consequently, each video that 
explicitly shows children either in pain or dead has 500,000 to 1.5 million views.  
All but four videos in the sample are shot from the point of view of the witness; that is to 
say, cameramen turn the camera as they walk around and are themselves part of the scene. 
The few videos that have not been filmed by a handheld camera are photo collages (e.g. 
ABC News; Kirnéa) or show the alleged firing of the rockets during daytime (e.g. winfama1; 
GlobalLeaks).22 Witnesses use close ups and medium shots to show bodies in pain. When 
focusing on details, the camera is brought close to the scene, instead of automatically 
zooming in. This way of filming enhances the authenticity of the video: it seemingly is a 
direct representation of the real. Indeed, the “verité aesthetic” of witness videos “heightens 
the effect of ‘realness’ and ‘closeness’ already so powerfully signified by the sense of view-
ing events from the involved perspective of those who lived or experienced a crisis as it was 
actually happening” (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 154). The clips show the chaos that 
comes after an attack, an impression enhanced by shaky and blurred images and quick 
camera movement. This leads to an immersive viewer experience which creates the sense 
of a present past that repositions the viewer as a witness herself. 
Uploaders and Frames
The question of how videos are framed should be preceded by identifying the main up-
loaders, especially with regard to a politically charged event such as the chemical attack 
on Ghouta. Different uploaders pick and choose available content in order to create new(s) 
stories. By identifying the main uploaders and the frames they apply in their remixes, this 
chapter demonstrates how witness material is used to provide different accounts about 
this specific past. Moreover, it allows us to make claims about the presence and power of 
certain types of uploaders.
Four types of uploaders were identified, based on their ‘about’ pages, websites and the 
content they shared: legacy media, web-native media, activist media and citizen witness-
es. The most prominent uploader type in the sample, legacy media, is defined as media 
that have had a pre-web presence and/or use other platforms (radio, TV, paper) as their 
main means of communication. No distinction was made between public, commercial, 
and independent media. In most cases these outlets employ professional journalists (e.g. 
CNN, ABC News, Al Jazeera). Web-native media did not exist prior to the emergence of the 
internet and aim to provide an alternative to legacy media. Yet, they adopt a journalistic 
approach and have a (partly paid) staff (e.g. Truthloader, The Young Turks, ANAChannel). 
Both legacy media and web-native media declare to function as objective news providers. 
22 The latter is highly unlikely, because the attack took place during the night. The photos used in collages might, 
however, also be stills from videos.
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Activist media we defined as strongly political media organizations or individuals that (often 
temporarily) pursue a political goal. Their declared function is to change views and call for 
political action (e.g. TheSyrianrev2011, GlobalLeaks, Eretz Zen). The fourth uploader type, 
citizen witnesses, consists of individuals who share either their own experiences or raw 
material shot by others. Results reveal that, although the majority of videos were uploaded 
by legacy media (figure 5.3), the three most-watched videos in the sample were uploaded 
by web-native media (Truthloader, ANAChannelEng, The Young Turks). 
Figure 5.3 – Types of uploaders in sample
While one clip in the sample uploaded by a citizen witness has by now been removed from 
YouTube, all videos curated by legacy media and well-known and well-watched online news 
shows are still available a year after they were uploaded (200,000-1.5 million views). These 
results suggest that especially legacy and web-native media select and channel witness 
content to wider audiences on YouTube. Simultaneously, they fulfill a gatekeeping role in 
both the storage and, indeed, display of witness videos. The videos that are watched more 
than 200,000 times most often are compilations of original witness footage, assembled 
into a (online) news report. Indeed, in today’s hybrid media system content spreads from 
medium to medium, being altered along the way (Chadwick, 2013). This supports Read-
ing’s (2014) argument that globital archives are in constant motion and never static: due 
to the nature of digital content, recorded witness experiences can be remixed, deleted and 
used in different contexts for distinct purposes. By contrast, the analysis shows that, while 
never static, YouTube’s archive concerning the Ghouta attack is partly stabilized by power-
ful uploaders like CNN and Al Jazeera.
Three dominant ways of telling the story of the attack through (remixing) witness videos 
can be inferred from the material in the sample. First, there is the questioning frame, applied 
by legacy and web-native media that follow journalistic norms. These uploaders adhere to 
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a detached style and primarily ask the question: Were chemical weapons used? If so, who 
did it? These videos use witness material as visual quotation. A voiceover or presenter tells 
the viewer that he or she should make up his or her own mind when it comes to judging the 
veracity and value of the videos. For example, Cenk Uygur, The Young Turks presenter, says 
after one report: “You can judge what you saw with your own eyes. We don’t have any more 
information than that” (The Young Turks: 5:17). Comments such as these not only show 
that journalists are skeptical about the footage coming from Syria, but also that they shift 
the responsibility for interpreting witness videos to viewers themselves. The journalistic 
analysis is focused more on determining the veracity of the videos than on what is seen in 
them, thereby leaving, for the better or the worse, space for viewer interpretation. 
Second, activist media apply an accusatory frame and an involved style. They use footage 
shot by themselves, other activists, or citizen witnesses in order to assert that Assad is 
to blame for the chemical attack. The sentence that might best describe this stance is: 
look what Assad did. He is to blame for our suffering. Uploaders such as TheSyrianrev2011, 
1Syriatruth and SouriaArchive:SA#14 first and foremost want to document the atrocities 
as to create an archive that can be used in the future to prove that Assad’s regime used 
chemical weapons on its own people. The mediated witness accounts are used to illustrate 
the direct effects of the Assad regime’s violence on non-militant, ordinary citizens (e.g. the 
in-video text in fig. 5.4).  
Figure 5.4 – Screenshot of video providing disclaimers (TheSyrianrev2011)
Third, a moral frame is adopted by citizen witnesses. They do not immediately point fin-
gers, but centralize the misery of the victims and the humanitarian crisis that is the result of 
the attack. “Look, world,” these clips are saying, “Syrian people are suffering. I was there.” A 
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recurring topos is that of a father being reunited with his children who are either dead or in 
shock (e.g. fazzamin; SYMAN NOLUN; figure 5.5). Videos such as these demonstrate how the 
daily lives of civilians are violently disrupted by the atrocities of war and provide personal 
accounts of the conflict that illustrate or represent the collective suffering of the Syrians.
Figure 5.5 – Screenshot of video showing father holding his dead children (fazzamin)
The four types of uploaders in the sample are thus not only trying to mediate the conflict 
directly, but are also consciously engaging with future memory to promote their interpreta-
tion of events. This can be interpreted in terms of Tenenboim-Weinblatt’s (2013) concept 
of “mediated prospective memory,” which describes how media have the potential to 
remind us of the public agenda of the past. The uploaders of the videos in the sample 
are concerned with creating their own version of this agenda. What is apparent from this 
research is that videos uploaded by legacy and web-native media—with their idiosyncratic 
frames—end up high in the search results, whereas activists and citizen witnesses do not. 
The next step in the analysis attempts to provide an explanation for this popularity by 
examining the curating practices of these uploaders and how they relate to algorithmic 
agency and visibility on YouTube. 
Curating
Curating practices are not descriptive or neutral, but are steered by the professional, 
political and ethical motives of uploaders. As a result, tags, titles and descriptions reflect 
the purposes the footage serves, what uploaders want to emphasize, how they anticipate 
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search behavior and how they try to preconfigure the reception of a video. As such, the 
tag analysis below is an analysis of practice, rather than content. By comparing the frames 
used in the videos with the curated descriptive elements attached to them, I explore how 
witness videos are appropriated by uploaders, gain visibility on YouTube and potentially 
become historical markers. 
YouTube requests that users upload their videos into one of the preexisting categories the 
platform provides. In this first step of curation, most videos in the sample were categorized 
under ‘news and politics’ or ‘activism,’ but other categories included ‘people and blogs,’ 
‘nonprofits and activism’ and ‘education.’ This categorization illustrates the division in the 
sample: in most cases, uploaders are proclaiming either to be objective or involved. Of the 
31 videos in the sample, 27 are tagged, the second step in curating. On average, each video 
has 18 tags. They concern: 1) place, 2) weapon type, 3) military actor, 4) political actor, 5) 
media actor, 6) political issues, 7) type of news, 8) state of affairs, and 9) religion. Figure 5.6 
shows the distribution of tags; tags such as ‘Syria chemical weapons’ were included in two 
categories, in this case ‘place’ and ‘weapon type’.
Figure 5.6 – Frequency of tag types in sample
The tags connected to the videos uploaded by legacy and web-native media mostly reflect 
the questioning frame; they connect directly to what is discussed in the video (place, weap-
on type, media actor and state of affairs). For example, the most-watched clip ‘Chemical 
attack in Syria’ by Truthloader (1.5 million views) has 29 tags, including ‘sarin gas’ (weapon 
type), ‘Syria’ (place), ‘Free Syrian Army’ (military actor), and ‘Syria latest’ (news type), but 
also ‘Syria chemical weapons’ and ‘Syria chemical attack.’ By providing as much tags as 
possible, uploaders such as Truthloader increase the chance of ending up high in the 
search results. The tags provided by activist media are more geared toward the apparent 
aggressors and military intervention, whereas those provided by citizen witnesses focus 
mostly on the description of place. What this shows is that mainly descriptive, rather than 
suggestive, tags do well in terms of search results. Also, legacy and web-native media tag 
themselves, a tactic by which they increase the visibility of their uploads. 
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The dominant frames identified in the analysis of the videos do not always correspond 
with the ways in which videos are tagged. The second most watched video in the sample 
(‘Young girl affected’ by ANAChannelEng) illustrates well how tags diverge from the up-
loader’s declared professional or ideological stance. Instead of describing what is seen in 
the video—a young girl having difficulty breathing—the tags focus on the broader context 
of the attack. Tags such as ‘uprising,’ ‘Assad,’ and ‘human rights’ have no denotative 
descriptive function but rather focus on the connotations evoked by the video: there are 
human rights issues at stake here, caused by the clash between a President and his people. 
Whether these tags reflect the political motives of the uploader or that they just anticipate 
the search queries of YouTube users remains unclear. However, the tags and content do 
show how this precarious moment of life after the attack is framed as a consequence of 
Assad’s decisions and therefore suggests the use of an accusatory frame (used by activist 
media) rather than the questioning frame applied in the video.
Titles and descriptions of the videos further establish the questioning, accusatory and 
moral frames adhered to by the four uploader types. The questioning frame is supported 
by titles such as: “Did Syria Use Chemical Weapons on Its People’ (ABC News) and ‘Inside 
Story: Syria: Chemical Warfare?” (Al Jazeera English). The descriptions below the videos 
with titles like these are tentative: “In Syria, women and children were among the dozens 
found dead under suspicious circumstances this week” (Al Jazeera English) and “Syrian 
opposition claims hundreds have died in a chemical weapons attack in Damascus” (ABC 
News). The descriptions that follow are either taken from existing press reports written 
by news agencies such as Reuters or AP, or by the news organization itself. Consequently, 
news media offer extended and detailed reports in the description section, thereby provid-
ing extra information alongside the video and reaffirming their frames. These titles and de-
scriptions warn users that the veracity and authenticity are to be questioned, for example: 
The reports, which could not be independently verified, come as a UN team is in 
Syria to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons during the two-year civil 
war. (Euronews)
This type of description shows an awareness of the power of witness videos in claiming 
truth. Journalistic skepticism is used here to contextualize them. Selecting from a vast pool 
of available videos, legacy media act as curators of display and by editing and providing 
text, they reestablish themselves as “memory agents” in globital archives.
The accusatory and moral frames adopted by activist media and citizen witnesses show 
involvement and an explicitly subjective stance. In this case, the videos are used as rhetori-
cal tools in the discursive battle waged on YouTube between users who either support or 
oppose the Assad regime. In the contra-Assad camp, which uploaded most videos, both 
activists and witnesses of the attack share a similar goal: show the world the atrocities 
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of chemical warfare and move a global audience into action. This is also illustrated by 
multilingual titles and descriptions written by activists and by unusual formatting: 
► August 2013 ♀ ATROCITIES IN SYRIA ~ CHEMICAL ATTACK ~ Bashar Al Assad (Kirnéa)
Moreover, the certainty expressed in the titles and descriptions on Assad’s forces being the 
perpetrators behind the attack is telling:
Tarma, Zamalka and again, the Syrian regime targeted the towns of Eastern Gouta 
[. . .] Other videos which show targeting civilians in the suburbs of Damascusv [sic] 
with chemical weapons on August 21, 2013.  (The SyrianRev2011) 
Another activist, Eretz Zen who describes himself on his ‘about’ page as a “secular Syrian 
opposed to having my country turned into a Taliban-like state” provides an alternative 
perspective:
This video footage that recently surfaced shows jihadi militants from the Islam Bat-
talion that operates in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta and led by Zahran 
Alloush launching an operation called ‘al-Reeh al-Sarsar (Almighty Wind) on the Da-
mascus suburb of al-Qaboun in Eastern Ghouta at the early morning of Wednesday, 
August 21, 2013. (Eretz Zen)
The titles and descriptions demonstrate that similar content can be used for different 
purposes. They may provoke particular readings and through them the position of the 
uploader becomes clear. The combination of the visual and textual dimensions of witness 
videos appearing on YouTube “casts the audience as the ultimate addressee and primary 
producer, making the collective both the subject and object of everyday witnessing, testi-
fying to its own historical reality as it unfolds” (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009, p. 12). The future 
memory of the Ghouta attack as it is represented in YouTube’s archive changes with every 
addition and deletion, and is therefore very much contingent upon audiences who both 
produce and consume witness texts. 
Conclusion
This chapter identified contemporary citizen witnessing and its associated practices as 
key components of memory work in a new media ecology. The first step of the analysis 
focused on formal and stylistic characteristics of witness videos and asked how different 
agents (re-)present these concerning the Ghouta attack on YouTube. Witnesses capture 
their experience by means of a seemingly neutral technology. The suggested objectivity of 
the camera-phone, or a similar technology, is a powerful element in the reconstruction of 
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past events. At the same time, witnesses are subjectively part of the scene, as much as they 
are observers. This internal paradox is also apparent in the witness videos of the Ghouta 
attack: they convincingly demonstrate—not in the least because of the sheer number of 
videos—that a chemical attack took place, while both pro and contra Assad witnesses 
produced footage. 
Different uploaders use these videos and remix them in order to support particular 
frames. While the witnesses who shot the videos are concerned with proving that a chemi-
cal attack took place, the most-watched, remixed videos concerning the event apply a 
questioning frame. For better or worse, citizen witnesses are not immediately regarded 
as trustful by legacy and web-native media. In direct opposition to this are the uploads by 
activist media and citizen witnesses themselves, which are used to persuade publics to 
act, either morally or politically.
Second, the chapter analyzed how the affordances of YouTube and the sociotechnical 
practices associated with it affect memory work. The analysis reveals how conscious 
choices and automated processes in the different stages of mediation, from shooting the 
video up until the moment of watching, affect the shape and content of YouTube as a glo-
bital archive. Uploaders are actively engaged in increasing the visibility of their videos by 
tagging and curating these in effective ways. The witness video, as a persuasive narrative 
device, is thus used to support varying claims about reality. By doing so, actors aim to 
influence public debates while at the same time constructing future memory about the 
Ghouta chemical attack. 
The sharing of witness accounts might be occurring on a much larger scale and speed 
than ever before; yet, other factors are involved in this trajectory, ranging from mobile re-
cording devices, affordances of the platform to search engine algorithms and the policies 
regarding the nature of content that can be uploaded. New media technologies indeed 
provided witnesses with the means to let the world know about the Ghouta attack. Yet, 
which accounts are prominently visible on YouTube is determined by the logic of the plat-
form and curating practices of powerful actors. The future memory of the Ghouta attack is 
thus simultaneously influenced by actors who know how to curate effectively and by the 
algorithmic logic and infrastructure of YouTube.  
This chapter has combined established methods (content analysis) with the study of 
metadata (tag analysis) to analyze how witness material is used to “promote specific public 
understandings of the past” (Neiger, Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011, p. 19). A closer examina-
tion of web archives’ technological architectures might provide new understandings of 
such technologies as active agents in the new memory ecology. Moreover, analysis of the 
viewers’ comments can shed light on the political negotiation and meaning-making pro-
cesses of audiences. The research demonstrates that the fields of witnessing and memory 
concerning the enduring conflict in Syria are sites of discursive battles. Through everyday 
media practices such as remixing, tagging, titling and describing content, agents—whether 
they are large media companies or individual activists—use and frame witness videos 
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according to existing professional and political ideologies in a struggle for meaning and 
attention. The analysis shows that witness videos prove invaluable for memory work. 
Correspondingly, their (re-)presentation and visibility in popular archives such as YouTube 
should be scrutinized in any discussion of them.

6
Activating the past in the Ferguson protests: 
Memory work, digital activism and the politics of platforms23
23 This chapter has been published as: Smit, R., Heinrich, A., & Broersma, M. (2017). Activating the past in the 
ferguson Protests: Memory work, digital activism, and the politics of platforms. New Media & Society. Advance 
online publication. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817741849
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On August 9, 2014, the shooting of 18-year old Michael Brown sparked civic unrest in Fer-
guson, a suburb of St. Louis with a large African-American population and a long history 
of racial tension (Teague, 2014). Brown was killed on the spot when he fled after a struggle 
with Darren Wilson, a police officer who wanted to arrest him for stealing a box of Swisher 
Sweets cigars worth $48. The African-American teenager turned out to be unarmed.24 
Police response to people taking to the streets was aggressive. Militarized forces patrolled 
the roads, tear gas was used and at least 155 people were arrested (Keating, Rivero & Tan, 
2014). The protests and violence re-escalated when, on November 24, a grand jury decided 
not to indict Wilson and a few days later another grand jury judged similar in the case 
of African-American Eric Garner who was killed by a New York cop after holding him in a 
prohibited chokehold.
These events instigated massive press attention (Hayes, 2014, p. 4). Not only in Fer-
guson, but also in other major cities in the US people demonstrated against racialized 
police violence. Decentralized protests, mainly organized via social media, emerged. Using 
mobile technologies such as smartphones, citizen witnesses recorded and shared their 
experiences of the protests, next to the extensive coverage by the mainstream press. Social 
networking and microblogging sites—mainly Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr, Vine 
and Twitter—served as public spaces in which people could commemorate Brown, vent 
their opinions, inform others about new developments, organize rallies, connect with 
similar-minded people, and aggregate and comment upon mediated material. Social 
media thus allowed individual protesters and activists to connect to each other and ideas 
in time, across different locations, something that recent scholarship devoted to digital 
activism has noted (Lim, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2015).
This chapter argues that, simultaneously, a temporally oriented discourse emerges 
within and surrounding protests, that connects the present to the past, through time (cf. 
Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). This occurs through protesters’ memory work. As was discussed, 
memory work is a discursive process—comprised of practices, cultural forms and tech-
nologies—wherein the past is shaped and constructed in the present and carried into 
the future. It can be highly intentional and purposive, as in the case of documenting and 
recording for future recall (Lohmeier & Pentzold, 2014), or the conscious appropriation 
of historical figures and symbols for present goals (Jansen, 2007). Other cultural objects 
and practices, however, can produce unanticipated mnemonic effects. A photo, phrase or 
meme then come to ‘stand in’ or represent a moment in time and particular narratives 
or personal stories might take hold publicly (Gerbaudo, 2015). Potentially, all practices, 
cultural forms and technologies can thus perform memory work. But in practice not all 
do, because certain interpretations of and engagements with the past have more currency 
in the present than others. Within protests, memory work may help mobilize individuals 
24 This is based on the witness reports, evidence and grand jury testimonies that were released in November 
2014. See: http://apps.stlpublicradio.org/ferguson-project/evidence.html
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into action, legitimize their cause, historically situate their struggle, and create a collective 
identity. 
To tease out the connections between digital activism, memory work and social media 
platforms, this chapter analyzes the memory work performed on the Facebook page Justice 
for Mike Brown (JfMB). This page was set up a day after the shooting and administered by 
Derk Brown, a Ferguson resident not related to Michael. The page, liked by 50,683 people 
as of November 2015, was initially set up as an activist platform aimed at direct action. Yet, 
it also offered a space for users to engage in memory work. This ranged from affective and 
personal practices such as mourning and condoling, to rational and political practices such 
as the sharing of purposively documented instances of police violence during the protests, 
which aimed to construct an agenda for the future, or “mediated prospective memory” 
(Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014). Moreover, the page helped spread and amplify particular 
repertoires, images and icons that made the protests recognizable in and through time.   
Consequently, the page invited memory work on different temporal and relational levels, 
either as a goal in itself or as a rhetorical resource. It functioned as a space in which private 
and public, individual and collective memories connected and converged. The resultant 
“connective memory” is “generated through the flux of contacts between people and digital 
technologies and media” (Hoskins, 2011, p. 272). Although memory work is highly dynamic 
on the page, this chapter argues that the page administrator, users and Facebook’s opera-
tional logic concurrently helped popularize particular narratives and representations, and 
stabilize them in repertoires.    
These theoretical observations lead to two questions that guide the research. First, how 
is memory work performed and shaped on JfMB? This question is geared toward revealing 
the interplay between humans and technology in representing the past and preserving the 
present on Facebook. By means of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of 180 posts, and more 
than 5000 comments, reply threads, images and videos, the chapter provides a typology 
of memory work. Secondly, the chapter analyzes which “interpretative repertories” (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987) are employed in this memory work. This shows how memory work was 
used to reach rhetorical goals and shaped understanding of events that occurred after the 
shooting. 
These questions move beyond an instrumental approach that views social media as mere 
tools for mobilizing, organizing, and coordinating (Castells, 2015, p. 257). Rather, JfMB is a 
formalized space that shapes interaction and is therefore part of the memory work done 
within digital activism. Consequently, the chapter provides an analysis of cultural forms, 
practices, and technologies, since these are inexorably linked on Facebook—or on any 
social platform for that matter. Therefore, this chapter rethinks the role of memory work 
within contemporary digital activism, wherein the controversial death of an individual 
ultimately inspired action against systematic injustice.
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Facebook thrives on the affective interactions its users have with the platform, other us-
ers, products, and the content shared on it (Van Dijck, 2013). Sharing is the imperative on 
Facebook: not only does the platform constantly ask its users to share, it also selectively 
shares what it deems important for its users. Users mediate activities, texts, ideas, feelings, 
relationships, memories, and places to “friends” but also with a company that makes its 
business out of this information. Moreover, users are engaged in the “affective processing” 
of data: Facebook expects people to connect, select, rank and produce digital content 
(Gehl, 2011). 
Facebook users who are interested in specific topics, people, places or causes can 
connect with pages about these by “liking” them in order to receive updates on the per-
sonalized News Feed and to interact (“like,” share, comment, reply) with it (Bucher, 2012). 
Hence, by liking and engaging specific content becomes part of unique informational 
diets. The more a user likes, shares and comments, the more visible the page becomes on 
the newsfeed. This also implies that Facebook’s algorithmic favoring can “hide” important 
news stories. Moreover, certain types of posts and comments are preferred by Facebook; 
for example, visuals (photos and videos) do well in terms of visibility, whereas plain text 
does not (Corliss, 2012). Accordingly, users are encouraged by Facebook’s architecture to 
post content that attracts interaction. Popular material thus becomes “most relevant” and 
therefore most visible on the platform, which in turn attracts more interaction.  
Facebook’s black-boxed communication interface is governed by hidden protocols and 
algorithms that, to a certain extent, have become part of our “technological unconscious-
ness” (Thrift, 2004). The underlying structure, architecture, and affordances of networked 
technologies “steer” (van Dijck, 2013) social interaction in a seemingly natural way. Taking 
this “engineered” or “platformed” sociality (van Dijck, 2013, pp. 3-18) into account, direct 
connections to memory work can be made. Facebook’s affordances and technological 
architecture prefer certain creative practices over others, semi-automatically value certain 
objects higher than others, and steer particular interpretations of mediated material. Its 
multiplier effect has come to determine popularity and visibility within the new media 
ecology and it partly explains why certain objects “go viral” (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). 
The commercially driven operational logic of Facebook does not only shape everyday in-
teraction with the platform, but it also affects engagement with the past by, on and through 
it. That is, the agency within memory work is distributed on Facebook. It ranges from the 
highly conscious and intentional memory work of users, to the ‘algorithmic’ memory work 
of the platform, which selects and re-presents digital objects that are highly interacted 
with.  Moreover, because each post, comment and reply is saved on Facebook, these might 
emerge again unexpectedly and might shape public discourse in unintended ways. In 
other words, Facebook pages—especially public Facebook group pages like JfMB—can be 
seen as spaces wherein memory of events and people is continuously assembled by both 
human and nonhuman actors. 
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Consequently, when Facebook users engage in memory work, besides other engage-
ments, they do so within a techno-discursive space that is ultimately driven by a com-
mercial strategy revolving around visibility and “the new.” How do these “politics of the 
platform” (Gillespie, 2010) entangle with the politics of memory? This question becomes 
even more pertinent when memory work plays a pivotal role in the internal dynamics 
of protests concerning highly contentious issues such as racialized police brutality. The 
procedural logic of Facebook may help, together with its users, lead to the legitimization, 
popularization, and normalization of a certain mnemonic discourse. In other words, 
Facebook’s operational logic may help stabilize connective memory’s unpredictable and 
dynamic trajectories. Research into discourse within digital activism—of which memory 
work is an important part—thus needs to take into account how both platforms and their 
users shape this.
Research design
When we examine a Facebook group and memory work within it, we are essentially examin-
ing discourse as it is presented within a formal technological environment. Consequently, 
“just” critically analyzing this discourse is not enough; it is produced, interpreted and prac-
ticed in interaction with Facebook’s interface and underlying mechanics. Which norms, 
attitudes and standards vis-à-vis memory flow out of this interaction between users and 
between users and the platform? To answer this question, this chapter situates a critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) within the operational logic of Facebook. CDA is both a theory and 
method (Wodak, 2001) and is used to study the dynamics of power—particularly pertaining 
to questions of voice and inequality—within particular discourses. 
To tease out the discursive functions of memory work the chapter employed the concept 
of interpretative repertoires, “recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing 
and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena” (Potter & Wetherell 1987, p. 203). 
Hence, interpretative repertoires can be viewed as the building blocks of discourse, be-
ing the frameworks of language that people employ both strategically and unconsciously 
to construct meaning. Each interpretative repertoire is the result of different memory 
practices and discursive units (tropes, metaphors, etc.). The uses of discursive units are 
manifold; that is, there is variation within interpretative repertoires that enables contesta-
tion (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 172). Identifying these discursive units within the memory 
work done on JfMB revealed how the past is used rhetorically to assert particular ideologi-
cal stances—how types of memory work emerged.
While the chapter conducted a CDA, it also paid attention to the technological features 
and operational logic of Facebook as to explain why certain posts and comments became 
dominant and visible. In critical approaches to platforms (Patelis, 2013; Kennedy, 2013), 
the interface is viewed as an important part of the content: “It is a non-neutral entity, as a 
cultural text that aspires to power and that frames specific forms of interaction” (Patelis, 
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2013, p. 120). Even though a thorough analysis of Facebook’s mechanics is beyond the 
reach of this study, it did investigate the ways in which users employed and appropriated 
Facebook for memory work and the dominant cultural forms and content that flowed out 
of this interaction. Thus, it demonstrates how the platform’s logics of visibility and sharing 
affected the popularization of particular interpretative repertoires and discursive units. 
Sample and data analysis
Data collection and the discourse analysis followed nine iterative-inductive steps (Fig. 6.1). 
In the first step, all posts, comments and replies between 10 August 2014, when the page 
was created, and 15 March 2015, when posting activity stopped (8 months), were read, 
which helped to familiarize the researcher with the data.25 This resulted in an initial data 
set of 180 posts by the page administrator and more than 5000 comments and replies. The 
latter were all anonymized for ethical reasons. Also, observational notes were made during 
this phase to indicate important moments and events and the emergence of dominant 
themes and narratives. Secondly, screenshots were made of posts, comments, and reply 
threads 1) that purposively engaged with the past for present or future-oriented goals, 2) 
were highly interacted with (through likes and replies) and thus more visible on the page, 
and 3) contained repetitive and recognizable content (recurrent images, narratives, etc.). 
For example, a post that called for a rally was not included in this step, yet a documentation 
of this rally to show its non-violent nature was.
Steps three, four and five revolved around describing and categorizing those posts and 
comments selected in step two. First, the types of memory work were identified by asking 
what memory practices were supported and realized by these posts and comments. For 
example, a comment might commemorate Brown, while another historicizes his death. 
Some posts and comments are examples of intentional memory work, for example those 
that aimed to “set the facts straight” about Brown’s death, while others unintentionally 
became important symbolic markers or part of the narrative surrounding his death. Step 
four consisted of identifying discursive units and connecting them to the specific types 
of memory work (step three). For example, posts that drew parallels between past and 
present (memory work) often used the trope of the “raised fist” and commemorating 
Brown (memory work) often involved portraying him as a martyr (trope). After these steps, 
tentative interpretative schemes were formulated based on the inductive categorizations.
The last four steps concerned the formulation and clustering of discursive questions that 
the memory work and content of the posts and comments aimed to answer. For example, 
in a mourning comment, Brown could be portrayed as an average teenager. The discursive 
questions connected to this would be: who was Mike Brown and what did he stand for? 
The consecutive interpretative repertoire (steps eight and nine) connected to this would 
be “Michael Brown’s identity.” Alternatively, a shared recording (memory work) of peaceful 
25 The entire page was saved as an html file for offline reading.
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protests (trope) answered the question how the protests should be represented and would 
be ascribed to the “protest identity” repertoire.
Figure 6.1 – Overview of procedural steps
It is important to note that the process of inductive theory building, which CDA ascribes 
to, is iterative and interpretative. It is “not a matter of following rules and recipes; it often 
involves following up hunches and the development of tentative interpretative schemes 
which may need to be abandoned and revised over and over again” (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987, p. 177). Consequently, throughout the analysis the aim was to provide a typology 
that demonstrates the complexity and untidiness of mnemonic discourse.
Justice for Mike Brown
Before the typology is presented, JfMB requires further introduction. The page was origi-
nally set up as an activist platform to rally support for punishment of police officer Darren 
Wilson, who shot Brown. As the first post demonstrates, the “cause page” was created “to 
gain awareness and bring Justice to Mike and his family, what the cops did was just sense-
less!!!!!! So angry at police right now....  #JusticeForMike#RipMike” (August 10, 2014). The 
phrase “Justice for” was popularized in the (social media) protests in the wake of the 2012 
shooting of Trayvon Martin and alludes to the principles of equality embedded in the foun-
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dational history of the US.26 Hence, the online and offline protests against racialized police 
brutality were immediately linked to the past: the shooting was interpreted as the result 
of systemic injustice and inequality towards African-Americans. The profile image used for 
the page is a photo of Michael Brown’s stepfather, Louis Head, holding up a cardboard sign 
that reads “Ferguson police just executed my unarmed son!!!” (fig. 6.2). The cover photo 
shows the street in which Brown was shot—his body lies just outside the frame—and the 
hashtag #justiceformike is placed over it. The hashtag plays a pivotal role: not only does 
it link this page to the hashtag stream within Facebook, it also connects the page to the 
larger online presence of the diffuse protest movement, most notably microblogging sites 
Twitter and Tumblr. The page’s description reads: “18 year old ‘Mike’ was gunned down by 
police shot 10 times and he was unarmed. He was heading home with his friend. Justice 
for Mike!”
Figure 6.2 – The JfMB “About” page
As this text, the profile and cover photos indicate, the page was clearly created to invoke 
affective responses. Increasingly, whenever a disruptive event occurs, people actively 
seek out spaces that provide them with more information. They share their thoughts and 
feelings online and engage with other people’s thoughts and feelings. Such alternative 
socially networked public spheres provide fertile ground for discussing race-related issues 
26 The phrase “justice for all” is widely used in American cultural memory: …And Justice for All (1979) is a court-
room film starring Al Pacino. A 1988 album by Metallica has the same title.
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and performing racialized identities (Florini, 2014; Sharma, 2013). In the week after the 
shooting, while a protest group grew in both size and (online) visibility, the page became a 
central space for information, to organize activities, vent frustration and anger, share grief, 
and engage in discussion. 
Because JfMB is a Facebook page and not a group it is visible and accessible to anyone 
with a Facebook account. Page administrator Derk Brown, however, was the only one with 
full control over posting activity.27 He also had the power to ban users, thereby effectively 
silencing those who comment or reply in offensive (racist) ways. Indeed, traces of bans 
were found in the comment threads. In the posts in which he spoke directly to page us-
ers he thanked them for the support (while users repeatedly thanked him for his work), 
provided additional (practical) information or corrected users. He also often asked about 
the visibility of his posts on individual timelines: “If you can see this post please comment 
(YES)” (January 16, 2015). Moreover, Derk Brown energetically covered the protests in 
Ferguson by writing weblog-like reports and by “live streaming” marches and road shut-
downs.28 He also actively included user’s documenting protest actions or events such as 
rallies, sit-ins and so-called “shut-it-down” actions (the closing-off of roads and shops). 
Brown was, therefore, an important agent for memory work on the site. He consciously 
set the agenda by providing the topics for discussion, moderating and deleting material, 
and drawing from experience or selecting from the vast amount of available (social) media 
content.
A typology of memory work
The chapter now moves on to present a typology of memory work on the page and a 
discussion of the interpretative repertoires applied in this. Even though memory work 
on the page differs on relational, geographical and temporal levels, it can be viewed as 
functioning toward political goals. It is a means to comment on institutional politics, to 
increase awareness of the structural problem of racialized police brutality, or to provide a 
“just” depiction of Michael Brown and the protests for future recall. Particular contentious 
discursive questions are answered by means of the employed discursive units, for example: 
how should the protests be represented and how does the shooting fit in US history? The 
comment in Fig. 6.3 adequately summarizes the memory work on the page.
27 Unfortunately, page administrator Derk Brown did not respond to requests for an interview.
28 Facebook introduced the live stream option in 2016, after the protests in Ferguson. Derk Brown used www.
livestream.com and linked to his page on JfMB.
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Figure 6.3 – screenshot of comments by a user on February 10, 2015
The phrase “Do not forget” signals that Michael Brown’s death and its aftermath should be 
remembered alternatively and in contrast to “mainstream” portrayals of Brown and the 
protests, which focused on riots and material damage. A comment like this shows how 
protesters and their supporters positioned themselves against a monolithic Other that did 
injustice to Mike Brown, and by extension, to a social group. This is in line with Van Dijck’s 
(2007, p. 5) conception of memory work as something that allows us “to make sense of the 
world around us, and constructing an idea of continuity between self and others.” Conse-
quently, the memory work on the page was aimed at “getting the facts straight” about who 
Brown was, the injustice within “the system,” and providing an alternative to mainstream 
media’s coverage of the protests and other police violence. Discursively, the past is thus 
used rhetorically, and as something to be actively shaped in the present. 
As figure 6.4 demonstrates, four distinct interpretative repertoires can be discerned in 
the memory work on JfMB. These will be discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 6.4 – Typology of memory work and interpretative repertoires
Michael Brown’s identity
Many discussions, especially in JfMB´s early stages when personal information and up-
dates on the shooting were scarce, revolved around the question who Mike Brown was and 
how he should be remembered in the “right” way. Through mourning, commemorating, 
memorializing, condoling, and paying tribute, page users constructed Brown’s identity. 
In borderline or explicitly racist comments, some users would call him a thug or worse, 
whereas especially family and community members would sanctify the young man, mak-
ing him a martyr who died for a grander cause. Illustrations of these ambivalent depictions 
are an image portraying Brown with angel wings on his shoulders and another showing 
him intimidating the convenience store owner (fig. 6.5). 
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Figure 6.5 – A compilation of popular depictions of Michael Brown 
This type of affective “impression management” is common on Facebook memorial pages 
(Marwick & Ellison, 2012). On JfMB, page visitors mainly depict the teenager positively. Most 
personal details and renditions of Brown’s image stress his kindness and good nature. Two 
visual tropes became especially dominant: Brown as an ordinary teenager and as a high 
school graduate (fig. 6.5). These photos were posted on the page and other social media 
platforms shortly after Brown’s death and were also often used in news reports. The photos 
highlight that what happened to Brown could have happened to any black teenager. More-
over they have high templatability (Rintel, 2013); that is, they are easily used as the basis 
for creative remixes and they are easy to identify with. As figure 5 shows, the high school 
portrait was appropriated for rhetorical effect. ‘Playful’ interaction in memory work is also 
stressed by Kuhn (2010, p. 3): the past, and memories thereof, is “material for interpreta-
tion, to be interrogated, mined, for its meanings and its possibilities” (Kuhn, 2010, p. 3).
Posts by people who knew Brown during his lifetime stabilized this public identity 
further. For example, a post by Brown’s old kindergarten teacher was shared by the admin-
istrator (fig. 6.6). She called Brown “one of the kindest kids that I have taught.” This post 
is representative of the personal memorial work done on the page that affectively shaped 
Brown’s public identity as an innocent teenager with a bright future ahead. This, in turn, 
had implications for the tone and subjects of more political discussions: how could it be 
that such a kind-hearted teenager was killed? Writing from the position of someone who 
knew Brown well, the kindergarten teacher’s claim that attacking a police officer was “NOT 
his nature” gains in authority. Through commemorative posts like these, Brown’s public 
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persona is being managed: who Michael Brown was perceived to be in life served as a 
means to criticize both police brutality and the violence and looting that took place during 
the protests.
Figure 6.6 – Re-posted post from Michael Brown’s kindergarten teacher
One depiction that incited much debate, on the page and elsewhere, shows Brown’s body 
lying in the street, the blood from his wounds visible. It was the first photograph that was 
shared on JfMB (fig. 6.7). To many, this picture was appalling and disrespectful to Brown’s 
family and his memory. This is understandable especially given the knowledge that his 
body had been on the street for over four hours—another point of discussion on the page. 
Others, however, argued that it was key to showing the human tragedy of the shooting. 
Kern, Forman and Gil-Egui (2013) found that on most Facebook memorial pages pictures 
of the deceased dead body are taboo. The fact that this photo is represented on the page 
demonstrates that its memorial quality served political goals. It was a means to show what 
“really” happened and to spark public debate, well beyond the page itself. The finality of 
the picture stands in stark contrast to the pictures of him taken when he was alive. Coming 
together, they evoked strong affective and emotional responses.
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Figure 6.7 – The scene of the shooting
Sharing photos of the (improvised) Michael Brown memorial at the location of the shoot-
ing became a popular way to memorialize and pay tribute (fig.  6.8). After some time, it 
even became a fad to take selfies at the scene and share these on JfMB and other plat-
forms. Here, we see how Facebook users actively engage with the platform’s features in 
their memory work. Pictures were placed on personal timelines, but made public by the 
place-tag “Michael Brown Memorial,” a Facebook feature to indicate a “historical place.” 
The physical place was interwoven with a digitally networked space, which increased 
its symbolic meaning for the protesters. Therefore, reactions were furious when a police 
report referred to the improvised memorial as a pile of trash (posted December 25, 2014) 
and when a person drove through it on purpose with his car (December 26, 2014). 
As these examples demonstrate, a highly mediated and networked display of affect and 
support emerged in the aftermath of the shooting. Following the vernacular Web logic of 
“sharing is caring,” these affective practices, that are simultaneously offline and online, were 
highly visible on the page. The off- and online distinction is even further blurred in a post with 
a picture of Michael Brown’s mother, Lesley McSpadden, crying, while two young people, 
presumably relatives, hug her (fig. 6.8). Her white hat shows the picture of her son with angel 
wings (fig. 6.5). The comment, selected as “most relevant” by Facebook and therefore pushed 
to the top, emphatically expresses the tragedy of losing a child. Integrated within this post are 
practices of affective processing (Gehl, 2011). Users are encouraged to affectively interact with 
the post by liking, sharing and commenting. “One Like = One Hug” reads the post. Moreover, 
they are afforded to connect to the broader protest network by three hashtags that are im-
mediately visible: #JFMS (Justice for My Son) in the picture, #Ferguson, and #RIPMikeBrown. 
Memory work in the form of mourning, condoling, commemorating, memorializing, and 
paying tribute thus actively shaped Michael Brown’s identity, both online and offline, and 
offered people to connect affectively to the protest cause. 
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Figure 6.8 – Compilation of two posts showing convergence of online and offline memory work
Facticity of the case
A less prominent, yet important repertoire concerns facts about the shooting. What did really 
happen on August 9, 2014? JfMB can be regarded as a collaborative space in which numerous 
“gatewatchers” provided updates on the basis of personal or community interest. Aimed at 
constructing “prospective memory” (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014), this aggregated material 
is used to set the agenda for the future and to achieve “justice for Mike Brown.” The memory 
work connected to this involves selecting and posting official documents, re-mediating 
media content and updating or correcting previous information. Administrator Derk Brown 
plays an important part in concomitantly shaping the current narrative and public memory: 
next to filming the protests, sharing this type of information is one of his main page activities. 
He regularly reminds page users of a recording in which a witness said “he had his hands 
up and he wasn’t no threat” (March 5, 2015). Users also posted material from professional 
journalists and government reports claiming that Brown was murdered in cold blood. This 
became an important narrative that took hold within the protest movement. Three other im-
portant, regularly raised points of contestation were the role of prosecuting attorney Robert 
McCulloch in the non-indictment of Wilson, the veracity of the witness accounts used in the 
Grand Jury hearing, and Darren Wilson’s own testimony.
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Although Facebook does not provide means for users to clearly order and index mate-
rial, JfMB functions as a distributed, yet specialized archive. As a living archive, Facebook 
favors the communicative aspect of memory work and the present over the past; it makes 
sharing and connecting easy, while the only way to curate is by integrating hashtags in 
posts. Facebook’s technology supports this in an idiosyncratic way: through #Ferguson, 
#ShawShooting and #JustForMike, posts appear in hashtag streams, and on personalized 
newsfeeds of “likers” and users of the page. In other words, archival material—physically 
stored on Facebook’s servers—becomes part of the repertoire of page users (Taylor, 2003). 
The memory work regarding the facticity of the case—selection, re-mediation, and updat-
ing of information—allows users to further justify the protests and support truth claims 
about ‘what really happened’. 
Protest Identity
JfMB also became a space to document and share videos and photos of protests and to cre-
ate icons that made the protests recognizable in the present and future. What forms should 
the protests take? How should the protests be represented? And: which symbols should 
be used? The page, for example, facilitated the emergence and spread of internet memes: 
“units of popular culture that are circulated, imitated, and transformed by Internet users, 
creating a shared cultural experience” (Shifman, 2013, p. 367). These “multimodal symbolic 
artifacts” (Milner, 201, p. 2359) are connected to memory work in three overlapping ways. 
First, they are the products of the “remix culture” of digital media (Bayerl & Stoynov, 2014, 
p 3). They intertextually feed off of cultural resources from the past. Secondly, memes can 
become mnemomic building blocks for the identity of protest movements. They are easily 
recognizable and can be put to powerful political use (Milner, 2013; Bayerl & Stoynov, 2014; 
Shifman, 2013). Finally, memes create simple narratives about the past that avoid nuance. 
They can inspire action, mobilization and creative activity, but may concurrently lead to 
polarized and antagonistic representations of the past. 
On JfMB, memes not only enhanced the protest movement’s visibility within social 
media networks, but also became important symbolic markers that signified the broader 
protest movement against racialized police violence. They were used to document and 
shape peaceful protests and thus became part of the movement. They became indica-
tors of a collective identity by inviting people to contribute and take part. The protests’ 
non-violent character and the aggressive police response were continuously highlighted 
on the page, making it an important part of how protesters were represented and saw 
themselves. As symbolic artifacts, memes carry the short-term memory of movements and 
make it recognizable as such: the meme is an important cultural form and social practice 
through which protesters can engage in memory work. 
One of the first protest phrases to emerge on JfMB was “Hands up, don’t shoot.” It alludes 
to the witness reports claiming that Michael Brown held up his hands before he was shot. 
It became a hashtag on social media, a gesture that signaled allegiance to the protest 
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movement, and a cue for creative practice because it was easy to adopt and to adapt. The 
stark contrast between unarmed people holding up their arms and heavily armed police 
forces aiming their guns at them provided photogenic moments. The phrase and gesture 
persisted and spread in TV news, newspapers and, most prominently, on social media. It 
further gained prominence when four US representatives made the gesture during a House 
floor meeting and when the St. Louis rams held up their arms before a NFL match (fig. 6.9).
Figure 6.9 – compilation of “Hands up, don’t shoot” images 
On JfMB, t-shirts with the phrase were sold (fig. 9) for charity purposes, users started to use 
“raising both” emoticons and people posted pictures of themselves, friends and family 
holding up their arms. Others restaged the photograph taken of Brown’s dead body lying in 
the middle of Canfield Drive. Even a mobile application, Handsup4Justice, was created—and 
promoted on the page—to record encounters with law enforcement (cf. handsuptheapp.
com). These bodily performances became recognizable, non-violent means to support the 
movement. Both practices also directly allude to narratives and tropes concerning Brown’s 
identity (non-violent, innocent, victim) and the disrespectful treatment of his deceased 
body. These examples further show that the distinction between online and offline action, 
or at least the display of sympathy, were blurred during the protests. 
The view that Brown’s fate could have been any black teenager’s was an important 
source of inspiration for activity on the page. The phrase “I am Michael Brown” was used 
in many comment threads and posts. This phrase also connects to other, earlier protests, 
for example “We are all Khaled Said” (2011 Egyptian Revolution) or “I am Charlie Hebdo” 
(2015 terror attack). “I am Michael Brown” and “Hands up, don’t shoot” became recog-
nizable symbols that referred to an activist attitude, a socio-political movement, and a 
historical moment. They became the memorable means by which individuals could easily 
connect, from a distance, to the protest movement. This conscious engagement with the 
past through documenting the protests and creating memes out of previously mediated 
material can be viewed as a type of memory work that allowed the page administrator and 
users to negotiate the identity of the protest group.
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A fourth repertoire apparent in the memory work was used to interpret Michael Brown’s 
death and the aggressive responses to the protesters as forms of systematic and historic 
injustice against African-Americans. This type of posts and comments links the present 
with the past by juxtaposing, comparing and contrasting current and past events, and re-
mediating iconographic imagery. Especially the time of the Civil Rights Movement became 
a historical era to draw from. For example, a Charles Moore picture from a Life magazine 
photo essay about the 1963 Birmingham Civil Rights protests (Spratt, 2008, pp. 86-87) was 
juxtaposed with a current picture (fig. 6.10). By using Moore’s photo, users link up to a com-
mon journalistic and historical discourse because it has come “to represent and explain 
an important chapter in American mythology and collective memory: the valiant struggle 
for civil rights by a people who were suppressed, segregated, and abused by the dominate 
White power structure” (Spratt, 2008, p. 102). This is communicated in the photographs 
through a now familiar trope: white men in powerful positions (holding dogs) and a power-
less African-American crowd. 
On JfMB recognizable icons are both popular to use as well as heavily interacted with in 
comments. Stripped of their original meaning and specific context, historical photos are 
visual symbols that span time and history. They become freely floating, mostly “empty 
signifiers”; that is, “signifiers without signified” that are easily identified with and therefore 
provide ample materials for political statements and identification with a group or cause 
(Gerbaudo, 2015, p. 921). This makes the historical picture ambiguous. It does provide the 
means for the quick transmission of allegiance within the political realm. However, the use 
of an icon also reduces the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the current political issue, 
which may stand in the way of nuanced understanding and solution of the problem. This 
ambiguity of historical imagery in protest movements is maybe clearest on JfMB when it 
comes to the usage of symbols from the Black Power and Black Panther movements (fig. 
10). The “Liking” of these images of previous protests reaffirmed their status as symbolic 
markers within cultural memory.
Another common practice on JfMB was to use iconic images in personal statements 
about race and the events in Ferguson for rhetorical effect (fig. 10). Martin Luther King’s I 
have a Dream speech, for example, is used to support a personal view on the destructive 
behavior of some protesters. The speech and the image are thus taken from their original 
context and placed in a new one. This type of cultural “hijacking” of meaning—or “textual 
poaching” as Jenkins (1992) calls it—is common and is often taken as an insult. Iconic 
words of important African-American leaders like King are treated as having a mythical 
status. When used and appropriated in the “right” sense—as support for the movement 
against racialized police brutality—they were highly “liked,” were deemed “most relevant” 
by Facebook in comment fields, and spread quickly. In these instances, we see how 
Facebook’s technology is co-supportive of the popularization and visibility of particular 
historical appropriations.
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Figure 6.10 – Compilation of historical imagery re-used and appropriated on JfMB
The ownership of history and the right to use it in order to comment on the present 
is highly central to political interaction on JfMB. A “White opinions bingo” makes this ex-
plicitly clear (fig. 10). Comments like “this isn’t what your ancestors fought for” and those 
using Martin Luther King Jr. quotes are considered “wrong”—that is, typically mainstream 
and White—appropriations of history. In comments like these, the iconic is seen as a racial 
cliché that glosses over the experience of being black. Seemingly friendly comments such 
as “it doesn’t matter if you’re black, white, etc.” and “we all need to come together” are 
insulting to the more protest-minded users on JfMB, who strive for recognition of the 
systemic problem of racialized police brutality and what they see as inherent racism in 
American society. Thus, by historicizing, drawing parallels, contextualizing, and remediat-
ing and appropriating icons, users of JfMB engage in a type of memory work that shows the 
continuity of racial injustice in the present, while simultaneously linking present protest 
with past protest.
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Conclusion: towards a model of memory work in digital activism
This chapter has demonstrated that memory work in digital activism is simultaneously 
personally affective and consciously political. It allows protesters to connect personal 
experiences and interpretations of the past as a means to express discontent and advo-
cate for change, now and in the future. Notwithstanding the particularities of national and 
geographical contexts, protests are fed by lingering tensions and often spark into being 
by an atrocious event. This is especially apparent when this involves the tragic death of 
an individual, as in the case of Brown. A wide variety of memory work—from mourning 
and condoling to documenting and historicizing—then becomes politicized. Today, these 
practices increasingly take place and are mediated through social media platforms to 
show allegiance to causes that involve the violent deaths of individuals and the system 
that produces these.
Although rooted in a specific case, the here provided typology theorizes general dynam-
ics of memory work in the context of digital activism and protests and provides a tentative 
model for future research. Four stages that are characterized by different interpretative rep-
ertoires, memory practices, and discursive units (see Fig. 4) can be distinguished. First, a 
shocking event such as the violent death of an individual inspires individual and shared af-
fective commemorative engagement, fueled by grief and anger. This results in the creation 
of a publicly remembered image of this individual and what he/or she stood for, in the case 
of Michael Brown an average African-American teenager. Second, protesters and activists 
contextualize this event within broader societal and historical trends through memory 
work. That is, the atrocity is framed as part of systematic injustice, in this case racialized 
police violence. Thirdly, these two first steps inspire and legitimize present action, wherein 
the present is continually being connected to the past, or, in the case of recording and 
documentation, the future. Fourth, present action helps stabilize certain discursive units 
by repeated use of them. This, in turn, may be picked up again within future protests. In this 
case, the past on JfMB is constantly ‘worked’ through the dynamic interactions between 
the page administrator, users and Facebook’s operational logic. The resultant memory of 
Michael Brown, his death, the protests, and systematic injustice are indeed “connective” 
(Hoskins, 2011) in the sense that it is in a constant state of flux due to people’s constant vis-
ible interactions with it. Yet, as the analysis has shown, even connective memory ‘settles’ 
to a certain extent. 
Memory work functions as a particular kind of discursive practice that connects per-
sonal action frames and provides the building blocks for collective identity formation. 
For example, the memory work on JfMB invites identification, which involves “a process 
of projection of the individual into various symbols of collectivity that could act as sort of 
rallying points for otherwise divided individuals” (Gerbaudo, 2015, p. 921). This, however, 
is a double-edged sword: while memory work on social media enables people to connect 
to each other, causes and ideas, it simultaneously leads to a dynamic in which the com-
plexities of the issues at hand are transformed into what Lim (2012, p. 244) describes as “a 
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simpler, more tangible narrative that [resonates] with everyday experience.” This is partly 
the result of the guiding technology and commercial logic of platforms like Facebook. 
The iconicity, representability, and visibility of images intermingle with the sociotechnical 
practices of social media users (clicking, liking, sharing, commenting, posting) and the 
procedural logics of social media platforms (algorithms, code, interface, design).
This, in turn, may lead to a further polarization of stances in contentious political issues 
such as racialized police violence. In the highly mediated public discourse on the shoot-
ing of Michael Brown, facts and fictions blended and provided the rhetorical resources 
for heated politicized debates. Additionally, Brown’s public image became the subject of 
controversy: some called him a thug, while others sanctified him, effectively making him 
a martyr. Michael Brown thus ‘stood in’ for other African-American teenagers and became 
a symbol in the broader social movement against racialized police violence in the US, 
most notably Black Lives Matter, which emerged a year before Brown was shot. Linking 
today’s problems to those of the past, old debates of racism and police violence were 
reinvigorated. Consequently, memory work helped activate the past in the present, but 
also to spread present concerns to other protests and into the future.
7
The limits of an ‘open’ past: 
Memory work on Wikipedia and the downing of flight MH17 
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When it comes to historical reliability, Wikipedia is not to be trusted.
(anonymous editor, 6 July, “Pro-Ukrainian Bias,” Archive 23)
On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur 
was shot down over Hrabove, Donetsk, Ukraine. All 283 passengers and 15 crew members 
were killed which made it the deadliest case of a commercial airliner shoot-down in his-
tory. A large part of the passengers consisted of families, with eighty children under 18. 
Also on board were top researchers and delegates of the 20th International AIDS confer-
ence in Melbourne. Most of the deceased were Dutch (196), Malaysian (43), and Australian 
(27) (Dutch Safety Board, 2015, p. 23).29 Unsurprisingly, the tragedy sent a ripple of grief 
throughout the world and the Netherlands in particular. A national day of mourning was 
announced and Dutch public broadcaster NOS covered live the ceremonial repatriation of 
the bodies. Together with the grief, however, came expressions of anger that culminated in 
two questions: What happened on that day in July? And: Who should be held accountable 
for this tragedy?
These questions were hard to answer due to the complex political situation in Ukraine. 
The country was in the midst of an enduring military conflict after the exile of the pro-
Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovich and the consecutive Russian annexation of the 
Crimea. Pro-government (Euromaidan) forces and pro-Russian separatists, the Lugansk 
People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), battled heavily against 
each other. However, Western media soon reported that an S-11 BUK missile, which is 
produced and used by the Russian Army, had been used to shoot the plane out of the sky 
(Sienkiewicz, 2015, pp. 208-209). In response, the Russian government denied any involve-
ment and pointed fingers at over-active Ukrainian fighter pilots (Davidson & Yuhas, 2014; 
AFP, 2014). The Ukrainian government argued that the incident was a case of aggression 
toward Ukraine by Kremlin-backed separatists, following the shooting of military aircraft in 
the days before (Finley, 2014; Sienkiewicz, 2015; Dutch Safety Board, 2015).
Against this backdrop of political tension and doubtful information, a Wikipedian with 
the nickname “Reedy” started the English Wikipedia page “Malaysia Airlines Flight 17” 
(“Page information”). On the day of the tragedy, also 73 pages in other languages on the 
event were started (Wikidata, 2016). The English page alone had over a million page views 
within three days of its creation, according to Wikipedia article traffic statistics (2016). 
This illustrates that Wikipedia functions as a “mediated center” and is one of the main 
turn-to information providers within the “networking communication model” (Bilić 2015, 
p. 1259). This is not to say that Wikipedia editors quickly agreed on what had occurred. The 
contentiousness of the event can be traced in the page’s metadata. In two years’ time, as 
of June 23, 2016, it was edited 6,113 times (75% major edits) by 1,017 users, including bots 
and anonymous users (Wikihistory, 2016). This high editing is in line with the finding that 
29 The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) was the primary official investigative body regarding the downing.  
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traumatic events are amongst the most-edited pages in Wikipedia (Ferron & Massa, 2011, 
p. 1326). 
This chapter investigates how the politics of Wikipedia as a platform (Gillespie, 2010) 
coalesces with the politics of memory work. Similar to science and journalism, the online 
encyclopedia strives to provide truthful reconstructions of reality. Its editorial policy is 
based on a set of values revolving around objectivity, verifiability and neutrality. I argue, 
however, that Wikipedia is anything but a neutral space of knowledge production. Rather, I 
demonstrate that another value, “openness,” offers an ideology that guides and constitutes 
the platform’s technological design, guidelines, and the practices of its contributors (Tkacz, 
2015). Although openness suggests that anyone can participate, entries are never finished, 
and editing Wikipedia is fully transparent, Wikipedia editors paradoxically have to adhere 
to strict rules and guidelines. These are created, amended, and enforced by editors high up 
in Wikipedia’s hierarchy who have access to tools that can prevent others from editing. As 
a result, the ideology of openness is continually contested and redefined among editors.
This leads to the question how the ideology of openness shapes memory work on Wiki-
pedia. On the platform, the process of memory work involves the practices of gathering, 
re-assembling, combining, paraphrasing, critiquing, and quoting sources on a given topic, 
using mediated, second-hand material. It is a collaborative endeavor which implies co-
creation, discussion, debate, and disruption. Three defining interlinked traits of Wikipedia 
that are shaped by the ideology of openness will be scrutinized: the interactions between 
editors, the platform’s policies and guidelines, and its technological features.
I first discuss Wikipedia’s ideology of openness, which is inscribed in the platform’s 
policies, technology, and ideals. I zoom in on the community dynamics and hierarchies 
of the platform, while regarding Wikipedians—registered and active contributors to the 
platform—as a “community of practice” that simultaneously interprets and reinforces this 
ideology. I then move on to show how Wikipedia functions as a key platform of memory 
within a new media ecology. Whereas all platforms present themselves as open, neutral, 
egalitarian, and progressive (Gillespie 2010), I will outline how Wikipedia’s distinctive set 
of practices, its community dynamics, politics and technologies shape memory work on 
it. Concurrently, these produce idiosyncratic representations of contentious past events. 
This theoretical lens is then used to analyze the creation process of the MH17 wiki and 
the themes of controversy within it. By means of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the 
wiki’s archived talk page where discussion about edits and sources takes place, I scrutinize 
the discursive strategies that Wikipedians use to settle disputes, value sources, and edit 
the page. I identify three overarching discourses that editors use to legitimize, position, and 
politicize their memory work: 1) objectivity and neutrality, 2) reliability and verifiability, and 
3) technological access and authority. Within the ideology of openness, what counts as 
objectivity and neutrality, reliability and verifiability, and ultimately, access and authority 
within Wikipedia is constantly renegotiated and reasserted. Scrutinizing these mechanisms 
allows us to understand how Wikipedia filters the past, and thereby stabilizes it. Especially 
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concerning politically contentious past events, such as the downing of flight MH17, this 
limits the possibility of an ‘open’ past.
The ideology of openness: rules, guidelines, and hierarchies
Wikipedia makes a firm claim that “anyone with  Internet  access can write and make 
changes” (About page). This ideology of openness resonates among commentators and 
scholars alike. Since its launch in 2001, the platform has been praised for its “communal 
evaluation,” “fluid heterarchy,” “ad hoc meritocracy” and “open participation” (Ben-
kler, 2006; Bruns, 2008, pp. 24-26). A wiki (from wikiwiki, meaning fast in Hawaiian), the 
name of a Wikipedia entry and the guiding principle of the platform, is viewed as open, 
incremental, organic, tolerant and transparent (Cunnigham, 2007; Pentzold, 2009). The 
platform’s modularity and granularity would allow for “collaborative production” (Shirky, 
2008) to quickly complete large projects, while a self-correcting “soft security” (Pentzold, 
2008) secures quality standards. Some scholars even argue that Wikipedia’s participatory 
nature has far-reaching consequences. Sullivan (2009, p. 10), for example, asserts that the 
platform does not “merely announce a new kind of dissemination of existing knowledge, 
but a change in the very nature of knowledge itself” because it is rooted in bottom-up, 
peer-produced knowledge, based on merit instead of institutional authority. 
The origins of this overt optimism can be traced back to Wikipedia’s proclaimed ideology 
of openness. In principle, anyone can write and edit wikis, which are thus open-ended. 
However, Wikipedia’s proclaimed ideology of openness is ambiguous. It invites participa-
tion; yet, it also heavily guides and restricts it. As Tkacz (2010, p. 50) argues, the success 
of Wikipedia “is not because everyone is free and there are no rules, norms or pressures, 
but precisely the opposite.” Wikipedia’s guidelines and content policies “form the core of 
the organizational process on Wikipedia” (Bilić, 2015, p. 1264) and reify its ideology. Even 
though they have been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Tkacz, 2010, 2012, 2015; Van Dijck, 2013), 
it is therefore worth to reassess them in the context of memory work. 
Wikipedia outlines five “pillars” on which the platform is built. It considers itself an ency-
clopedia that is written from a neutral point of view and based on free content that anyone 
can use, edit, and distribute. It is a place without firm rules where editors treat each other 
with respect and civility. Next to these pillars Wikipedians should adhere to three principles 
when adding content (“core content policies”). First, there is the principle of neutral point 
of view (NPOV), which implies “representing significant views fairly, proportionately and 
without bias.” Second is the principle of verifiability (VER), meaning that all information 
“must be attributed to a reliable, published source”. And third, there is the principle of no 
original research (NOR), which means that articles may not “contain any new analysis or 
synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position not clearly advanced 
by the sources.” These core policies and goals the Wikimedia foundation outlines, aim at 
aiding contributors to reach consensus. This “does not mean unanimity (which, although 
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an ideal result, is not always achievable); nor is it the result of a  vote. Decision-making 
involves an effort to incorporate all editors’ legitimate concerns, while respecting Wikipe-
dia’s policies and guidelines” (“consensus”).
Wikipedia’s rules and guidelines shape the platform’s community of practice (O’Sullivan, 
2009). That is, editors form a group that pursues these ideals and preferred actions which 
shape the content of wikis. At the same time, these principles are continuously reinter-
preted: What belongs in the encyclopedia? What is a neutral point of view? What are 
legitimate concerns in reaching consensus? The answers to these questions are not set in 
stone. Rather, certain norms emerge out of editor’s sayings and doings. As Pentzold (2010, 
p. 716) points out, Wikipedians “primarily understand their collective as an ethos-action 
community tying community membership not to admission procedures but to the personal 
acceptance of a set of moral obligations and rules of conduct.” Editors are constantly be-
ing evaluated, rewarded, and punished by their peers. On the platform “every action” is 
a “monitored performance” (p. 714). That is, every edit is tracked and saved, and users 
can build up trust by adhering to the ethos of the community. As a consequence, “the 
right action and the right thinking then become crucial for determining the community’s 
boundaries” (Pentzold 2010, p. 716). This relates back to the concept of practices as a 
performed, organized set of “sayings and doings,” which are mutually shaping each other 
(Nicolini, 2017, p. 21).
These ideals, moral obligations, right ways of thinking, and principles are enforced 
through Wikipedia’s highly hierarchical organizational structure and the distribution of 
access to technological tools. They “serve as guidelines for contributors, instruct the algo-
rithmic logic of bots, and anchor the encyclopedia’s quality standards” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 
140). Rules and hierarchies are inscribed in the platform’s design, making it a sociotechnical 
system that distributes “permission levels to types of users [and] imposes a strict order on 
decision making over what entries to include or exclude, what edits to allow or block” (Van 
Dijck, 2013, p. 136). This comes down to granting certain users more power over/than oth-
ers. However, to describe “Wikipedians in bipolar categories of humans and nonhumans 
doesn’t do justice to what is in fact a hybrid category: that of the many active users assisted 
by administrative and monitoring tools, also referred to as ‘software-assisted editors’” (Van 
Dijck, 2013, p. 139).
User access levels are determined by three factors: whether or not the user is logged into 
an account, whether the account has a certain age and number of edits, and whether or 
not certain rights are provided manually to an account, which can only be done by users 
with appropriate authority (“User access levels”). While in theory anyone can become a 
Wikipedian, the process of building up authority and acquiring higher permission levels 
and access to technological tools is actually interminable and complex.
Experienced editors with good standing in the community can become “Administrators,” 
which grants them additional rights (see fig. 7.1). Users can only be promoted to this after 
consensus is reached in community discussion and through the process “request for admin-
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ship.” Additionally, users can be granted special “flags” such as Oversight (hide revisions) 
and Checkuser (check accounts and editing activity of IP addresses). These are only given 
when users have confirmed their identity and signed a confidentiality agreement with the 
Wikimedia foundation. Hence, the allocation of tasks and rights is a combination of merit 
(making good and many edits), proper standing, and strict adherence to Wikipedia’s rules 
and policies. In most cases, users with a higher permission level can overrule users lower 
in the hierarchical structure of Wikipedia (see Fig 1). They can do so because these editors 
receive access to technological tools that allow them to ban users, protect articles from 
editing, or create and implement bots that co-construct wikis. 
Permission 
level
User group Tasks and rights
Low Blocked users Edit their own ID/talk page
Unregistered users Not logged in (“IP users”); edit not protected or 
semi-protected pages
New users Editing
Registered (or auto-confirmed) 
users
Editing, send emails to other users, add pages to 
watchlist, set preferences
Medium Bots Minor editing, monitoring, blocking, spell-checking, 
policing, banning
Administrators Editing monitoring, (un)blocking, spell-checking, 
policing, banning, page deletion, page protection, 
access fully protected Wikis
Bureaucrats Promoting users to administrators or bureaucrats. 
Remove users from admin and bot user groups
Stewards Full access, right to change user rights and groups, 
battling vandalism
High Developers Maintaining software
System administrators Server access, full permission
Figure 7.1 – a schematic overview of Wikipedia’s hierarchical structure
(based on: Van Dijck 2013, pp. 136-137, Niederer and Van Dijck, 2010, p. 1372, Meta-Wiki—Wikipedia about Wiki-
pedia)
Wikipedia’s community rules, policies and ideology do not remain undisputed. The com-
bination of Wikipedia’s hierarchical structure and its use of bots, makes some users “worry 
about their site becoming a semi-automated, impermeable operational system that pro-
hibits discord and favors consensus at the expense of a variety of opinions” (Van Dijck, 
2013, p. 139). Similarly, O’Sullivan (2011) critiques the platform’s “increasingly bureaucratic 
‘policing’ of its content, as for example with NPOV, means it is in danger of merely mirroring 
the typical knowledge economies of the West” (p. 48). 
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Next to administrative roles, Wikipedians with high authority can be on special commit-
tees and advisory boards like the Arbitration Committee, which resolves serious disputes 
among Wikipedians. Also, Wikipedians can reward each other with Barnstars and other 
digital prizes for good behavior and work (e.g. “the random act of kindness barnstar,” “the 
civility barnstar,” “editor of the week,” “the barnstar of diplomacy”). Likewise, users can 
be given indicators of bad behavior. These rewards and indicators show on the individual 
user’s page (fig. 7.2).
Figure 7.2 – screenshot of user RGloucesester’s user page
Wikipedia’s hierarchy and punishment and reward systems are means to discipline and 
control the community of practice. Ultimately, this shapes and steers interaction and 
content creation, according to specific interpretations of factuality, consensus, objectivity 
and neutrality and on the basis of hierarchy and acquired authority. Accordingly, emotion, 
interpretation, and subjectivity are not advocated within the community.
The “real wisdom of Wikipedia,” writes Van Dijck (2013, p. 136) can thus be found “not in 
its crowds but in its crowd management.” Likewise, Tkacz (2015, p. 49) notes: “Wikipedia 
is collaborative not because it has no hierarchies, but because it has policies that medi-
ate between different and, indeed, often conflicting views, seemingly absorbing different 
perspectives into a single frame.” In the end, “[d]ecentralized organization can only exist if 
certain principles are especially forceful” (Tkacz, 2015, p. 85). Wikipedia is the encyclopedia 
that anyone can edit, but, paradoxically, this can only be the case because the freedom to 
edit is limited. Openness on Wikipedia, therefore, is more an ideal than something that is 
practiced. These tensions are an important aspect of the discursive construction of what 
counts as “truth” and “facts” on Wikipedia. Norms about what counts as an objective fact 
about or how to truthfully reconstruct the past are constantly debated among editors.
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Wikipedia and memory work 
Memory work is central to Wikipedia’s community of practice and as a platform itself. 
Through Wikipedians’ practices and the platform’s digital archive, the past is re-presented 
and carried into the future in specific ways. Wikipedians gather, re-assemble, combine, 
paraphrase, critique and quote sources on a given topic. They use mediated, secondary 
material and annotate and re-present this in the cultural form of a wiki. These are essentially 
collages of existing bits and pieces of mostly online material that is collaboratively pieced 
together in a coherent way. Wikipedians are also encouraged to archive the websites used 
as references in their articles via the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. This prevents 
dead links and allows users to revisit the original website of the source (“Wikipedia: citing 
sources”). 
The information in wikis originates from multiple sources throughout the Web. It is de-
contextualized from its origin and re-contextualized on the platform. At the same time, 
the platform is highly linked—through millions of hyperlinks—which allows it to emerge 
at the top of search results. This allows for a more abstract way of seeing Wikipedia as an 
important node within an information network stored in digital memory. “Googling some-
thing” often ends up in reading a Wikipedia article. The platform ends up high in the Google 
results page and receives 60 percent of its traffic through Google searches. The close bond 
between the two organizations was also demonstrated when Google in 2010 donated $2 
million to the Wikimedia foundation. “Wikipedia’s success,” writes Van Dijck (2013, p. 153), 
“is highly dependent on its frictionless compatibility with mainstream big players.” 
However, this is not where Wikipedia’s compatibility to the broader media ecology begins 
or ends. Even before Google came to dominate the Web with their services and platforms, 
Wikipedia heavily relied and still relies on the output of so-called legacy media. Next to 
reports and official sources, broadcast media and newspapers are widely referenced on 
the site (something that will come back in the analysis below). Consequently, a large part 
of the information we find through Google search can be traced back to news media, 
institutional and government sources. 
Another important aspect of Wikipedia pertaining to memory work is that it offers a 
vast archive of all edits in wikis and the discussions about them. Wikipedia’s talk pages 
(discussion board) is a “place where the negotiation of different, and sometimes contrast-
ing, interpretations of the past takes place” (Ferron & Massa , 2014, p. 37). The archived 
revision history and talk page of an article show, in a transparent way, what was included 
and excluded from the page and which “individual pieces of information are selected and 
ordered into a coherent narration, through users’ discussion and active participation in 
remembrance” (Ferron & Massa, 2014, p. 29). 
Wikipedia talk pages thus provide insight into the processes of negotiation and selec-
tion that precede the formation of a more or less stable wiki. As Luyt (2015, p. 6) writes: 
“by making it relatively easy for anyone to look ‘under the hood’ so to speak, Wikipedia 
allows a glimpse of collective memory at work: a messy and contingent process”. Adapting 
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Nora’s (1989) concept of “sites of memory” (lieu de mémoire), Pentzold (2009) theorizes 
Wikipedia as a global memory place which is “not a symbolic place of remembrance [as in 
Nora’s original sense, RS] but a place where memorable elements are negotiated” (p. 264). 
In other words, these pages show how the messiness of communicative interaction, which 
stands at the root of any engagement with the past, fixates in a somewhat stable form as 
time progresses. What Pentzold (2009) calls the “floating gap” can be seen as “the gradual 
passage from disputed points of view in everyday discussions to the formalized character 
of an encyclopaedic article” (p. 267). 
Accordingly, Wikipedia articles are both influenced by the internal political dynamics 
of the platform as well as the external geopolitical situation. Despite what the platform 
claims, they are not at all value-free. Most editors of the English language Wikipedia, for 
example, are as much part of Wikipedia’s community of practice as they are part of a 
“language community” that privileges Western world views (Pentzold, 2010, pp. 714-715; 
Tkacz, 2015). Therefore, Luyt (2015) rightly remarks that Wikipedia is socially embedded 
within a “network of wider discourse” that maintains and constructs the past in the present 
(p. 3). The processes of assessing which sources and information are included, writing and 
editing, and the deliberation that underlies this memory work make Wikipedia “not only 
a platform to constitute and store knowledge, but a place where memory—understood as 
a particular discursive construction—is shaped” (Pentzold, 2009, p. 264). The mechanisms 
and group dynamics behind the discursive stabilization of the wiki on MH17 will be the 
focus of the rest of this chapter.   
Research Design
This chapter focuses on the English wiki on the shooting and crash of flight MH17 and its 
aftermath.30 This case was chosen because the downing is a highly controversial topic that 
was widely covered by the media and led to diplomatic tensions between, roughly, the 
countries in the EU and other “Western” countries and Russia. Although there are wikis on 
this event in 74 languages, the English one is the most-visited and most-edited. It is the 
most international and editors from all over the world were and are engaged in editing 
and maintaining the page. This international character allows research into what binds 
and divides this spatially diffuse and culturally diverse group of editors, while taking into 
account that Western perspectives might dominate the wiki and the talk page discussion. 
Wikipedia makes it relatively easy for researchers to analyze the process in which infor-
mation is assessed, accepted or dismissed, reshuffled and put together again because the 
revision history of each wiki is available. Moreover, the talk pages document debates on 
the content of wikis and the discursive strategies of editors. In these behind the scenes 
30 URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17.
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discourses on practices and norms editors negotiate what is legitimate knowledge and 
what belongs and does not belong in Wikipedia. 
The main corpus for this study consisted of the wiki on the MH17 disaster and the talk 
page connected to it (titled “Malaysia Airlines Flight 17,” version 13 June 2016). Additionally, 
Wikipedia guideline articles to which discussions in the talk page referred were included. 
Using Wikipedia’s Wikihistory tool, it was determined when the page was edited most often 
and presumably moments of controversy emerged in the talk page.31 This resulted in the 
following weeks to be subjected to critical discourse analysis (fig. 7.3): 
Time period Events
weeks 29-52, 2014 roughly the first half  year after the disaster
weeks 10-16, 2015 roughly around the time a story spread through VKontakte about the use of  
an air-to-air missile
weeks 22-33, 2015 roughly around the disaster’s first anniversary
week 42, 2015 the publication of  the final report of  the crash by the Dutch Safety Board
weeks 20-29, 2016 roughly around the disaster’s second anniversary
Figure 7.3 – time periods with increased editing activity and the events that caused this
This sampling method follows certain discursive events, resulting in “critical discourse 
moments” (Carvalho, 2008, p. 173). This leads up to synchronous analysis, the analysis of 
discourse stemming from specific moments in time, rather than diachronic analysis, the 
study of discourse through time (Jäger, 2004, p. 71; Carvalho, 2008, pp. 171-172). Applying 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) allows us to scrutinize the ideology of Wikipedia which is 
“embedded in the selection and representation of objects and actors, and in the language 
and discursive strategies employed in a text” (Carvalho, 2008, p. 170).
Critical Discourse Analysis
Through particular “discursive strategies” (Carvalho, 2008, p. 169) such as positioning, (de)
legitimizing, and (de)politicizing, Wikipedia editors entitle themselves or others to edit in 
particular ways, to add information or leave things out, or to (dis)credit certain sources. 
In this way, editors intervene in each other’s memory work and, through that, build up, 
or re-assert their standing in the community. Positioning Carvalho (2008, p. 169) sees as 
the arrangement of social actors vis-a-vis each other that authorize them for particular 
practices. This is closely related to the construction of identity through discourse and 
practice. Legitimization describes the process of sanctioning and justifying actions on the 
basis of normative beliefs. Politicization is “the attribution of a political nature or status to 
31 The results of which are available through the following URL (constantly updated): https://tools.wmflabs.org/
xtools/wikihistory/wh.php?page_title=Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17
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a certain reality,” which occurs when Wikipedians accuse each other of editing that aligned 
with national politics. This constant form of power-play in the arena of the talk pages ulti-
mately affects the memory work regarding the MH17 disaster. The following analysis uses 
examples of these discursive strategies as to show how Wikipedians position, legitimize 
and politicize their practices.
In order to conduct the CDA, I will apply a “toolkit” developed by Schneider (2013) which 
is based on the work of Mayring (2002), Jäger (2004), and Fairclough (1995). Although this 
toolkit is by no means exhaustive, it does provide a structured overview of a process that 
is often unclear and difficult to reproduce by other researchers. According to Schneider 
(2013), eight analytical steps guide the process of CDA: 1) establishing context, 2) exploring 
the production process, 3) preparing materials, 4) coding material, 5) examining structure 
of the text, 6) collecting and examining discursive statements, 7) Identifying cultural refer-
ences, 8) Identifying rhetorical and linguistic mechanisms. 
Steps one to three have already partly been taken in the previous sections and will be 
expanded further below. Step four involved the inductive “tagging” of passages that are 
theoretically interesting and/or connect to the research questions. This process familiar-
ized the researcher with the material and instilled theoretical sensitivity towards it. All 597 
talk page threads were inductively coded for main topics and themes. These ranged from 
images and media coverage to the neutrality of the wiki (see appendix 1 for the overview 
of found categories). Next, the moments of controversy were scrutinized further, by paying 
special attention to issues revolving around topic selection (passages about the in- or ex-
clusion of sections), referencing (passages on what and how to reference and what sources 
should be included), and editing (passages on who to edit and “right” and “wrong” editing). 
Step five, examining the structure of the text, is to large extent included with this step since 
it is structured by the thread titles.
Step six further inspected those coded threads that were marked as relevant to the 
research questions. Particularly interesting were those discursive statements that describe 
what Wikipedia is and what it is not, those that engage with questions of neutrality and 
those that cover which sources are reliable and which are not. Step seven involved the lo-
calization of intertextuality within the talk page. This is partly automated within Wikipedia 
by the wide use of hyperlinking (to other wikis and external pages). Step eight included the 
identification of specific word groups, grammatical features, rhetorical and literary figures 
and direct and indirect speech. This step also involved the documentation of specific 
modalities (normative statements) and ‘evidentialities’ (phrases that suggest factuality). 
Sources and content of the MH17 wiki
Before presenting the results of the discourse analysis of the talk page, it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the content of the wiki itself and the 303 sources used in it. The first thing 
that is striking about the wiki titled “Malaysia Airlines Flight 17” is its length. Including the 
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references, it consists of more than 18,000 words. Eight main topics are discussed: the air-
craft (mainly technical descriptions of it), passengers and crew, the conflict in which it took 
place (the section is called “background”), crash, aftermath, investigation (subdivided into 
initial attempts at investigating the crash, cause, recovery of bodies, Dutch safety board 
(DSB) preliminary report, final report), reactions, and a last section on the Russian media 
coverage. 
What type of sources are most-used and valued in the wiki on Mh17? A simple count 
of sources—based on these sources’ websites—reveals that newspapers are the most 
referenced sources in the article, followed by radio and TV websites, web-native news 
websites, and press agencies. This does not say anything, of course, about the ways in 
which the sources are used. For example, the reports by Bellingcat, a crowdsourced citizen 
journalism platform, are highly valued in the article. The same counts for Intelligence and 
information services Foreign Policy, the Levada Center, and Stratfor. The practice to use 
newspapers as reliable sources is explained by the Wikipedia guideline on the topic:
“News reporting” from well-established news outlets is generally considered to be 
reliable for statements of fact (though even the most reputable reporting sometimes 
contains errors). News reporting from less-established outlets is generally considered 
less reliable for statements of fact [ ] Editorial commentary, analysis and  opinion 
pieces, whether written by the editors of the publication (editorials) or outside au-
thors (op-eds) are reliable primary sources for statements attributed to that editor 
or author, but are rarely reliable for statements of fact. Human interest reporting is 
generally not as reliable as news reporting, and may not be subject to the same 
rigorous standards of fact-checking and accuracy (see  junk food news). (“reliable 
sources,” emphasis mine)
These guidelines signal that on Wikipedia, objectivity and the provision of multiple points 
of view are valued as high as in news reporting. The italicized parts show that Wikipedia is 
skeptical about new players in the media ecology and has a somewhat traditional, norma-
tive view on what “good” journalism is. Hard news from well-established outlets is valued 
most in the wiki.
The wiki’s introduction describes what occurred on July 17, 2014, on the basis of infor-
mation mainly provided by American intelligence and government sources, the Dutch 
Safety Board, and citizen journalistic organization Bellingcat. This part reads that the 
plane was shot down by pro-Russian insurgents, using a BUK missile launcher, while the 
Russian government blamed the Ukrainian government for the crash. Thus, immediately, 
the tone is set for the rest of the article. Interesting is the prominent place of Bellingcat in 
the introduction as a reliable source, something that was not undisputed (see below). The 
sections titled “Aircraft” and “Passengers and Crew” are technical and factual. Relevant 
to mention, though, is that in these first parts it is mentioned twice that the crash is “the 
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deadliest airliner shootdown incident” to date, which is factually correct, but, because of 
its rhetorical weight, criticized for inclusion among editors. 
The section “Background” sketches the context in which the downing occurred, the 
Ukrainian conflict. Again, the article takes it as a fact that the plane was brought down 
with a missile by pro-Russian separatists. This part discusses the (inconsistency of the) 
Russian media, which are treated on a meta-level: the article talks about them instead of 
using them as reliable sources of information. The section called “Crash” is mostly based 
on flight data and is supported by maps and also specifies that a fireball on impact was 
captured on video and that bodies fell into crop fields and houses. This level of detail is 
consistent throughout the article which is within Wikipedia seen as a sign of quality. In the 
Aftermath part, a remark is made about a video that was shot shortly after the crash that 
shows “Russian-backed rebels” ransacking the wreckage. 
The section “Investigation” is the most extensive and it mainly follows the findings of the 
Dutch Safety Board. Throughout, the article never directly dismisses Russian claims, but 
rather lets other sources debunk them, for example: “In the report published by the Dutch 
Safety Board, an air-to-air missile strike was ruled out.” Even though claims such as these 
are seemingly neutral, they are placed at the end of paragraphs that describe Russian point 
of views, thereby rhetorically silencing them. The section “Reactions” provides an overview 
of official statements by world leaders and involved organizations. Important to note here 
is that Australian Prime Minister Abbott is said to immediately connect the shooting to 
Russia, but that other world leaders’ reactions were diplomatic and not outspoken. In the 
last section, “Russian media coverage,” claims by Russian media are covered, including 
plots to assassinate Russian President Putin and mass murder Russian citizens. Although 
these claims are not refuted in the wiki, the fact that there is a special section on Russian 
media coverage shows that Russian media are treated suspiciously.
Talk page discourses
Three sets of overarching discourses emerge in the MH17 talk pages. Firstly, there is a 
discourse on objectivity and neutrality that mainly revolves around the inclusion of alter-
native viewpoints, tone of the article, and emotional and subjective content. Secondly, 
reliability and verifiability were discussed, which involved the assessment of sources and 
facticity of information. Thirdly, a discourse on technological access and authority can be 
distinguished. This stems from internal debates on editorial access and the ability to block 
and ban editors, and protect the wiki from further editing. 
These discourses, unpacked below, are essentially about what a good wiki should look 
like and what Wikipedia ought to be. They reveal in what form the past should be re-
presented in Wikipedia and which versions of it should be carried into the future. Moreover, 
these discourses reveal how certain editors legitimize, position and politicize their own 
and others’ practices. In other words, they show what ‘good’ memory work is, according to 
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authoritative editors. The discursive battles here are not fought on equal ground. Certain 
editors have more authority than others, based on a combination of experience, merit, 
good standing, and national and cultural background. Descriptions of these user charac-
teristics will be given throughout the analysis, based on user pages.32 In the three sections 
below, each discursive theme is discussed through the analysis of concrete examples of 
discursive statements, cultural references, and rhetorical mechanisms during moments of 
controversy (steps 6, 7 and 8).
Objectivity and neutrality
What constitutes neutrality and objectivity is one of the most prominent issues in the talk 
pages of the MH17 article. Neutral Point of View (NPOV) is a policy to adhere to, an ideal at 
the core of Wikipedia. As a tag, it is also a rhetorical weapon at the disposal of every editor, 
which can be pointed at others: being accused of non-neutrality is insulting for editors. A 
particularly persisting issue concerning NPOV revolved around a perceived anti-Russian, 
pro-Western bias in various edits of the article. To many editors, the “information war”, 
comparable to that of the Cold War era, led to biased reporting in news media. Avoiding 
biased sources, therefore, became a prime concern within the talk pages. For example, edi-
tor Kudzu133 writes on September 10, 2014, that the inclusion of official Russian statements 
regarding MH17 in the article is a source of frustration for him: “If the Kremlin announced 
that the seas are made of chocolate pudding, I’m convinced a small army of Wikipedia edi-
tors would insist on adding that claim to [the] Ocean [wiki].” However, editor Cla6834 dryly 
responds: “as long as it is made clear that it is a Russian claim, and not put in WP’s voice, 
I don’t see the problem” (“Ukrainian air traffic…” archive 15). This exchange exemplifies 
how discussions about neutrality are resolved: as long as statements are made by major 
parties and attributed to them, the inclusion of these statements is perceived neutral and 
objective.
Language use (word choice and phrasing) and the application of quotes and viewpoints 
are continuous topics up for debate in the context of assessing objectivity and neutrality 
of the article. Regarding language, an illustrative debate ensued after editors used the 
words “terrorists,” “rebels” and “separatists,” especially in combination with the prefix 
“pro-Russian,” in order to describe the perpetrators behind the downing: “Through the way 
we are including the word ‘terrorist’ in our paraphrase, we are creating the impression that 
32 Even though users write their own user pages, awards like barn stars or community memberships only appear 
when awarded or confirmed by other editors, which increases the reliability of the user pages. Moreover, user 
pages provide valuable insight into how users perceive their role in Wikipedia.
33 User Kudzu1, according to his user page, has been working on Wikipedia for over a decade, is American and 
has been awarded numerous editorial barn stars.  
34 According to Cla68’s user page the user is “generally disillusioned with Wikipedia,” due to “activist ownership 
in certain topic areas” and because of its current system and culture.
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our sentence presupposes the fact that they indeed are terrorists, which is clearly prob-
lematic,” writes editor Future Perfect At Sunrise35 on 20 July, 2014. Rgloucester36 responds: 
Using ‘terrorist’ is in line with the Manual of style. WP:TERRORIST would beg to dif-
fer. As Fut. Perf. says, sources carry a POV. It isn’t our job to reflect that POV. We must 
adhere to WP:NPOV, unlike such journalistic sources […] All it does is add pathos.” 
(“terrorist,” archive 5) 
A consensus is reached in the matter through reference to the guidelines on NPOV and 
the special wiki on the use of the word terrorist. Terrorist is deemed too charged with 
connotative meaning. The article now uses the words separatists, rebels and insurgents 
interchangeably. 
Objectivity and neutrality in the context of Wikipedia is achieved through critical distance. 
Emotive language and details that might lead to affective responses are seen as indications 
of subjectivity and “point-of-view” and are therefore warded from the page. In a discussion 
on July 22, 2014, editor RGloucester responds to another editor’s decision to include the 
number of deceased children in the article: “What’s relavent [sic] depends on perspective. 
There is too much pathos in this article as it stands. Wikipedia is not a memorial” (“why do 
people keep removing,” archive 7). Wikipedia is a place for detached interpretation and 
reflection on the past, according to this editor. It is a place where memory work should be 
“factual,” but what counts as such is not set in stone. For example, later, in another thread, 
RGloucester asserts that specifying the number of dead children is an “attempt at sensa-
tionalism.” Instead, he argues, “we should remain neutral and encyclopaedic” (archive 7, 
“80 children”). The discussion that follows this post is illustrative for the type of reasoning 
behind the inclusion or exclusion of information in the wiki:
I’m not “trying to appeal to people’s emotions about “children”. I’m adding facts. 
But I’d disagree with you, that “Children are no different than anyone else. They are 
just people.” I think that’s a fundamentally wrong view, for all sorts of reasons. Mar-
tinevans123 
35 This user is a highly decorated user with Administrator status, according to the user page. Interestingly, the 
user is also part of the community of Rouge Admin group, who are committed in their efforts to increase verifi-
ability of sources in Wikipedia. 
36 RGloucester is an active and influential editor of the MH17 wiki. According to his user page, the user has been 
editing Wikipedia for over five years and has accumulated numerous editing awards, culminating in the ser-
vice award “Senior Editor III.” Also illustrating is that RGloucester is a member of Association of Wikipedians 
Who Dislike Making Broad Judgments About the Worthiness of a General Category of Article, and Who Are In 
Favor of the Deletion of Some Particularly Bad Articles, but That Doesn’t Mean They Are Deletionists (AWWD-
MBJAWGCAWAIFDSPBATDMTAD). This is a club of around 500 Wikipedians committed to judge suitability of 
wikis for inclusion.
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Why is it a fundamentally wrong view? Is there any difference in terms of dignity, 
value of life between a child and an adult? What else, apart from pathos, does it 
evoke to say that “children, women are hurt”? As if killing an adult is somewhat less 
culpable than killing a child? As if a child’s life is even more valuable than that of a 
renowned (male) surgeon who saved hundred [sic] of lives? As if the value of life is 
decreasing when one grows older? Psychologically you can accept whatever the 
media is feeding you about the “children” and “women”, and be my guest if you 
want to cry over the fallen leaves of Autumn, but wikipedia is [not] a place to write In 
Search of Lost Time.128.189.191.60 (Archive 7, “80 children”)
By alluding to Proust’s novel, the IP address editor clarifies that anything that comes close 
to emotion and experience does not belong in Wikipedia. Also notable is the way in which 
this editor responds to Martinevans123’s37 comment, who does not provide strictly rational 
arguments for his position in the matter. Ultimately, the issue is resolved on the basis of 
the fact that the ratio of deceased children is high compared to other crashes, but the word 
“children” is replaced by a detached phrase: “At least twenty family groups were on board 
the aircraft, and eighty of the passengers were under the age of 18.” 
Some viewpoints are given more weight than others. As editor Geogene38 explains in a 
comment on July 30, 2014, if Wikipedians would report on every minority viewpoint, that, 
ironically, “would violate neutrality because then we’d be giving them more coverage than 
was warranted” (“neutrality of media coverage section,” archive 10). But even this is up for 
discussion, as an anonymous IP editor demonstrates on November 19, 2014:
With the help of Google Translate I have checked every version of this article in other 
languages. Nearly every big article in other language covers this event considerably 
better than the English version. Namely, no single party is blamed and alternative 
theories/viewpoints are discussed. The English version is pretty much an exception 
and I believe it is due to its editor’s POV pushing and reluctance to accept non-
Western theories. (“this article in other languages,” archive 19)
By claiming that the English wiki on MH17 is “pretty much an exception” the editor ef-
fectively dismisses the page as being non-neutral and therefore unreliable. Proportionate 
attention and balance are said to be highly important values. However, most of the sources 
37 This user is ranked number 417 on the list of Wikipedians by number of edits and is Master Editor III.
38 Geogene’s user page shows the user’s discontent with the platform’s alleged politics: “As the Wikipedia Foun-
dation has joined a pointless and overtly political lawsuit against the US Government, [Wikimedia v. NSA], I’m 
suspending my activity here until it’s resolved. I’m interested in writing an encyclopedia, but I don’t care at 
all how Wales and the WMF interpret the US Constitution, and I’m not interested in strengthening user:Jimbo 
Wales’ bully pulpit to pursue the Libertarian internet cause du jour. Unfortunately it is not possible to do one 
without also doing the other.”
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used in the article stem from major English-speaking countries. Ironically, the discussion 
that follows the post above is settled by comments made by authoritative editors such as: 
“[t]he bottom line remain [sic] that Wikipedia in whatever language is not a reliable source” 
(Arnoutf) and “crowd-sourced sources are generally not reliable” (Volunteer Marek).39 
A last example of how conflicts about bias are resolved is a thread called “neutrality.” 
In it, editor Sceptic195440 initiates the discussion by arguing that the wiki is not neutral 
because the cause of the crash was not known yet then, while the wiki claimed pro-Russian 
separatist using a BUK system were to blame, based on early German and American intel-
ligence reports. Instead, the editor argues, “[t]he first thing [the wiki] should be saying [is] 
that the cause is under investigation” (August 3, 2014). A number of solutions is proposed 
and the discussion is ultimately settled by the most authoritative editors:
The solution is to remove almost all the media and political claims and speculation. 
We cannot know what is true, and each of us is probably going to be influenced in 
our judgements by our own prejudices. By including it Wikipedia becomes a player 
in the propaganda war that began long before this plane crashed.  HiLo48  (talk) 
08:24, 3 August 2014 (UTC)
As I suggested above, would it be worth creating a section to outline all points of 
view, possibly split into mainstream, Russian, and other theories?  CSJJ104  (talk) 
09:59, 3 August 2014 (UTC)
I don’t think there needs to be any speculation in the article. Let’s stick to the facts 
that we do know and wait for the commission to finish investigation. Wikipedia 
should not be used as a weapon in information war. rampa  (talk) 04:54, 8 August 
2014 (UTC)
Not everything is “propaganda,” HiLo. It’s the propagandists who want you to think 
so since that muddies the waters.--Brian Dell (talk) 16:12, 3 August 2014 (UTC)” 
Contrary to your assertion the Russian POV is included in the article and it is labeled 
as statements of the Russian government. The article talk page is not the place to 
pontificate about politics or carry out polemics. Quite simply, we use reliable sources. 
That’s it. Volunteer Marek (“Neutrality,” archive 13, emphasis mine)
39 User Arnoutf, a “consumer behavior researcher and associate professor at Wageningen University, the Nether-
lands,” is a highly active and decorated Wikipedian. Likewise, user Volunteer Marek is an authoritative “Master 
Editor III.”
40 Sceptic1954 does not have a user page, which means the user is not part of a community and does not have 
rewards.
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The italicized parts in the thread above indicate discursive statements with which edi-
tors explicitly position Wikipedia as something outside “mainstream” media and political 
discourse. This imagining of Wikipedia as something different and better than “the biased 
media” is used to settle disputes about bias and statements such as the one above. It also 
allows editors to locate Wikipedia outside the so-called “information war” and label it a 
haven of neutrality. However, this claim of neutrality is simultaneously applied by those 
in favor of including Russian views and those opposed to them, thereby actually drawing 
Wikipedia into the information war. This particular exchange thus demonstrates that the 
norms regarding objectivity and neutrality are flexible in terms of their interpretation. How-
ever, as this thread also shows, the interpretation of the guidelines by authoritative editors 
ultimately becomes the rule. Instead of consensus, hierarchy determines the outcome of 
the debate.  
Reliability and verifiability
Verifiability can be argued to be the most essential policy on Wikipedia. Simply put, without 
reference to outside, reliable sources (RS) Wikipedia would not exist. This is why Wikipedi-
ans have lengthy debates in the talk pages about what reliable sources are, especially in 
the light of the many speculative reports that emerged after the crash. 
Because a cloud of uncertainty surrounded the crash and the responsibility for it, 
conspiracy theories started to materialize all over the Web in the days after the downing. 
Most experienced Wikipedians are avid combatants of the spread of conspiracy theories 
on “their” platform. “This is not a forum,” writes Dbrodbeck.41 He continues: “and, this is 
especially not a forum for crazy conspiracy theories” (19 July 2014, Cui Bono, archive 3). 
Wikipedians have developed an effective strategy to cope with these “fringe theories,” an 
Essay42 to which experienced editors often refer to in the talk pages: 
A Wikipedia article should not make a fringe theory appear more notable or more 
widely accepted than it is. Statements about the truth of a theory must be based 
upon independent reliable sources. If discussed in an article about a mainstream 
idea, a theory that is not broadly supported by scholarship in its field must not be 
given undue weight, and reliable sources must be cited that affirm the relationship 
of the marginal idea to the mainstream idea in a serious and substantial manner. 
(“Fringe theories”)
41 Dbrodbeck, according to his user page, is a psychology professor and has been editing Wikipedia for more 
than ten years.
42 “Essays, as used by Wikipedia editors, typically contain information, advice or opinions of one or more Wiki-
pedia contributors. The purpose of an essay is to aid or comment on the encyclopedia and not any unrelated 
causes. Essays have no official status, and do not speak for the Wikipedia community as they may be created 
without approval. Following the instructions or advice given in an essay is optional. There are currently about 
2,000 essays on a wide range of Wikipedia related topics.” (“Essays”)
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One persistent theory held that the actual target of the perpetrators was President Putin, 
who was flying back in a private jet coming from Brazil. Another argued that flight MH17 
contained the dead bodies from another Malaysia Airlines flight (MH370) that disappeared 
months before MH17 was shot down. Both theories were repelled from the wiki on the 
basis of the fringe theory policy.
Using the fringe theory guideline—fringing—to battle the spread of conspiracy theories 
is not an uncontested strategy. For example, critical, yet active editor Geogene (93 major 
edits to the MH17 wiki) writes on 21 July, 2014:
My understanding is that WP:FRINGE is more about who advocates a position rather 
than the oddness of it. The plane-full-of-dead-bodies conspiracy theory was cham-
pioned by the leader of the militia that controls the crash site, so it is notable no 
matter how ridiculous it is. Internet conspiracy theories not attributed to stakehold-
ers in the investigation should continue to be disregarded. (“conspiracy theories,” 
archive 6)
Interestingly, some editors proposed to start a wiki on conspiracy theories regarding the 
MH17 disaster (similar to the page  “Malaysia Airlines 370 unofficial disappearance theo-
ries”), because of their prominence in the global media, but the only mention of conspiracy 
theories in the wiki on MH17 at the moment of writing is in the Russian media coverage 
section: 
Large number of fakes and various conspiracy theories were distributed in Russian 
mass media in due course, their appearance usually coinciding with updates from 
the Dutch Safety Board.  For example, on 15 November 2014, Russia’s  Channel 
One  reported on a supposedly leaked spy satellite photo which shows the plane 
being shot from behind by a Ukrainian fighter jet. (“Malaysia Airlines Flight 17”)
In general, collectively labeling a view a fringe theory instead of a conspiracy theory is an 
effective strategy by Wikipedians to silence alternative voices. Labeling a view or theory 
a conspiracy would immediately politicize the discussion. Fringing, instead, is a practice 
based on a specific interpretation of the verifiability principle, which allows authoritative 
editors to quickly settle disputes.
In addition to the treatment of fringe theories, the introduction of (the emerging) crowd-
sourced citizen journalism platform Bellingcat as a reliable source is illuminating with 
regard to discussions of verifiability and reliability on the platform. Bellingcat uses open 
source and social media investigation for their reports. It was founded by Elliot Higgins, 
who formerly worked on uncovering the use of chemical weapons in Syria under his pseud-
onym Brown Moses. Its first major investigation traced the BUK system that, according to 
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the DSB and other investigations, shot down MH17. Bellingcat’s publication caused some 
turmoil in the talk pages, as an edit remark on 9 September, 2014, by Geogene shows:
I reverted content sourced to Bellingcat at  [5]. I don’t think a website “by and for 
citizen investigative journalists” are [sic] RS enough to identify the specific Russian 
unit that (allegedly) shot the plane down. I also think this is a lot of weight given to 
one source (which also applies to the BBC panorama content, although the BBC is 
much more RS than this.) (“Igor Ostanin,” archive 15)
Bellingcat is treated with suspicion, yet also fiercely defended, even two months later:
I think such reports by independent investigative journalists [Bellingcat blog] are 
significantly more reliable and informative than vague claims by state-controlled 
organizations, such as German intelligence, or meaningless statements by official 
investigators who do not reveal their data before the end of their investigation.
My very best wishes [an editor, RS] thinks that a blog is more reliable than statements 
made by the relevant investigative authority, which is engaged in the largest criminal 
investigation in Dutch history. Are editors really going to try to pretend that there is 
consensus for this madness? – Herzen(talk) 01:18, 14 November 2014 (UTC)
bellingcat report was picked up by multiple RS - you are protesting too much me-
thinks - belingcat [sic] pointed out blatant lies from the Russians concerning where 
certain vehicles were - perhaps its that that drives your determination to rubbish the 
messenger. I like the way you don’t mention what was in the bellingcat report - just 
denigrate it - lowbrow stuff really.  Sayerslle  (talk) 01:42, 14 November 2014 (UTC) 
(“edit war,” Archive 22, emphasis mine)
This thread shows that the use of Bellingcat instigated a clash of opinions regarding facts 
presented by sources whose authority is derived from establishment (“state-controlled 
organizations” and legacy media) and an independent, bottom-up knowledge producer. 
Bellingcat is only accepted as a reliable source after much debate and, importantly, after 
mainstream media such as the BBC and the CNN started to take the organization’s work 
seriously. In the stable version of the wiki, findings by Bellingcat have a prominent place 
in the article. 
The reliable source guideline and interpretations thereof help settle disputes, but are 
also criticized and contested. The common reasoning would be the following (Geogene, 12 
August, 2014): “The plane was shot down. Hundreds of sources say so. Therefore, the article 
should say so. If reliable sources later decide that aliens did it, then we’ll change the article 
to reflect that. The only standard of truth is RS.” Yet, as Sceptic1954 argues in a comment on 
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26 August, 2014, if this “simply means we select those RS which suit our point of view and 
disregard others,” than this article is “as reliable as Russia Today” (“changes to lead,” archive 
14). Here we see a pivotal problematic issue: how can Wikipedia be neutral and truly reliable, 
if the selection of sources lies in the hands of individual editors who each have their own 
political and cultural backgrounds? This question is repeatedly addressed in the talk pages 
and remains fundamentally unanswered. Only by especially forceful measures (see next sec-
tion) do established editors high up in the hierarchy effectively counter this. 
Technological access and authority
So far, the technological features and affordances of Wikipedia have not taken center stage 
in the analysis. However, authority in Wikipedia is intrinsically connected to access to tech-
nological features of the platform. The higher up an editor is on the hierarchical ladder, the 
more technologically-enabled measures are available to him or her to prevent others from 
editing. A pivotal, yet contested measure is increasing the so-called “protection status” of 
the article, implemented especially during ‘edit wars’. Because this procedure effectively 
prevents editors with low permission levels from editing, discussions about the imple-
mentation make up a discourse of access and authority. Although comment threads that 
discuss the protection status of the article are not the most proliferate, they are extensive 
and revolve around a number of key issues in Wikipedia: who may edit a contested topic 
and who is, through the platform’s technological affordances, excluded from editing and 
why? 
The wiki on MH17 is highly edited and consensus was not reached on a number of issues, 
especially on the inclusion of Russian sources. This led to calls in the talk pages to increase 
the protection status of the article. This involves a technical restriction that allows only 
certain editors to add and change content to wikis. Only administrators can apply, modify 
and remove protection. The most common types of protection are “full protection” (only 
administrators can change the wiki) and “semi-protection” (only logged in and confirmed 
accounts may edit) (“Protection Policy”).
Increasing the protection status is an effective measure against so-called single purpose 
accounts (SPAs)43. Sock puppetry (or socking) is the use of multiple user accounts for 
improper purposes, which include “attempts to deceive or mislead other editors, disrupt 
discussions, distort consensus, avoid sanctions, evade blocks or otherwise violate commu-
nity standards and policies” (“Sock-puppetry”). A SPA “is a user account or IP editor whose 
editing is limited to one very narrow area or set of articles, or whose edits to many articles 
appear to be for a common purpose” (“single-purpose account”). Within the top 20 editors 
of the wiki in terms of their number of edits, there are two sock-puppets. Even though 
their accounts are now banned, they provoked heavy discussion in the talk pages. Both 
43 Within the top 20 of editors in terms of number of edits, there are two sock-puppets. Their accounts are now 
blocked and banned.
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SPAs and sock puppets are regarded as highly disruptive and increasing the protection 
status of an article effectively counters this. In a nutshell, this means that editing the wiki 
directly only became possible for editors who were higher up in Wikipedia’s hierarchical 
ladder. New users and editors without a proven track record could not make edit requests 
anymore. Even though increasing the protection status of an article is highly effective at 
repelling malicious editing, it is also fiercely argued against on democratic grounds.
Another tension regarding the protection status is between speed of updates and ac-
curacy of information. An exchange between editors 9kat, an inexperienced editor, and 
RGloucester, an authoritative editor, is illustrative in this matter:
Full protection is a very bad idea, and is doing more harm than good here. The 
article will quickly become outdated and inaccurate. With this many edits and this 
big an event, some editwarring is inevitable; deal with those users individually if 
they can’t use the talk page. The article was developing nicely overall before it was 
protected. It will be impossible to get changes needed through talk page requests, 
so potentially useful edits will simply be lost. 9kat (talk) 00:26, 20 July 2014 (UTC)
There is no deadline on Wikipedia. We need to avoid  WP:RECENTISM, and hold-
ing off until the picture becomes clearer is an excellent idea. Allowing the article 
to become slightly outdated is better than it constantly changing based on every 
piece of tabloid drivel. RGloucester — ☎ 01:20, 20 July 2014 (UTC) (“fully protected,” 
archive 3)
Throughout the talk pages the theme of speed versus accuracy comes back. Because Wiki-
pedia is a key player within the new media ecology, many editors felt the need to keep the 
site as updated as possible, yet especially in the first month after the crash misinformation, 
speculation, and fake news circulated. 
If affordances describe the range of possible actions regarding a technological object or 
environment, than increasing the protection status of a wiki limits this range of action. Pro-
tection status effectively counters the disruptive or political usage of Wikipedia through, 
for example sock-puppets and SPAs. In the process, however, the platform becomes more 
closed off, less accessible, for beginning editors or those whose perspectives do not follow 
mainstream, Western media discourses. What is more, ‘protection’ can be perceived as an 
affordance of Wikipedia in itself. The catch is that this affordance is connected to hierarchy. 
What editors can do on and with Wikipedia is dependent on their permission levels. 
Most Wikipedians attempt to be civil, neutral, and objective observers of the world 
around them. Yet, these codes of conduct were practiced in many different ways. Swearing 
and profane language did not occur in the talk pages—due to the extreme vigilance of 
fellow Wikipedians—yet views on terms such as objectivity and neutrality, reliability and 
verifiability, and authority and access vary. The messiness of collaborative construction is 
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structured through interpretation and indeed enforcement of policies, guidelines, rules 
and principles by established editors with a proven track record and a good standing in 
the community. Indeed, in principle anyone can edit Wikipedia, but in practice the edit 
process is oligarchic and often restricted. This frustrates editors up until the point that they 
accuse established editors of the same misconduct they are accused of, as a comment by 
Herzen, a starting editor, on 2 December 2014 demonstrates: “You stop your edit warring, 
tag teaming, continual misrepresentation, lawyering, civil POV-pushing, BATTLEGRUND, 
and OWN. You don’t actually [think] people to put up with all that, do you? Your editing is 
extremely disruptive” (“new edit war,” archive 22).
Conclusion: memory work and the ideology of openness
In the previous two chapters, respectively YouTube and Facebook have been conceptual-
ized as platforms of memory. In both cases, the platforms enable, shape, and constrain 
memory work. They are part of memory work because the both re-present the past, as 
well as carry it into the future. Even though these platforms present themselves as neutral 
intermediaries in this process, they are active actors within it through their associated user 
practices, community dynamics, and technological features. Wikipedia is no exception to 
this. As a community of practice and as a technological site or object, it is actively engaged 
in the re-presentation of the past and its transference into the future. Editors filter the past 
and create their own version of it by choosing topics for inclusion (what does and does 
not belong in Wikipedia), by selecting sources that provide information on these topics, 
and represent these topics in a way corresponding to Wikipedia’s perceived ideology. Each 
of these practices is shaped by contested norms and values of the community, while the 
practices themselves shape these norms and values.
This chapter has shown that an ‘open’ past has its limits. Despite Wikipedia’s claims and 
efforts to provide a platform to which anyone can contribute, it is a hierarchically stratified 
place of knowledge production. The result of this is that past contentious events such as 
the MH17 disaster are interpreted and re-presented by a relatively small group of Wikipedi-
ans high up in the hierarchical ladder. These editors might be conceived of as new ‘elites’ 
in memory work; they construct the past in the present and help transfer that construction 
into the future. 
Reaching consensus in Wikipedia might take into account “all editors’ legitimate con-
cerns” but the actual decision-making process is oligarchical. In other words, memory 
work on Wikipedia is not so much done by crowds, but rather by in-crowds. Wikipedia is 
managed by established editors who have access to technologies to prevent others from 
editing and who have the social capital and the knowledge of guidelines, rules, principles, 
and ‘Essays’ to steer discussions and settle disputes. The knowledge of rules is therefore 
more important than knowledge about the topic at hand. This, in turn, stabilizes articles 
and interpretations of past events. The ideology of openness is thus ambiguous. On the 
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one hand it invites participation, but on the other hand this participation is limited and 
steered into particular directions.  
This does not mean that Wikipedians do not challenge the platform’s guidelines, rules 
and hierarchies. Wikipedia is a specific community of practice in which an ideology of 
openness is continually challenged and negotiated, but also where interpretations of it 
are enforced, mainly by authoritative editors. Through analysis of the article’s talk pages, 
the chapter engaged with the question how editors legitimize their selection of topics for 
inclusion, negotiate neutrality, choose and discuss reliable sources, and critique, revert 
and prevent each other’s edits. This process seems chaotic and indeed often is, yet, during 
this process, normative stances about what a good wiki is and what Wikipedia ought to be 
are formed. These stances are constructed in the talk pages and revolve around overlap-
ping discourses on objectivity and neutrality, reliability and verifiability, and technological 
access and authority.
Many of these normative stances are carefully defended by editor Geogene, an influential 
editor of the MH17, in a comment meant for new editors on October 13, 2014: 
•	 Yes, the article is biased towards a "Western" POV; this reflects what seems to be the 
bulk of sources.
•	 Russian sources have a very different perspective from most of the rest of the world.
•	 The article is supposed to be biased towards the bulk of reliable sources.
•	 What “neutral” means in Wikipedia is different from what most new users assume it 
means. (see WP:NPOV)
•	 The NPOV tag is strongly opposed by consensus.
•	 The article is no place for conspiracy theories. (see WP:WEIGHT and WP:FRINGE)
•	 “Systemic bias” is not an excuse to override any core content policy.
•	 Edit warring takes place on most weekends.
  (“a summary for new editors here,” archive 19)
Hence, Geogene provides an interpretation of the rules as guidelines to abide by. A wiki is 
regarded as objective and neutral when it simply states a claim made by a source, rather 
than questioning the actual truthfulness of the claim. This has striking similarities with 
the practice of ‘objective’ journalism (Tuchman, 1978). By ‘just’ stating what their sources 
state, Wikipedians claim to be objective and neutral. This strategy is used by both editors 
who want to include non-Western sources and those who do not. This makes source selec-
tion a political practice, something that is also noted by critical editors. 
Proportionate attention and balance in viewpoints expressed in sources are important, 
according to many editors, yet most of the sources that are deemed reliable come from 
mainly ‘Western’ and established news sources or government documents. By ‘fringing’ 
alternative perspectives editors ward off conspiracy theories, but the downside of this 
practice is that less mainstream ideas and perspectives might be quickly disregarded 
Chapter 7  |  the lImIts oF An ‘open’ pAst
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as a fringe theory. Even though many editors discursively position Wikipedia outside 
mainstream media and government perspectives, the influence of both on the content 
of the article is high, which is evidenced by the inclusion of a majority of references to 
these sources on the grounds that they are reliable, which also gives them more rhetorical 
weight. Besides striving to select objective and neutral sources, Wikipedians aim for an ob-
jective and neutral tone in wikis as well. The language used to describe details of the crash 
and its aftermath is a precarious and much-debated issue. Distance in writing is achieved 
through interpretations of the NPOV principle by authoritative editors, who also settle and 
lock these debates. The most controversial ‘lock-down practice’ is increasing the protec-
tion status of the wiki. This technologically enabled measure is reserved for authoritative 
editors who reassert their standing and power within the community by means of it.
Despite the platform’s description of itself as ‘just’ an encyclopedia, it is actually much 
more. Notwithstanding the platform’s guidelines on the matter, it is a forum in which wikis 
are discussed and, through that, what Wikipedia is and what it is not. And what is even 
more important in light of this dissertation’s main topic, Wikipedia is a platform where the 
past is constantly worked and transferred into the future. This follows the strict guidelines 
created and (re)enforced by authoritative editors. This is why an anonymous editor writes 
on July 6, 2015: 
So much biased crap that this is why Wikipedia will probably never really work as a 
reliable source of information for people. Teachers at my former school have said 
that Wikipedia has gotten better over the years, I’m really questioning that state-
ment when I see articles like these. When it comes to historical reliability, Wikipedia 
is not to be trusted.  (“Pro-Ukrainian Bias,” Archive 23)
This remark precisely points at the inherent ‘problem’ concerning Wikipedia. Time and 
again, Wikipedians accuse each other of bringing into discussions their own personal 
interpretations, which are based on their social, cultural and political context. When so 
many turn to Wikipedia as a place that contains a large and growing part of our public 
pasts—a platform of memory—we need to remember that the memory work involved in 
the construction of that past is as much political as any other form of memory work, despite 
the platform’s promise of openness. If memory work is a particular discursive activity, we 
can see this construction in the talk pages of MH17. This has striking similarities with the 
memory work in other domains, ranging from traditional media to historiography. Memory 
work is always caught in the dynamics of power and steered by those with access to social, 
cultural, and technological resources. As Bowker (2008, pp. 229-230) asserts “[m]emory 
practices matter because they are what carries the past along with us into the future; they 
are what makes our current reality true and our future—in will if not in deed—controllable 
[…] Only an open past can unlock the present and free the future.” Despite its promise of 
openness, Wikipedia is not free of politics that are entangled in memory work.
Conclusion









Social media platforms are complex agents of memory work. In the summer of 2017, 
evidence was again provided for this claim. The New York Times reported that YouTube 
accidently removed thousands of videos that were aimed at documenting atrocities in the 
Syrian conflict (Browne, 2017). This was the result of the platform’s effort to automatically 
delete material that did not comply with its guidelines, using machine learning technology 
to facilitate this. Not only were videos deleted, also complete channels ran by citizen jour-
nalists, human rights watchers, and activists—who rely on YouTube to archive and spread 
their videos—were temporally inaccessible. “What’s disappearing in front of our eyes is the 
history of this terrible war,” responded Chris Woods, director of Airwars, an organization 
that tracks airstrikes against civilians. Moreover, legal organizations using information 
originating from social media, such as the United Nations’ I.I.I.M. (the International, Im-
partial and Independent Mechanism), were hindered in their work (Browne, 2017). Even 
though some videos were reinstated when their uploaders notified YouTube, this instance 
demonstrates in the extreme how the politics of a platform interweaves and interferes with 
the politics of memory. 
Platforms can become “memory holes” when automated procedures assess and remove 
content, or when their technology changes or is replaced. The example above is reminiscent 
of an imagined technology in the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell. In the book, 
protagonist Winston Smith works at the Ministry of Truth where he writes propaganda texts 
and burns and disposes—using a “memory hole”—every written trace of the past that does 
not correspond with the current state of affairs. Although Orwell’s vision of the future is 
dystopian, the author understood the power of memory work. At two points in the novel 
he writes: “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the 
past.” For all his prophetic talent, Orwell did not foresee social media platforms, though 
they might have fitted well within his novel. Most platforms automatically save ‘everything’ 
or serve as popular archives, but are, concurrently, selective and forgetful. 
The case studies in this dissertation detail how platforms have become important ac-
tors in memory work by keeping, transferring, shaping, interpreting, and re-presenting our 
individual and collective pasts. This may sound overly alarmist and somewhat techno-
logically deterministic. Humans have, of course, not completely surrendered control over 
their pasts. As the case studies elucidate, memory work is more complex than that. People 
strategically and creatively use and appropriate platforms for memory work, even as this 
usage is simultaneously steered and shaped by the platform. Agency in memory work has 
been re distributed among old and new, human and nonhuman actors. The ‘accidental’ de-
letion of thousands of potentially compromising videos is but one example of the agency 
of a platform in memory work.
This study addressed the need for empirically focused, theory-driven work that avoids a 
priori pessimism and remains critical of social and technological determinism. My aim in 
this dissertation was to provide a detailed assessment of the complex, often less obvious 
interactions between human and ‘nonhuman’ actors in memory work. Of course, social 
168
CoNClusioN 
media platforms allow for the sharing, saving, and archiving of material in the first place. 
That is, in principle ‘anyone’ with access to the right media technologies can add their 
versions of the past to platforms. Yet, this material does not remain unscathed and, once it 
is uploaded to platforms, it can be remixed, altered, edited, and re-presented by other us-
ers and by the platforms themselves. To better understand the dynamics of contemporary 
memory work, this study provided much needed insights into these interactions.
For analytical purposes, this dissertation has developed and employed the term 
memory work. Even though the term has been applied throughout memory studies both 
as a method (cf. Haug, 1984; Kuhn, 2010) and as a theoretical construct (Van Dijck, 2007; 
Pentzold & Lohmeier, 2014), it has not been thoroughly developed. Moreover, these studies 
mostly focus on the intentional and human-centered aspects of engagements with the 
past for present and future purposes. This dissertation has strived to address these gaps 
in existing research. Memory work has been conceptualized here as the construction of 
the past in the present and the transfer of the present into the future. This occurs through 
concurrent interactions between human practices, technologies, and cultural forms. Such 
a conceptualization is inclusive: anyone and anything can become an actor in memory 
work, but not anyone or anything does. This is the result of constant power struggles 
between these actors. 
In what follows, I will first briefly revisit how these power struggles played out in the 
case studies. Second, I will discuss how this study has provided a methodological roadmap 
for future research and challenged dominant theoretical conceptualizations in memory 
studies. I then move on to discuss how the findings of this study can be placed within 
the broader discussion on the mediatization of memory and memory construction in a 
new media ecology. I conclude by discussing what the implications of this study are for 
important “memory workers” and for society at large.
Memory work on and by YouTube, Facebook and Wikipedia
In the introduction, I asked how is memory work performed in the new media ecology? To 
operationalize this question, three sub-questions were asked. On the level of practice, I 
asked how are power and agency negotiated and redistributed in memory work on plat-
forms? On the level of technology, how do the technological affordances, mechanics and 
operational procedures of platforms enable, shape and constrain memory work on them? 
And, on the level of cultural form, why are certain versions of the past re-presented and 
transferred into the future on and by platforms? In this section, I answer these questions in 
light of the case studies and then move on to answering the main research question.
In chapters five, six and seven I analyzed memory work on and by three platforms, re-
spectively YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia. In the case of YouTube, I showed how certain 
witness videos are popularized and others are forgotten, which is mainly the consequence 








in Ghouta on August 21, 2013, one of the cases researched here, is mostly comprised of 
material shot by witnesses, yet this material was picked up by others who framed the event 
in specific ways. Most prominently, I provided insight into how witness accounts were 
remixed into videos that questioned whether or not a chemical weapons attack took place 
in the first place. Additionally, the study found that legacy and web-native media have a 
powerful role in determining what is most visible in YouTube’s archive: They know best how 
to curate their ‘remixes’ of witness footage and are well-embedded in the rest of the Web. 
What this ultimately shows is how mediated memory, in this case of the Ghouta attack 
re-presented in YouTube’s archive, is structured by curating practices and the platform’s 
(Google’s) search logics.
The second case study analyzed the Facebook page Justice for Mike Brown in order 
to rethink the role of memory work within contemporary digital activism. I showed how 
memory work on Facebook pages can be conceptualized as a particular type of discursive 
practice, offering us insights into how this work bridged personal and collective action 
frames. This bridging occurs in four overlapping ways. First, the page allows for affective 
commemorative engagement that helped shape Brown’s public image. Second, Brown’s 
death is contextualized as part of systematic injustice against African-Americans. Third, the 
past is used to legitimize present action, wherein the present was continually connected to 
the past and future. And fourth, particular discursive units became recognizable symbolic 
markers during the protests and for future recall. 
Consequently, I demonstrated how memory work, although multidirectional and in flux, 
is stabilized by the interactions between the page administrator, its users and Facebook’s 
operational logic. The memory work on Justice for Mike Brown thus allowed protesters and 
activists to connect to each other in time, across different geographical locations, but also 
through time, connecting the present situation to previous protests and activism. At the 
same time, Facebook’s visibility and personalization mechanisms—supported by ‘likes’, 
‘shares’, and comments—are interwoven with memory work to the point that especially 
simple discursive units are popularized and carried into the future. We need to question 
to the extent to which this may ultimately lead to further polarization of an already heated 
debate on racism and police violence in the US. 
In the third case, which focuses on Wikipedia, I critically investigated how strict adher-
ence to community rules and hierarchies led to a specific, ‘Wikipedian’, reconstruction of 
a past event. In principle, we could argue that the platform’s politics of openness allow 
everyone to add perspectives and information on what happened during an event, in the 
case of this research the flight MH17. However, through in-depth analysis I paint a more 
complex picture and show how authoritative editors high up in Wikipedia’s hierarchical 
ladder legitimize their editing interventions and use technologies to restrict others from 
editing. This results in wikis on important historical events being mostly written by a hand-
ful of authoritative editors. These editors favor media sources that reflect Western perspec-
tives. Ultimately, this exemplifies what I have theorized as the limits of an ‘open’ past.  
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This conclusion also applies to the other case studies: when people engage in memory 
work on platforms, hierarchies will emerge and the authority that comes with these will 
help shape what and whose versions of the past come to dominate the present and which 
ones are transferred into the future. However, here we need to be cautious: My research 
details the differences between platforms and we need to keep in mind that one platform 
is not the other. Each invites different practices and each helps produce specific cultural 
forms. Vice versa, these practices, cultural forms, and communities shape the platforms 
themselves. Without user input, they would not exist or be able to operate.
Methodological roadmaps and theoretical challenges
This thesis has not only provided and applied a theoretical model of memory work 
(discussed further below), but it has also offered a methodological roadmap on how to 
study digital memory work. This is necessary given the novelty and complexity of digital 
memory work. In the thesis I have outlined this in detail, but here I would like to illustrate 
the core components by briefly sketching the roadmap by means of one example. At the 
core of the roadmap is the acknowledgement that we need to investigate memory work 
at different levels. Researching memory work on the levels of practices, technologies, and 
cultural forms allows us to scrutinize the layered and complex nature of memory work, by 
operationalizing the here-developed theoretical approach into empirical research.
Let us take Instagram as a platform and ‘9/11’, when the US was struck by a series of 
terrorist attacks, as an event. On the level of practice, research can ask what people do 
with and on Instagram to commemorate the attacks. A quick search on the platform shows 
that users have shared a wide range of photos, using the hashtag #sept11. The more than 
60,000 posts using this hashtag create a commemorative space revolving around the 
event. Research into this archived hashtag can shed light on patterns of memory practice. 
Do users engage with the platform to share private memories on the event, or is it used as a 
space to engage in more politically oriented memory work? On the level of technologies, we 
could ask how Instagram re-presents those pictures to its users. In terms of technological 
affordances, what practices does the platform invite and support? For example, what role 
do the platform’s ‘geotagging’ options play in memory work? How is content structured 
through the interactions between users and the operating logic of the platform?  On the 
level of cultural form, what types of photos are dominantly shared? Do we mainly see self-
ies taken at the newly built Freedom Tower, or do we see videos of the attacks or old news 
photos? How do users engage with Instagram’s photographic ‘filter’ (or ‘layers’) options in 
order to add meaning to their photos? By adopting such a multi-level analysis, research 
is able to provide insights into how people, technologies, and cultural forms and content 
concurrently constitute and perform memory work. 
Theoretically, the findings of this dissertation challenge dominant concepts in memory 








historical, and public memory converge and collapse on social media platforms. That is, 
the research conducted here shows how the diverse relational and temporal heuristic lev-
els of memory work identified in earlier research (see chapters 1-3 for a discussion) fail to 
do justice to the hybrid memory work found within a new media ecology. It is through the 
multi-level analysis of multiple case studies, including different platforms, that allows us 
insight into this. This shows, for example, how a creative appropriation of a historical figure 
shared on Facebook (here: Mike Brown) is a personal interpretation, while at the same, it 
is also infused with cultural meaning and used to communicate a particular stance in a 
(semi) public space. The sharing, on the same platform, of personal grief and memories 
may attract diverse public interactions and come to ‘stand in’ for the grief and memory of 
a collective. 
In other words, the research has allowed me to show and theorize how digital memory 
work is diverse and layered. It may take the form of deliberate and rational engagement 
with the past, but it can also be spontaneous, affective, and unanticipated. On social me-
dia platforms, this ‘messiness’ and unpredictability is apparent. Historical facts blend with 
emotional opinions; an expert’s rigorous reconstruction of an event may be undermined 
by an internet troll’s antagonistic rants; activists concerned with documenting atrocities for 
future recall may be challenged by cynical nationalists. These confrontations initially lead 
to chaotic and heated debates. However, people’s practices, community dynamics, and 
the operational procedures and cultural forms associated with platforms, concomitantly 
stabilize this layered and blurred mnemonic discourse. The empirically-driven research of 
this thesis supports these insights. In the next section, I discuss how the findings of this 
thesis add to research into the dynamics of memory construction in a “mediatized world” 
(Hepp, 2013).
Memory work in a mediatized world
Stepping back from the case studies, I will consider here how the findings of this disserta-
tion contribute to our wider understanding of memory construction in a new media ecol-
ogy. As I have argued in the theoretical chapters, the distributed nature of memory work is 
not intrinsic to the digital age. From ‘oral’ to ‘mediatized’ cultures and societies, memory 
work has always involved processes of mediation, interaction, and association between 
people and their social and material environments (Van Dijck, 2007; Pentzold & Lohmeier, 
2014). As such, the past is never neutrally recorded, re-presented or transmitted into the 
present and future (Huyssen, 1995), but is affected by the assemblage (Latour, 2007) of 
both previous and emergent actors involved in memory work. Following the arguments 
most prominently outlined in chapters one and two, we thus need to study engagements 
with the past in relation to sociotechnical and communicative environments. In contrast 
to the largest part of human history, this environment is currently pervaded by media, and 
especially social media platforms, which have crept deeply into the textures of our every-
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day lives (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 55). As Hepp (2013) has argued, we live in mediatized worlds, a 
condition that leaves its mark on memory and memory work (Hoskins, 2009; 2014).
But how can we understand memory work in the face of mediatization of culture and 
society? Most prominently, my research, following Le Goff’s (1992) discernment of differ-
ent phases in the history of memory, shows how mediatization can be seen as giving rise 
to a sixth phase in the history of memory. This phase follows an age in which memory 
was dominated by centralized broadcast media and the institutionalized memory of the 
nation-state. Notwithstanding the fact that broadcast media are still very much alive and 
interwoven with digital media, I make the case based on my research that digital media 
enable and shape new practices, forms, and technologies of memory and simultaneously 
remediate ‘old’ ones. 
This study offers us clear insights into these practices, forms, and technologies. As I show 
in Chapter 7, for example, curating is an age-old memory practice that was historically 
done by the powerful élite, but it is now also part of everyday media practice. Furthermore, 
the recording and documenting of atrocities has traditionally been the work of journalists 
and activists, but can now also be done by neighborhood residents, as I show in chapter 
five. The creation and circulation of recognizable and iconic imagery is today largely de-
pendent on clicks and likes, next to 24-hour cable broadcasting (see also Chapter 6). The 
reconstruction of historical events lies not only in the hands of historians, but also in the 
hands of people coming together on platforms (see chapter 7) and the mechanics of those 
platforms themselves (chapter 5-7).
 The mediatization of culture and society, then, has inspired the emergence of a wider 
range of memory agents who employ the media at their fingertips. As becomes clear in this 
research, these media structure or ‘mold’, to use Hepp’s (2013) term, the memory work of 
our time in idiosyncratic ways. In the case of YouTube, this is primarily involves the logics 
of search and curation (chapter 5). Facebook structures memory work according to its 
mechanics of visibility and interaction (chapter 6). And Wikipedia shapes memory work 
according to its strict guidelines and hierarchies, which are supported by editing-restrictive 
technologies (chapter 7).
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that like the earlier stages in memory’s history, the 
current stage builds upon previous ones. People still turn on their radios and television sets 
for national commemorative events. During family gatherings, they still listen to grandfa-
ther telling stories from times past. People still write in paper diaries to keep a personal 
record of their lives and still visit national museums. Yet, in highly mediatized societies and 
cultures, the past is also literally at our fingertips. The structural components of the digital 
media ecology—digital and mobile media, ‘living’, accessible archives, peer production, 
Web 2.0—have opened up new possibilities and challenges pertaining to memory work. 
A family member can check grandfather’s claims on her smartphone or comment on a 
national commemoration while it takes place. Iconic images and videos can be created 








quickly as it is made, or it can disappear altogether in “memory holes.” Memory today is 
constructed inclusively, globally, and transnationally, yet alternative interpretations of the 
past that follow racist or extreme right-winged agendas can also undermine it.
The idea that the digital era is a next phase in the history of memory has, to some extent, 
been noted within recent research on the topic. Let me briefly revisit some dominant 
perspectives on this. A new “social network memory” is, asserts Hoskins (2009): “fluid, de-
territorialised, diffused and highly revocable, but also immediate, accessible and contin-
gent on the more dynamic schemata forged through emergent sociotechnical practices” 
(p. 41). This seems to go hand in hand with a rather hopeful view of the democratizing 
potential of digital technology in memory work. Haskins (2007, p. 405), for example, as-
serts that, in the digital era, “[t]he boundaries between the official and the vernacular, 
the public and the private, the permanent and the evanescent will cease to matter, for 
all stories and images will be equally fit to represent and comment on the past.” Pentzold 
(2009, p. 262) also ascribe to this line of thinking by arguing that “[t]he web presents not 
only an archive of lexicalized material but also a plethora of potential dialogue partners” 
and that the texts produced in these dialogues are not only part of “storage memory,” but 
also of “functional memory” because “they are remembered and linked to other texts in 
forms of ‘living’ intertextuality.” Finally, states Ibrahim (2007, p. 3), “[m]obile technologies 
and new media platforms offer spaces of storage in which a proliferation of narratives and 
images provide avenues for reading history differently, away from institutionalized spaces 
of museums and official archives.”
In summary, these authors argue: today, memory is increasingly networked, connected, 
and shared; actively and reactively, hastily and spontaneously constructed; collapsed in 
terms of time and space; dynamic, multiple, creative, contested, embodied, performed, 
and mediated. However, we can ask whether this has not always been true about memory. 
The perspective that I have proposed here is that memory is always under construction, 
always worked. The relevant questions then are how it is worked, who is involved, and how 
has this changed? These questions are at the heart of this thesis. Memory construction 
has always taken place within networks of people, things, places, and ideas that mutually 
shape our understanding and knowledge of the past. 
Rather, as I argue, memory work involves a process of mediation from the start. More-
over, memory work has always been about connection: it allows people to connect to each 
other in and through time. At the same time memory work also can divide people, through 
the creation of pasts that do not correspond to individuals’ experiences and feelings. 
Ultimately, memory work has always been about collapsing time and space—imagining 
the past in the present makes us travelers in time and space. Certainly the range, speed, 
and extent to which this occurs may have altered, yet, one could argue, the underlying 
principles of memory work have remained the same. This does not mean that nothing 
is new. Rather, memory work has been re-distributed among old and new actors who 
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interact with each other in new ways, an essential insight that I will pick up now in the final 
section of this conclusion.  
Social media and digital memory work
How can or should we understand digital memory work then? As I have argued, different 
actors stabilize and structure memory on social media platforms in different ways. To a 
certain extent, memory is re-territorialized, re-organized, and stabilized on and by plat-
forms. In theory, digital media technologies make the past accessible and re-workable for 
everyone.  In practice, we see that certain versions become dominant, more visible, and 
more easily taken over on the basis of platform-specific rules, operational procedures, and 
community dynamics. The past might be initially fluid on social media platforms, yet it 
becomes more solid as time progresses. Social media platforms ‘filter’ the past, enable 
actors to shape it, contain it, and are part of it. They enable and shape memory work ac-
cording to their own technological procedures, associated affordances and practices, and 
the newly-formed hierarchy and authority within their user communities. It may be true 
that more material is recorded, uploaded, remixed, and archived by a more diverse group 
of people, but, if anything, this thesis has shown the important central roles platforms 
play in the selection and re-presentation of this material. They are not just social media 
platforms. They are platforms of memory, not only as archives and databases that store 
and externalize our pasts, but also as active “memory agents” (Zelizer, 2008) that shape 
our memory work and re-present the past for us in specific ways, next to and interaction 
with human agents. 
Given the important role that memory work plays in societies, these findings hold impli-
cations for different societal groups and for the public at large, who all, to varying degrees, 
have an impact on and are affected by memory work. Activists, citizen witnesses, and hu-
man rights advocates are all influenced by the fact that the material they upload and use 
might be saved, but is not necessarily safe on platforms. Though the dependence on these 
platforms may suggest otherwise, non-public platforms like YouTube and Facebook are 
not reliable or accountable for safekeeping this material. They can even become “memory 
holes,” as I have shown here. Seemingly less dramatic, but equally if not more impact-
ful, information that circulates on platforms is almost never ‘raw’. It is changed, remixed, 
revised, altered and amended. 
This understanding of the nature of digital memory work is equally relevant for two 
other important groups of (potential) “memory workers” who use or will use platforms 
as platforms of memory: historians and journalists. When investigating past events by 
using platforms, historians and journalists, like all memory workers, need to understand 
the operating procedures of these platforms. Such literacy is needed if we wish to use 
platforms and the content they carry as valuable sources for historical inquiry. Trusting 








In this dissertation, I have theorized how memory work is done and have given insight into 
the role played by platforms in what and how societies remember and how the present is 
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Appendix 1 – coding categories for talk page threads
Topic Code Rule 
Images, figures, photos IM Thread about the placement and content of  images
Media coverage MC Thread about the media coverage of  the disaster
Casualties CA Thread about the human casualties in the crash (crew and 
passengers)
International reactions IR Thread about the international reactions (gov’ts, Boeing, 
indiv politicians)
Cause and responsibility CR Thread about the cause of  and responsibility for the crash
Links, see also section, similar 
incidents
SA Thread about links that direct to other pages
Timeline & map TM Thread about times, location, coordinates relating to the 
downing
Protection status PS Thread about the protection status of  the Wiki or the talk 
page
NPOV NP Thread about neutrality point of  view relating to the Wiki
Verifiability VE Thread about the reliability of  sources and the verifiability 
of  claims
Manual of  Style and guidelines MS Thread about the Wikipedia’s Manual of  Style and the 
guidelines concerning edit procedures
War circumstances and tensions WT Thread about the war and tensions in the region of  the 
crash site
Airplane and cargo AP Thread about technical details of  the plane and its non-
human cargo
Investigation IV Thread about the ongoing investigation into the downing.
Original research OR Thread about Wikipedia’s “no original research” policy




Appendix 2 – Time path of significant events in the aftermath of the downing of 
MH17
Date Organization Publication
September 9, 2014 DSB Preliminary report
October, 2014 German Federal Intelligence 
Service
Report claiming that plane 
was shot down by pro-Russian 
separatists using a BUK system
November 16, 2014 DSB Recovery of  wreckage begins
November 2014 Bellingcat Report claiming that separatists 
possessed BUK system on July 
17
December 9, 2014 DSB First wreckage convoys arrive at 
Gilze-Wijen air force base
March and April, 2015 VKontakte and various Russian 
websites
News story that a R-60 air-to-air 
missile was used to shoot down 
MH17.
May and June 2015 Novaya Gazeta Report by Russian military 
engineers concluding that BUK 
system was used to down MH17 
by Ukrainians. Navoya Gazeta 
critical. 
May and June 2015 Bellingcat and Bild Reports that claim Russian 
satellite imagery of  the crash site 
was tampered with
July 29, 2015 Various countries UN proposal to adopt resolution 
on tribunal (vetoed by Russia)
October 13, 2015 DSB Final report
February 25, 2016 DSB/Dutch Parliament Dutch Parliament asks questions 
to DSB
May, 2016 Families of  casualties Suing of  Russia and President 
Putin European Court for 
Human Rights
May and June 2016 Bellingcat Detailed report on launcher on 





This dissertation develops and explores the concept of digital memory work. Memory work 
is as old as humankind, and it has always involved specific technologies and techniques—
whether they are cave paintings, rituals, writing, or television. Memory work can be more 
personal, like diary writing, or more collective, as in the case of national anniversaries and 
commemorations. It encompasses the transfer and reconstruction of knowledge and expe-
rience of the past into the present and future. This occurs through and by specific practices, 
technologies, and cultural forms and, often, for specific goals. This makes memory work 
inherently political. Which and whose version of the past is carried into the future is the 
result of a continuous power struggle. 
Hence, I argue, the past is continually being constructed in the present by various social 
actors that have their own goals and agendas. Nowadays, this process increasingly involves 
social media platforms. These platforms affect memory work—like the media technolo-
gies before them—in idiosyncratic ways. The primary effort of this dissertation is to trace 
how different social actors use platforms for digital memory work and, concurrently, how 
platforms enable, shape, and constrain it.
One way to rethink memory work in the ‘digital age’ is to talk about “connective memory” 
in a “new media ecology.” This latter term is used to describe our contemporary socio-
technical and communicative environments (Hoskins, 2011). At the basis of memory work 
in a previous ‘broadcast age’ stands a linear trajectory of mass communication where a 
powerful medium sends a message that arrives, in one piece, at a heterogeneous group of 
receivers. 
Even though aspects of this view are debatable from the start (was there ever such a thing 
as a passive mass audience?), it is contrasted by today’s new, more active media ecology. 
This new media ecology is characterized by bottom-up, user-generated content appearing 
next to content produced by media professionals. It is populated by hyper-connected, 
transnational audiences using mobile media. Within a new media ecology people are 
therefore confronted by a constant stream of updates from all around the world and from 
different kinds of people, wherever they are. Potentially, they are also able to produce their 
own content wherever they are.
Hence, researchers have described digital memory work as being less institutional and 
more bottom-up. It is theorized as fluid, diffuse, easily revocable, and more accessible 
(Hoskins, 2009, p. 41). In this view, anyone with the appropriate (digital) tools at hand can 
construct and spread their versions of the past, which may ultimately lead to new voices 
being heard and the previously invisible being made visible. This dissertation, however, 
aims to nuance this slightly utopian perspective by scrutinizing the newly emerged power 
dynamics within digital memory work.
Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation is to trace the agency of and interactions be-
tween platform users and platforms themselves. YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia—the 
platforms analyzed in the empirical chapters—can, I contend, be regarded as platforms 
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of memory. I view platforms of memory as those social media sites that allow and are 
appropriated for memory work and which at the same time shape it in medium-specific 
ways. They are media, but also living archives and they re-present and re-construct the 
past from these archives. On these platforms, personal, collective, private, public, political, 
and cultural memories connect, converge, and collapse. This is a messy, dynamic, and 
unpredictable process. Yet, there is order in this mnemonic chaos: certain versions of the 
past become more popular and visible than others, and are then carried into the future. 
Following this line of thinking, the main research aim guiding this dissertation is to theo-
rize how memory work is performed in the new media ecology. Yet, in order to investigate 
this new media ecology and its implications for memory work, it is crucial to shed light on 
the issue at stake on three analytical levels: practices, technologies and cultural forms. 
What should be kept in mind, however, is that this is a heuristic construct. Practices, tech-
nologies, and cultural forms affect each other and concomitantly constitute memory work. 
In line with this, this study addresses the following sub-questions: On the level of prac-
tice it asks, how are power and agency negotiated and redistributed in memory work on 
platforms? This question relates to how users use and appropriate a platform for memory 
work. It is also geared toward answering how norms and values emerge within memory 
work and how communities are shaped through practice (and how communities shape 
practice). 
On the level of technology, this study explores the following question: how do the tech-
nological affordances, mechanics, and operational procedures of platforms enable, shape 
and constrain memory work on them? This question pertains not only to how platforms 
structure human memory work, but also how platforms themselves engage in memory 
work. 
The third question relates to the outcomes of these practical and technological interac-
tions: Why are certain versions of the past re-presented and transferred into the future on 
and by platforms? By answering these questions and relating each back to the others, I aim 
to paint a holistic picture of the dynamic interactions between human and ‘nonhuman’ 
actors in digital memory work.
In chapters five, six and seven, I analyze memory work on and by three platforms, re-
spectively YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia. In the case of YouTube, I show how certain 
witness videos are popularized and others are forgotten, which is mainly the consequence 
of curating practices and the logics of search. Indeed, the visual record of what happened 
in Ghouta on August 21, 2013, one of the cases researched here, is mostly comprised of 
material shot by witnesses, yet this material was picked up by others who framed the event 
in specific ways. 
Most prominently, I provide insight into how witness accounts were remixed into videos 
that questioned whether or not a chemical weapons attack took place in the first place. 
Additionally, the study finds that legacy and web-native media have a powerful role in 
determining what is most visible in YouTube’s archive: They know best how to curate their 
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‘remixes’ of witness footage and are well-embedded in the rest of the Web. What this ulti-
mately shows is how mediated memory, in this case of the Ghouta attack re-presented in 
YouTube’s archive, is structured by curating practices and the platform’s (Google’s) search 
logics. 
The second case study analyses the Facebook page Justice for Mike Brown in order to 
rethink the role of memory work within contemporary digital activism. I show how memory 
work on Facebook pages can be conceptualized as a particular type of discursive practice, 
offering us insights into how this work bridged personal and collective action frames. This 
bridging occurs in four overlapping ways. First, the page allows for affective commemora-
tive engagement that helped shape Brown’s public image. Second, Brown’s death is con-
textualized as part of systematic injustice against African-Americans. Third, the past is used 
to legitimize present action, wherein the present was continually connected to the past 
and future. And fourth, particular discursive units became recognizable symbolic markers 
during the protests and for future recall.
Consequently, I demonstrate how memory work, although multidirectional and in flux, 
is stabilized by the interactions between the page administrator, its users and Facebook’s 
operational logic. The memory work on Justice for Mike Brown thus allowed protesters and 
activists to connect to each other in time, across different geographical locations, but also 
through time, connecting the present situation to previous protests and activism. At the 
same time, Facebook’s visibility and personalization mechanisms—supported by ‘likes’, 
‘shares’, and comments—are interwoven with memory work to the point that especially 
simple discursive units are popularized and carried into the future. We need to question 
to the extent to which this may ultimately lead to further polarization of an already heated 
debate on racism and police violence in the US. 
In the third case, which focuses on Wikipedia, I critically investigate how strict adherence 
to community rules and hierarchies led to a specific, ‘Wikipedian’, reconstruction of a past 
event. In principle, we could argue that the platform’s politics of openness allow everyone 
to add perspectives and information on what happened during an event, in the case of 
this research the flight MH17. However, through in-depth analysis I paint a more complex 
picture and show how authoritative editors high up in Wikipedia’s hierarchical ladder 
legitimize their editing interventions and use technologies to restrict others from editing. 
This results in wikis on important historical events being mostly written by a handful of 
authoritative editors. These editors favor media sources that reflect Western perspectives. 
Ultimately, this exemplifies what I have theorized as the limits of an ‘open’ past.
This conclusion also applies to the other case studies: when people engage in memory 
work on platforms, hierarchies will emerge and the authority that comes with these will 
help shape what and whose versions of the past come to dominate the present and which 
ones are transferred into the future. However, here we need to be cautious. My research 
details the differences between platforms and we need to keep in mind that one platform 
is not the other. Each invites different practices and each helps produce specific cultural 
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forms. Vice versa, these practices, cultural forms, and communities shape the platforms 
themselves. Without user input, they would not exist or be able to operate. In this disserta-
tion, I theorized how memory work is done today and give insight into the role played by 





Dit proefschrift ontwikkelt en verkent het begrip digitaal herinneringswerk. Herinnerings-
werk is zo oud als de mensheid en verscheidene technologieën en technieken maken 
reeds deel uit van dit fenomeen, van grottekeningen en rituelen tot het schrift en televisie. 
Herinneringswerk kan persoonlijke vormen aannemen zoals het schrijven van een dagboek 
of collectief zijn zoals nationale herdenkingsdagen. Het omvat de overlevering en recon-
structie van kennis en ervaringen van verleden naar het heden en de toekomst. Dit uit zich 
in specifieke gebruiken, technologieën en culturele vormen, en meestal voor specifieke 
doelen. Dit maakt herinneringswerk intrinsiek politiek. Het is een constante machtsstrijd 
wie of wat bepaalde versies van het verleden naar de toekomst draagt. 
Dit is de reden waarom die proefschrift beargumenteert dat verschillende sociale ac-
toren het verleden constant reconstrueren met hun eigen doelen en agenda’s. Vandaag 
de dag spelen sociale media platformen een groeiende rol in dit proces. Deze platformen 
beïnvloeden herinneringswerk - net als de media technologieën voor hen - op eigen wijze. 
Het primaire doel van dit proefschrift is om te traceren hoe oude en nieuwe sociale actoren 
deze platformen gebruiken voor herinneringswerk en, tegelijkertijd, hoe platformen dit 
gebruik mogelijk maken, vormen en beperken. 
Eén manier om herinneringswerk in het digitale tijdperk opnieuw te conceptualiseren 
is om over “connectieve herinnering” in een “nieuwe media-ecologie” te spreken. Hoskins 
(2011), bijvoorbeeld, gebruikt de laatste term om onze huidige sociaal-technische en 
communicatieve omgeving aan te duiden. Aan de basis van herinneringswerk in een voor-
afgaande tijd van massacommunicatie stond een lineair traject van massacommunicatie, 
waarin een machtig medium een boodschap verstuurt, die arriveert bij een heterogene 
groep ontvangers. 
Zelfs al is deze opvatting discutabel (is er ooit zoiets geweest als een passieve groep 
ontvangers?), dan complementeert een huidige, actievere media-ecologie dit bestaande 
media landschap. Deze nieuwe media-ecologie wordt gekarakteriseerd door bottom-up 
media-inhoud, gemaakt door gebruikers van sociale media, naast de producties van pro-
fessionele media producenten. Individuen die constant met elkaar in verbinding staan en 
mobiele media gebruiken bewonen deze transnationale ecologie. In deze ecologie worden 
gebruikers constant geconfronteerd met een stroom updates van over de hele wereld en 
van verschillende mensen, waar ze ook zijn. Daarnaast kunnen gebruikers ook hun eigen 
media-inhoud genereren, waar ze ook zijn.
Bovengenoemde elementen zijn de redenen waarom onderzoekers vandaag de dag 
herinneringswerk conceptualiseren als minder institutioneel en meer bottom-up. Onder-
zoekers theoretiseren herinneringswerk als zijnde vloeibaar, diffuus, makkelijk verander-
baar en toegankelijker (Hoskins, 2008, p. 41). Volgens deze opvatting zou iedereen zijn of 
haar versies van het verleden kunnen maken en verspreiden. Dit zou uiteindelijk leiden 
tot meerstemmigheid en zichtbaarheid van alternatieve opvattingen en ervaringen. Dit 
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proefschrift, echter, tracht deze licht utopische zienswijze te nuanceren door de nieuwe 
machtsdynamiek in digitaal herinneringswerk te onderzoeken.
Dit proefschrift traceert de machtsverhoudingen en interacties tussen platformgebrui-
kers en platformen zelf. YouTube, Facebook en Wikipedia – de platformen die dit proef-
schrift analyseert – kunnen, beargumenteer ik, gezien worden als herinneringsplatformen 
(platforms of memory). Ik zie herinneringsplatformen als dié sociale media die herinne-
ringswerk uitnodigen en/of hiervoor worden gebruikt. Tegelijkertijd vormen platformen 
zélf herinneringswerk. Platformen zijn media maar ook ‘levende archieven’ die constant 
veranderen en ze representeren en reconstrueren het verleden uit dit archief. Persoonlijke, 
collectieve, privé, publieke, politieke en culturele herinneringen conflicteren of smelten 
samen op deze platformen. Dit is een onordelijk, dynamisch en onvoorspelbaar proces. 
Desalniettemin, er is orde in deze mnemonische chaos: bepaalde versies van het verleden 
zijn populairder en zichtbaarder dan andere.
De hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift vloeit voort uit deze manier van denken: hoe voeren 
verschillende sociale en technologische actoren samen herinneringswerk uit in de nieuwe 
media-ecologie en welke (veranderende) machtsstructuren liggen hieraan ten grondslag? 
Echter, voordat ik deze vraag kan beantwoorden is het belangrijk om dit probleem te 
benaderen vanuit drie analytische niveaus: gebruiken, technologieën en culturele vormen. 
Wat in het achterhoofd gehouden dient te worden is dat deze constructie heuristisch is. 
Gebruiken, technologieën en culturele vormen beïnvloeden elkaar en vormen samen 
herinneringswerk. 
Daarom onderzoekt dit proefschrift een aantal deelvragen. Op het niveau van gebruiken 
onderzoek ik hoe de macht is verdeeld in herinneringswerk op platformen. Deze vraag 
heeft betrekking op de vraag hoe gebruikers een platform omvormen tot een herinnerings-
platform. Ook is dit deel van het onderzoek gericht op het beantwoorden van de vraag hoe 
normen en waarden opkomen in herinneringswerk en hoe groepen worden gevormd door 
gebruiken (en hoe groepen gebruiken vormen). 
Op het niveau van technologie vraagt deze studie: hoe sturen en beïnvloeden de techno-
logische processen van platformen herinneringswerk? Deze vraag relateert niet alleen aan 
de vraag hoe platformen menselijk herinneringswerk structuren, maar ook hoe platformen 
zelf participeren in herinneringswerk. 
De derde deelvraag is gericht op de uitkomsten van het samenspel tussen menselijk en 
technologisch handelen. Waarom worden specifieke versies van het verleden gerepresen-
teerd in het heden en getransporteerd naar de toekomst op en door platformen? Door 
deze vragen te beantwoorden en de uitkomsten aan elkaar te toetsen beoogt dit proef-
schrift een holistisch beeld te schetsen van de dynamische interacties tussen menselijke 
en niet-menselijke actoren in digitaal herinneringswerk.
In hoofdstukken vijf, zes en zeven analyseer ik herinneringswerk op en door drie platfor-
men, respectievelijk YouTube, Facebook en Wikipedia. In het geval van YouTube, laat ik zien 
hoe bepaalde video’s van getuigen (witness videos) populair worden en andere vergeten. 
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Dit is voornamelijk het resultaat van de wijze waarop video’s zijn gearchiveerd, beschreven 
en gelabeld en de logica van zoekmachines. De case studie richt zich op het visuele archief 
van een chemische wapenaanval op de wijk Ghouta in Damascus, Syrië. 
Wat het onderzoek laat zien is dat hoewel het meeste materiaal is gemaakt door getuigen, 
anderen hiermee aan de haal gaan en de gebeurtenis anders inkaderen. De belangrijkste 
bevinding is dat gebruikers video’s van getuigen hergebruiken in video’s die zich afvragen 
of er in de eerste plaats een chemische wapenaanval heeft plaatsgevonden. Daarnaast 
laat de studie zien dat traditionele media en web media een machtige rol hebben in de 
zichtbaarheid van bepaald materiaal op YouTube. Zij weten het best hoe ze hun remixes 
van origineel materiaal moeten cureren zodat ze bovenin de zoekresultaten verschijnen. 
Wat de case studie uiteindelijk laat zien is dat de gemedieerde herinnering van de aanval 
op Ghouta gestructureerd wordt door cureer-gebruiken en de zoeklogica van YouTube 
(Google).
De tweede case studie is een analyse van de Facebook-pagina Justice for Mike Brown. 
In dit hoofdstuk belicht ik de rol van herinneringswerk in hedendaags digitaal activisme. 
Dit hoofdstuk theoretiseert herinneringswerk op Facebook-pagina’s als een discursieve 
praktijk, die persoonlijke en collectieve actie-raamwerken (action frames) overbrugt. Deze 
overbrugging vindt plaats op vier, overlappende niveaus. Ten eerste nodigt de pagina 
uit tot affectieve herinnering die het publieke beeld van Brown vormt. Ten tweede con-
textualiseren paginagebruikers de dood van Brown als zijnde deel van de systematische 
onrechtvaardigheid ten aanzien van Afrikaans-Amerikanen. Ten derde gebruiken zij het 
verleden om actie in het heden te legitimeren en verbinden zij het heden constant met 
het verleden en toekomst. Ten vierde werden zekere discursieve eenheden herkenbare 
symbolen tijdens de protesten en de toekomst.
Een belangrijk resultaat uit deze studie is dat, alhoewel herinneringswerk multi-
directioneel is en in constante beweging, het ook stabiliseert door de interacties tussen 
de beheerder van de pagina, haar gebruikers en Facebooks operationele technologie. Het 
herinneringswerk op Justice for Mike Brown nodigt daarom activisten en protesteerders 
uit om zich met elkaar te verbinden in de tijd, op verschillend locaties, maar ook door 
de tijd, door het heden met het verleden te verbinden. Tegelijkertijd zorgt Facebooks 
zichtbaarheids- en personaliseringstechnologie ervoor dat bepaalde, en vooral simpele, 
discursieve eenheden populair worden. We moeten ons daarom afvragen in hoeverre dit 
leidt tot verdere polarisering van een al zeer hoog opgevoerd debat over rassenongelijk-
heid en politiegeweld in de VS.
De derde case studie richt zich op Wikipedia. Ik analyseer hierin hoe strikte navolging van 
gemeenschapsregels en hiërarchieën leidt tot een specifieke, ‘Wikipediaanse’ reconstructie 
van een gebeurtenis uit het verleden. In principe kan men beargumenteren dat Wikipedia’s 
ideologie van openheid iedereen toelaat tot het verstrekken van informatie en perspectie-
ven, in het geval van dit onderzoek de wiki over vlucht MH17.  Echter, door de discussies 
achter de schermen van Wikipedia te analyseren, concludeer ik dat vooral redacteuren die 
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hoog op de ladder staan anderen er van weerhouden de wiki te veranderen, mede door ge-
bruik van technologieën. Uiteindelijk leidt dit ertoe dat slechts een handjevol redacteuren 
belangrijke historische gebeurtenissen beschrijven. Deze redacteuren bevoorrechten met 
name Westerse media en bronnen. Uiteindelijk laat deze case studie de beperkingen van 
een ‘open’ verleden zien.
Deze laatste conclusie is ook toepasbaar op de andere case studies. Wanneer mensen 
deelnemen aan herinneringswerk op platformen zullen er hiërarchieën ontstaan. De 
hieruit ontstane autoriteit zal mede bepalen welke versies van het verleden het heden 
domineren en welke zullen verschijnen in de toekomst. Echter, we moeten hier voorzichtig 
zijn: het onderzoek in dit proefschrift laat de verschillen tussen platformen zien, iets wat 
we ons moeten blijven herinneren. Elk platform genereert verschillende gebruiken en 
gemeenschappen, en produceert verschillende culturele vormen. Omgekeerd vormen 
de platformen deze gebruiken, culturele vormen en gemeenschappen. Zonder input van 
gebruikers kunnen zij niet functioneren. 
In dit proefschrift heb ik getracht te laten zien hoe herinneringswerk vandaag de dag tot 
stand komt en hoe platformen deel uitmaken van wat en hoe samenlevingen herinneren 
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